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ABSTRACT 
The mobile networks are characterized by limited powerful mobile devices, limited 
bandwidth and wireless link. Consequently, any transmitted message can be inter-
cepted by an unknown number of other users. These users can also be malicious 
and brings attacks to the networks. In addition, due to the mobility of mobile users, 
authentication is critical while the user roaming to another area to access mobile 
services. 
This thesis studies security mechanisms for next-generation mobile networks. The 
main research objective of this thesis is to design a set of efficient and cost-effective 
security mechanisms dedicated to next generation mobile networks. Particularly, this 
thesis addresses three major issues: mobile service access, enhancement of UMTS 
AKA and DoS attacks in UMTS. This thesis comprises three parts. 
In the first part, the thesis gives an introduction and literature review in Chapter 1 
and Chapter 2. This part shows the characteristics and constraints in the design of 
security mechanisms in mobile networks. Then, we point out the motivation and the 
research challenges. The research objectives of the whole thesis are presented. Last, 
we analyze current works on these issues. 
In the second part, four novel mechanisms are designed to give solutions to three issues 
while accommodating constraints in mobile networks. Chapter 3 shows a lightweight 
secure and accountable mobile service access through reusable tickets. This work has 
several advantages compared to related work. First, the ticket is reusable. Second, the 
mechanism is lightweight at mobile devices. Last, the charging and billing is practical 
and may avoid payment chain reinitialization. Chapter 4 presents an enhancement of 
UMTS AKA through a technique: vector combination. As a result, we eliminate the 
synchronization of sequence numbers and liberate the HE/HLR from the bottleneck 
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of authentication traffic generation. Chapter 5 presents another enhancement from 
the mobility point of view in UMTS. Chapter 6 addresses the DoS issue in UMTS. 
We design a client puzzle against DoS attacks. The puzzle is based on quasi partial 
collision in a hash function. Its difficulty levels are fine-grained compared to related 
approaches where there is a gap between two neighbor difficulty levels. 
In the last part, this thesis discusses generally the proposed mechanisms. It also 
studies their limitations. In the end of this thesis, a conclusion is given. 
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RESUME 
Les reseaux mobiles sont caracterises par les dispositifs mobiles avec capacite limites, 
la largeur de bande limitee et le lien sans fil. En consequence, n'importe quel message 
transmis peut etre arrete par un nombre inconnu d'autres utilisateurs. Ces utilisateurs 
peuvent egalement etre malveillants et apportent des attaques aux reseaux. En outre, 
en raison de la mobilite des utilisateurs mobiles, authentication est critique tandis 
que l'utilisateur errant a un autre secteur pour acceder a des services mobiles. 
Cette these etudie des mecanismes de securite pour les reseaux mobiles de la prochaine 
generation. L'objectif principal de recherches de cette these est de concevoir un en-
semble de mecanismes securite efficaces consacres aux reseaux de mobile de prochaine 
generation. En particulier, cette these aborde trois questions principales : acces a ser-
vice mobile, amelioration d'UMTS AKA et attaques de DoS dans UMTS. Cette these 
contient trois parties. 
Dans la premiere partie, cette these donne une introduction et une revue de l i -
terature dans Chapitre 1 et Chapitre 2. Cette partie montre les caracteristiques et 
les contraintes dans la conception des mecanismes de securite dans les reseaux mo-
biles. Apres, nous precisons la motivation et les defis de recherches. Les objectifs 
de recherches de la these entiere sont presentes. A la fin, nous analyzons les travaux 
courants sur ces questions. 
Dans la deuxieme partie, trois nouveaux mecanismes sont congus pour donner des 
solutions a trois issues tout en adaptant a des contraintes dans les reseaux mobiles. 
Chapitre 3 montre un acces leger et facturable a service mobile par les tickets reutilis-
ables. Ce travail a plusieurs avantages compares au travail relatif. D'abord, le ticket 
est reutilisable. Deuxiemement, ce mecanisme est leger dans la cote de terminaux 
mobiles. Dernierement, la facturation est pratique et peut eviter la reinitialisation 
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a chaines de paiement. Chapitre 4 presente une amelioration d'UMTS AKA par la 
technique: combinaison de vecteur. En consequence, nous eliminons la synchronisa-
tion des nombres de sequences et liberons le HE/HLR du goulot d'etranglement de 
la generation du trafic d'authentification. Chapitre 5 presente un autre amelioration 
du point de vue de mobilite dans UMTS. Chapitre 6 aborde la question de DoS dans 
UMTS. Nous concevons un puzzle de client contre attaques de DoS dans UMTS. 
Le puzzle est base sur la collision partielle quasi dans une fonction de hachage. Ses 
niveaux de difficulte sont a grain fin compares aux approches relatives ou il y a un 
espace entre deux niveaux voisins de difficulte. 
Dans la derniere partie, cette these discute generalement les mecanismes proposes. 




Cette these etudie des mecanismes de securite dans les reseaux mobiles de prochaine 
generation. Les reseaux mobiles ont leurs caracteristiques particulieres. Une carac-
teristique significative des reseaux mobiles est celui de la communication sans fil. La 
capacite de communiquer avec d'autres unites mobiles ou stations de base fixes est 
accomplie par la transmission de radio. Une consequence de cette communication est 
que les messages transmis peuvent, en principe, etre regus par un nombre inconnu 
d'autres utilisateurs. En plus, la communication sans fil est egalement plus sensible 
aux attaques actives. Un adversaire peut brancher sur le canal de transmission sans 
etre detecte. 
Les reseaux mobiles sont caracterises par les dispositifs mobiles avec capacite limitee, 
la largeur de bande limitee et lien sans fil. En consequence, n'importe quel message 
transmis peut etre arrete par un nombre inconnu d'autres utilisateurs. Ces utilisateurs 
peuvent egalement etre malveillants et apporter des attaques aux reseaux. En outre, 
en raison de la mobilite des utilisateurs mobiles, l'authentification est critique lorsque 
l'utilisateur entre a un autre domain pour acceder a des services mobiles. 
Done, un ensemble de mecanismes doit etre congu pour ces dispositifs mobiles de 
sorte que l'authentification mutuelle et l'intimite numerique puissent etre accomplie 
efricacement. En general, elles devraient etre legeres, exigeant des interventions mini-
males d'utilisateur, simples a implementer, ayant un niveau de securite et scalabilite. 
L'objectif principal de cette these est de concevoir un ensemble de mecanismes de 
securite efficaces consacres aux reseaux mobile de prochaine generation. Plus speci-
fiquement, il vise a atteindre les objectifs specifiques suivants: 
1. Proposer un mecanisme d'authentification pour l'acces de service a valeur 
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ajoutee qui tient compte des contraintes dans les reseaux mobiles; 
2. Proposer des ameliorations de l'authentification et d'accord de clef dans UMTS; 
3. Concevoir un mecanisme de puzzle de client contre des attaques de DoS dans 
UMTS; 
4. Valider et evaluer les mecanismes proposes afin de verifier leur efficacite et leur 
robustesse. 
Cette these aborde trois questions principales: acces de service mobile, ameliorations 
d'UMTS AKA et contre attaques de DoS dans UMTS. 
1 Acces de service mobile par ticket reutilisable 
1.1 Introduction 
Dans les systemes mobiles de la prochaine generation, le service de telecommunica-
tions mobile universel (UMTS) apporte aux utilisateurs mobiles une large gamme de 
nouveaux services a valeur ajoutee (VASs). Pour utiliser un service, les utilisateurs 
doivent s'authentifier au fournisseur de service a valeur ajoutee (VASP), alors que la 
derniere soit aussi authentifiee. 
Etant donne les capacites limitees de calcul des dispositifs mobiles, concevoir des 
mecanismes de securite pour acces de service appropries aux reseaux mobiles est 
un defi non trivial. En raison de la complexity des problemes fondamentaux, la 
cryptographic publique (PKC) ou la cryptographie asymetrique comporte souvent des 
operations plus cheres que des operations dans la cryptographie symetrique. Done, 
dans la conception de protocole, il est toujours preferable de deplacer des requis de 
calcul du dispositif mobile a un serveur puissant. 
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Dans des communications mobiles, un ticket est un ensemble de donnees qui est 
analogue a un ticket que nous utilisons dans divers evenements sociaux. Ainsi, il n'y 
a aucun besoin d'executer des protocoles de distance longue avec une troisieme partie 
en ligne afin de valider le certificat de Futilisateur. 
II y a plusieurs avantages a employer des tickets pour l'acces de service mobile: 
• Flexibilite. Les utilisateurs peuvent facilement etablir et mettre a jour des profils 
personnalises de service en achetant l'ensemble de tickets appropries. lis ne 
doivent pas s'engager dans des rapports contractuels a long terme avec des 
fournisseurs de service. Au lieu de cela, ils peuvent choisir des services comme 
ils en ont besoin. 
• Scalabilite. Pour que le fournisseur de service decide de fournir le service, 
le ticket doit contenir toute l'information necessaire. Ainsi, il n'y a aucun 
besoin d'executer des protocoles avec un agent de confiance pour effectuer 
1 'authentification. 
• Intimite numerique. Le mecanisme base sur un ticket, ainsi qu'un agent de 
confiance qui publie ou acquiert des tickets et manipule des paiements au nom 
des utilisateurs, peuvent efficacement proteger l'intimite numerique des utilisa-
teurs. L'utilisateur peut seulement demontrer qu'il est un support legitime du 
ticket, et il ne doit pas necessairement indiquer son identite vraie. Ainsi, aucune 
information privee n'est disponible aux fournisseurs de service. 
Les utilisateurs ne doivent pas reveler l'information personnelle, quand l'authentification 
de ticket est exigee. En outre, des billets peuvent etre employes dans des VASPs dif-
ferents, qui sont de grande importance dans les reseaux mobiles heterogenes. 
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1.2 Techniques Legeres de non-reniement 
Le non-reniement est exige pour Pacces de service. En raison des capacites limitees 
de calcul des dispositifs mobiles, la technique de non-reniement devrait etre legere du 
cote d'utilisateur mobile. La signature numerique est utilisee souvent pour le non-
reniement. Cependant, les calculs sont souvent couteux. Les fonctions de hachage 
sont plus rapides que des algorithmes de signature numerique. 
Une chaine de fonction de hachage est une chaine a laquelle on a applique qu'une 
fonction de hachage plusieurs fois. Ainsi, une chaine hache peut etre employee pour 
le non-reniement plusieurs fois. Dans ce mecanisme d'acces de service mobile, nous 
adoptons des chaines de fonction hache dans nos protocoles congus pour fournir le 
non-reniement. 
1.3 Acces de service par ticket 
Nous definissons d'abord un modele d'acces de service dans lequel il y a quatre entites: 
un certificat d'autorite, un serveur de ticket, un utilisateur mobile et le fournisseur de 
service. Le certificat d'autorite est responsable de delivrer des certificats a Putilisateur 
mobile et produit des paires principales de publique / prive au serveur de ticket et 
au fournisseur de service. Puis, Putilisateur mobile demande un billet a partir du 
serveur de ticket. Plus tard, il peut employer ce ticket pour service d'acces. Une fois 
que Putilisateur mobile obtient le ticket, il peut Pemployer pour demander le service 
du fournisseur n'importe quand, n'importe ou. 
Ce mecanisme contient deux protocoles: acquisition d'un ticket et fourniture de ser-
vice. Dans le protocole d'acquisition d'un ticket, Putilisateur mobile presente son 
certificat au serveur de ticket. Quand le serveur de ticket valide le certificat avec suc-
ces, il genere un ticket a Putilisateur mobile. Ce ticket consistue une chaine hachee. 
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Ainsi, l'utilisateur mobile peut reutiliser ce ticket jusqu'a ce que la chaine hache soit 
epuisee. De plus, ce ticket contient une autre chaine hachee pour facturation. 
Dans le protocole de la fourniture de service, l'utilisateur mobile presente son ticket 
au fournisseur de service. Quand le fournisseur de service valide ce ticket avec suc-
ces, il enleve un noeud de la chaine et etablit une clef secrete pour communiquer 
avec l'utilisateur mobile. Selon le type de service, le fournisseur peut demander a 
l'utilisateur mobile de mettre a jour la chaine de facturation. Bien sur, la chaine 
hache de facturation joue le meme role : non-reniement pour l'utilisateur et le four-
nisseur. 
1.4 Analyse de securite et comparaison 
Le but d'un mecanisme d'acces est de s'assurer que l'authentification est realisee pour 
tous les entites impliques dans la communication. Nous analysons la securite de notre 
mecanisme par la logique de BAN. Cette logique peut valider un protocole afin de 
justifier si deux principaux etablissent un rapport de confiance. Par l'analyse de la 
logique de BAN, nous croyons que nos protocoles reussissent a etablir le rapport de 
confiance entre l'utilisateur mobile, le serveur de ticket et le fournisseur de service. 
Nous avons egalement compare notre mecanisme a d'autres travaux. Vu les capacites 
limitees de calcul des dispositifs mobiles, le mecanisme est leger du cote de l'utilisateur 
mobile : seulement les operations symetriques et les fonctions de hachage sont neces-
saires. Nous transferons la complexity informatique elevee au serveur de ticket et au 
fournisseur de service qui sont habituellement plus puissants. Deux chaines haches 
sont presentees pour realiser la reutilisation de ticket, mutueile d'authentification et 
non-reniement. En permettant la reutilisation de ticket, un utilisateur mobile ne 
doive pas appliquer un nouveau ticket pour chaque acces de service. C'est tre inter-
ssant pour deux raisons: d'abord, il est approprie pour les utilisateurs mobiles; puis, 
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il diminue la charge du serveur de ticket. 
2 Ameliorations d'UMTS AKA 
2.1 Introduction 
Un mecanisme important dans UMTS est l'authentification et l'accord de clef (AKA). 
UMTS AKA realise l'authentification mutuelle pour l'utilisateur et le reseau par une 
clef secrete partagee a long terme entre le module universel d'identite de l'abonne de 
l'utilisateur (USIM) et le centre d'authentification (AuC). 
L'USIM de l'utilisateur mobile maintient un nombre de sequence avec le reseau de 
maison de l'utilisateur. Quand l'utilisateur mobile entre dans un reseau visite, le 
reseau de maison envoie un ensemble de vecteurs d'authentification au reseau visite. 
Pour authentifier la station mobile, le reseau visite prend un vecteur inutilise et envoie 
la piece de defi a la station mobile. La station mobile verifie la fraicheur du nombre de 
sequence et calcule une reponse. En outre, la station mobile calcule la clef de chiffre 
et la clef d'integrite pour la communication suivante. Le reseau visite compare la 
reponse a la reponse prevue dans le vecteur d'authentification. Si elles sont les memes, 
la station mobile est authentifiee. Alors, l'authentification mutuelle est realisee dans 
UMTS. 
2.2 UMTS AKA faiblesses 
Cependant, UMTS AKA a ete critique pour son introduction du nombre de sequence. 
Un echec de synchronisation de nombre de sequence pourrait amene l'execution com-
pliquee de protocole particulierement quand l'utilisateur erre a un reseau etranger. 
Un autre inconvenient d'UMTS AKA reside dans la distribution des vecteurs 
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d'authentification. Un choix de la taille n de vecteurs d'authentification peut etre 
employe pour l'authentification de n fois seulement. Puisque le reseau de maison 
est responsable de generer et d'envoyer des vecteurs d'authentification pour tous les 
abonnes. 
2.3 Amelioration d'UMTS AKA: VC-AKA 
Nous abandonnons l'adoption des nombres de sequence et proposons un AKA ameliore 
pour eliminer les inconvenients ci-dessus. L'AKA propose est base sur la combinaison 
de vecteur : differents vecteurs combines ensemble peuvent egalement etre employes 
pour Pauthentification. Par la combinaison de vecteur, un choix de la taille n de 
vecteurs d'authentification peut realiser jusqu'a l'authentification mutuelle de 2n~1 
fois au lieu seulement de n fois dans UMTS AKA. Alors, le trafic du reseau de maison 
pour generer des vecteurs d'authentification est exponentiellement diminue. 
Ce mecanisme consiste en deux procedures. Dans la premiere procedure, le reseau 
de la maison genere une sequence de vecteurs et l'envoie au reseau visite. En outre, 
l'utilisateur mobile genere une autre sequence de vecteurs par lui-meme. Les deux 
vecteurs ne sont pas identiques. C'est critique pour empecher des attaques par rejoue 
de message. 
Dans la deuxieme procedure, le reseau visite envoie une combinaison des vecteurs 
comme un defi a l'utilisateur mobile. L'utilisateur mobile verifie d'abord si cette 
combinaison a ete utilisee. Si c'est le cas, il rejette l'authentification. Autrement, 
il obtient le defi et calcule la reponse. II met a jour ses combinaisons utilisees et 
renvoie la reponse au reseau visite. Le reseau visite verifie le defi. S'il reussit, 
l'authentification mutuelle entre le reseau visite et l'utilisateur mobile est realisee. 
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2.4 Amelioration d'UMTS AKA: MO-AKA 
Dans notre vrai vie, bien que personne n'ait le potentiel de comportement aleatoire, 
il existe des routines dans la vie de chaque personne. Ainsi, dans un reseau mobile, 
beaucoup d'utilisateur suivent regulierement une routine chaque jour. 
Nous considerons l'authentification d'utilisateur dans UMTS du point de vue des 
modeles de mobilite d'utilisateur. L'UMTS AKA ne considere pas le modele de 
mobilite d'utilisateur. II traite la mobilite pour tous les utilisateurs mobiles d'une 
maniere generale : la meme authentication par un mecanisme de defi - reponse. 
Le mecanisme de defi - reponse implique toujours trois entites : l'utilisateur mobile, 
le reseau de la maison (HE/HLR) et le reseau visite (VLR). En consequence, ils 
ne sont pas efficaces si les utilisateurs mobiles restent dans leurs reseaux etrangers 
frequemment visites pour la plupart de leurs activites. 
Pour ameliorer le mecanisme d'AKA a mobilite orientee, nous proposons le MO-
AKA dans lequel chaque utilisateur mobile maintient une cachette du VLRs le plus 
frequemment visite et du dernier VLR visite. Chaque VLR dans la cachette peut 
etre un proxy de l'HE/HLR pour le but d'authentification. Sur la prochaine au-
thentication, l'utilisateur mobiles cherche d'abord la cachette pour voir s'il y a un 
rapport secret approprie disponible. S'il peut en trouver un, l'utilisateur mobile et 
les VLR visites n'ont pas besoin de demarrer le protocole long avec le HE/HLR pour 
l'authentification. 
Par l'analyse des valeurs et la comparaison d'execution, sur une trace d'une semaine, 
dans la pratique, nous prouvons que notre approche est plus efficace et sure. 
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3 Contre attaques de DoS 
3.1 Introduction 
La convergence de la communication mobile et de l'Internet apporte des services 
de l'Internet aux utilisateurs mobiles. L'architecture et les protocoles de systeme 
d'UMTS sont congus pour s'adapter a ces services, alors qu'elles aussi exposent le 
reseau d'UMTS a des attaques diverses. L'attaque du deni-de-service (DoS) est l'une 
de ces attaques. Le reseau mobile de terre publique d'UMTS (PLMN) peut etre 
facilement encombre et done paralyse par le faux trafic de l'Internet. 
En outre, les dispositifs mobiles de plus en plus puissants peuvent se coordonner pour 
lancer des attaques de DoS, tirant profit des ressources limitees dans le reseau, tel 
que la largeur de bande de lien par radio. 
La fonction d'une attaque de DoS est fondamentalement d'inonder ses serveurs de 
cible avec de nombreux connections des demandes et de les empecher d'etre accessi-
bles a toutes les autres demandes d'utilisateurs legitimes ou de fournir des services. 
En consequence, les serveurs de cible deviennent trop surcharges pour repondre aux 
demandes de leur attaquants. De plus, ils n'ont plus de ressources de systeme suff-
isantes pour repondre aux demandes legitimes sur le reseau. 
3.2 Puzzle de client 
Le puzzle de client est une methode pour defendre des attaques de DoS. Pour chaque 
demande de service, le client est force de resoudre un puzzle cryptographique avant 
que le serveur n'affecte ses ressources. Les efforts de calcul pour chaque demande sont 
tres faciles. Cependant, ceci impose une grandd charge sur des adversaires produisant 
du trafic en grande quantite. L'idee principale derriere des puzzles de client est que 
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n'importe quel client demandant le service doit allouer certaines de ses ressources 
propres (duree de la transformation ou memoire) avant que le serveur n'affecte ses 
ressources pour la communication suivante. Le client doit consommer des ressources 
pour resoudre le puzzle, alors que les puzzles sont souvent verifies facilement par les 
serveurs. 
Aura a montre un puzzle de client base sur la collision partielle dans une fonction 
de hachage. Une bonne fonction de hachage (comme SHAl, MD5) exige qu'aucune 
des deux entrees distinctes dont les resultats de hachage soient memes. Une colli-
sion partielle resulte du fait que deux valeurs hachees ont les valeurs partiellement 
identiques. 
Ces puzzles de client, cependant, sont souvent conc,us pour l'environnement de reseau 
fixe. La plupart d'entre eux ne sont pas assez petits pour s'adapter aux reseaux 
d'acces sans fil. En outre, les difficultes de ces puzzles ne doivent pas facilement etre 
ajustees finement, ce qui a comme consequence un espace entre deux niveaux voisins 
de difficulty. 
3.3 Puzzle base sur la fonction de hachage avec collision quasi partielle 
Nous avons congu un puzzle de client base sur la fonction de hachage avec collision 
quasi partielle. Une collision dans une fonction de hachage est definie comme suit. 
Nous divisons la partie de collision dans le puzzle partiel regulier de collision en deux 
parties. La premiere partie est tous bits 0; la deuxieme partie peut etre d'autres 
valeurs predefinies y compris tous bits 0. Ainsi, la deuxieme partie ont plus de choix 
au lieu seulement un choix (tous bits 0) dans le puzzle regulier. 
De cette facon, nous pouvons ajouter plus de difficultes entre deux niveaux de diffi-
culte dans des puzzles avec collision partielle. 
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Nous avons simule nos puzzles et avons compare a d'autres puzzles. Les resultats ont 
prouve que nous avons ajoute plus de niveaux de difficultes dans l'espace vide entre 
deux niveaux voisins dans des puzzles reguliers avec collision partielles. 
4 Relation des mecanismes 
Dans la communication mobile, l'utilisateur mobile communique avec le serveur par 
l'intermediaire du lien sans fil. Le lien sans fil apporte un nouveau defi pour concevoir 
des mecanismes de securite. Quelle couche devrions-nous proteger? La couche lien, 
la couche reseau ou la couche plus elevee (transport ou couche application)? Ici, nous 
discutons nos mecanismes dans le cadre de reseau. 
La securite de la couche lien protege un reseau sans fil en niant l'acces au reseau lui-
meme avant qu'un utilisateur ne soit pas authentifie avec succes. Ceci empeche des 
attaques contre l'infrastructure de reseau et protege le reseau contre les attaques qui 
connectent le reseau par la couche d'IP. Cependant, les protocoles de securite de la 
couche lien ne fournissent pas la securite bout a bout. D'autre part, la couche reseau 
ou la couche transport peut fournir une solution plus appropriee de securite dans la 
partie fixe des reseaux. Ainsi, on accepte generalement que la securite de la couche 
lien puisse etre completee par l'utilisation des mecanismes de securite a des couches 
plus elevees de protocole. Des protocoles de securite de couche de lien peuvent etre 
employes pour fournir la securite de domaine d'acces de reseau. Les protocoles de la 
couche elevee peuvent fournir la securite bout a bout. 
Dans cette these, les mecanismes congus sont particulierement applicables aux reseaux 
mobiles de prochaine generation ou un certain nombre de systemes mobiles coexis-
tent a grande echelle. Pour les mettre dans le modele de reseau, les perfection-
nements d'UMTS AKA authentifient les utilisateurs mobiles a la couche lien tandis 
que l'acces de service par ticket est responsable de fournir le service dans la couche 
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reseau, couche transport ou meme dans la couche application. En consequence, 
la disposition de service s'effectura comme suit. L'utilisateur mobile doit d'abord 
s'authentifier aux reseaux mobiles par les mecanismes d'authentification de la couche 
lien d'UMTS ; puis, il peut envoyer une demande de disposition de service a son 
fournisseur de service local par le mecanisme d'acces de service par ticket. Ceci com-
porterait Pauthentification a grande echelle. Le mecanisme peut fournir la flexibility 
et la scalabilite dans ce scenario. 
Sans aucun doute, les fournisseurs de service et les reseaux d'UMTS pourraient etre 
les cibles potentielles des attaques de DOS pendant la disposition de service. Les 
puzzles de client congus peuvent etre lances pour le defendre contre ces attaques 
si le systeme le trouve necessaire. En bref, nos mecanismes congus fournissent les 
solutions appropriees d'authentification pour le reseau mobile de deuxieme generation 
non seulement de la couche lien mais egalement de la couche reseau ou meme de la 
couche elevee. Nous donnons egalement une solution a grain fin pour des attaques de 
DOS de potentiel. 
5 Conformite de la contribution aux objectifs de recherches 
Dans cette these, le premier objectif specifique de recherche etait de proposer un me-
canisme d'authentification pour l'acces de service a valeur ajoutee qui tienne compte 
des contraintes dans les reseaux mobiles. L'acces de service mobile par ticket reutilis-
able est leger pour le dispositif mobile et mutuellement authentifiable entre le disposi-
tif mobile et le fournisseur de service. II exige les dispositifs mobiles seulement des 
operations legeres: fonction de hachage et operations cryptographiques symetriques. 
Des operations de calcul cheres telles que des operations cryptographiques publiques 
sont seulement utilisees dans le serveur de ticket et les fournisseurs de service puis-
sants. 
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Vu les contraintes dans les reseaux mobiles, ce mecanisme peut empecher des attaques 
par rejoue et garantissent la confidentialite, l'integrite et l'intimite de l'utilisateur. 
Car le ticket propose est reutilisable et le paiement est base sur une chaine hache 
par accroissement de valeur d'escalier, il est plus efficace que d'autres mecanismes 
d'acces de services mobiles. Ce mecanisme satisfait les contraintes et est approprie 
aux reseaux mobiles. Ainsi, le mecanisme congu a realise Pobjectif specifique propose 
de recherche. 
Le deuxieme objectif specifique de recherche etait de proposer des ameliorations de 
1'authentication et de l'accord de clef dans UMTS. Nous avons propose deux amelio-
rations dans cette these. L'UMTS AKA original a ete congu specifiquement pour les 
reseaux mobiles avec la consideration des contraintes. Nos ameliorations sont bases 
sur ce mecanisme sans introduire des operations cheres supplementaires. II n'y a 
aucun calcul cher ajoute dans les deux mecanismes, ainsi ils satisfont egalement les 
contraintes et sont appropries a UMTS. Les deux ameliorations augmentent Pefficacite 
de reseau en liberant le HE/HLR du trafic d'authentification. Pour atteindre ce but, 
une amelioration est base sur la combinaison de vecteur tandis que l'autre est base sur 
le modele de mobilite d'utilisateur. En outre, tous les deux permettent une augemen-
tation de la la securite comparee a l'UMTS AKA original. Ainsi, nous avons realise 
l'objectif specifique propose de recherche. 
Le troisieme objectif specifique de recherche etait de concevoir un mecanisme de puz-
zle de client contre des attaques de DoS dans UMTS. Le mecanisme que nous avons 
propose est base sur des collisions quasi partielles dans une fonction de hachage. II 
est compact et approprie aux dispositifs mobiles. Vu les caracteristiques des reseaux 
d'UMTS PLMN, le puzzle congu de client est a grain fin dans la commande de diffi-
culte et efficace pour defendre des attaques de DOS. Ainsi, ce mecanisme a egalement 
realise l'objectif propose de recherche. 
Le dernier objectif specifique de recherche etait de valider et evaluer les mecanismes 
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proposes afin de verifier leur efficacite et leur robustesse. Dans ce chapitre, nous avons 
deja donne une analyse de tous nos mecanismes congus, des aspects des techniques, 
des attaques, de la securite et de l'execution. Par l'analyse, nous pouvons voir que 
nos mecanismes congus sont efficaces, surs et robustes. 
L'objectif principal de recherche etait de concevoir un ensemble de mecanismes de 
securite efficaces consacres aux reseaux mobiles de prochaine generation. Comme 
nous l'avons montre, tous les mecanismes congus utilisent seulement des techniques 
legeres sur les dispositifs mobiles. La discussion de performance a egalement montre 
qu'ils etaient efficaces et pourraient fournir la securite forte. Tous ces mecanismes sont 
consacres aux reseaux mobiles de prochaine generation. Puisque nous avons realist 
tous les objectifs specifiques de recherche, nous avons realise naturellement l'objectif 
principal de recherche de cette these : concevoir un ensemble de mecanismes de 
securite efficaces consacres aux reseaux mobiles de prochaine generation. 
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A significant feature of mobile networks is that of wireless communication. The ability 
to communicate with other mobile units or wired base stations is accomplished via 
radio broadcasts transmission. One consequence of this communication is that the 
transmitted messages can, in principle, be received by an unknown number of other 
users. Even worse, the wireless communication medium is also more difficult to be 
protected against active attacks and eavesdropping. An eavesdropper can tap into a 
communication channel over-the-air without being detected. Besides, an adversary 
can also jam a channel easily. Hence, security is a major concern. 
In mobile networks, mobile devices are generally characterized by the limited memory 
capacity and limited computational power. In addition, the wireless environment 
is limited in bandwidth and is subject to erratic changes such as weather, terrain 
and external interferences. These constraints have prevented a simple migration 
of cryptographic protocols that have been widely adopted in wire-line networks to 
wireless networks for authentication and security. 
Furthermore, due to the mobility of wireless devices, authentication of both wireless 
devices and base stations becomes paramount important. In wireless environments 
where a (roaming) mobile user purchases value-added services (VAS) from a value-
added service provider (VASP), authentication protocols should mutually authen-
ticate a mobile user and VASP and initialize an appropriate payment mechanism. 
Encryption provides the means to regain control of both privacy and authentication. 
Therefore, a set of mechanisms need to be designed for these low-power wireless de-
vices so that mutual authentication and data privacy can be accomplished efficiently 
2 
and effectively in terms of computational complexity, memory demand and band-
width requirement. In general, they should be light-weighted, requiring minimal user 
interventions, simple to implement and fast but also maintaining an expected level of 
security and a certain amount of scalability. 
1.1 Basic Concepts and Definitions 
Security is considered an important issue for mobile communication networks. In 
particular, the design of authentication and privacy mechanisms has received consid-
erable research interest. In this section, we give basic concepts and definitions on this 
issue. 
Definition 1 Access network: In mobile communications, the access network is the 
portion of a wireless network that connects access nodes to individual subscribers. 
More simply, it is the last link in a network between the customer premises and the 
first point of connection to the network infrastructure. 
Definition 2 Authentication: The act of verifying a claimed identity, in the form of 
a pre-existing label from a mutually known name space, as the originator of a message 
(message authentication) or as the end-point of a channel (entity authentication). 
Definition 3 Mutual authentication: The act of authentication for both originator 
and destinator of a message. 
Definition 4 Confidentiality is the assurance that the person receiving is the intended 
recipient. 
Definition 5 Non-repudiation is the assurance that the person sending cannot deny 
participation. 
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Non-repudiation is similar to authentication in that it is an asymmetric security 
service. A simple way to describe the difference between authentication and non-
repudiation is that with authentication the recipient himself is confident about the 
origin of a message but would not necessarily be able to convince anybody else about 
it, whereas for non-repudiation the recipient is also able to convince third parties. 
Digital signature is the mechanism used for non-repudiation. From the view of cryp-
tography, a message's authentication code and non-repudiation code can be identical, 
and the difference between the two services might only depend on the key distribution. 
Definition 6 A message authentication code (MAC) is an authentication tag (also 
called a checksum) derived by applying an authentication scheme, together with a 
secret key, to a message. Unlike digital signatures, MACs are computed and verified 
with the same key, so that they can only be verified by the intended recipient. 
Definition 7 Public key cryptography is an encryption method that uses a two-part 
key: a public key and a private key. To send an encrypted message to someone, you 
use the recipient's public key, which can be sent to you via regular e-mail or made 
available on any public Web site or venue. To decrypt the message, the recipient uses 
the private key, which he or she keeps secret. Contrast with "secret key cryptography, " 
which uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt. 
Definition 8 Privacy is a combination of maintaining the confidentiality of informa-
tion and restriction of the use of the information, as authorized by the information 
owner. 
Definition 9 Denial of Service (DoS) A security intrusion which causes a system to 
be damaged, and where the damage is sufficient to disable at least one of the services 
offered by that system, is called a Denial of Service. 
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1.2 Motivation and Research Challenges 
The unprecedented growth of world-wide mobile wireless markets, coupled with ad-
vances in communications technology and the accelerated development of services 
taking place in fixed networks, instigates the emergence of third Generation Mobile 
Communications System (3G). The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS) represents an evolution in terms of capacity, data speeds and new service 
capabilities from second generation mobile networks. 
UMTS is bringing mobile users with a broad range of new value-added services 
(VASs). To access a service, users must authenticate themselves to the value-added 
service provider (VASP). For mobile access across multiple service domains, the tradi-
tional access mechanisms require the exchange of authentication information between 
home domain and foreign domain using roaming agreements. This will be much 
complicated in large scale networks and limits the future mobile applications. 
UMTS also provides more secure wireless access security mechanisms. The access 
security features in UMTS are a superset of those provided in GSM. UMTS provides 
mutual authentication between the UMTS subscriber, represented by a smart card 
application known as the USIM, and the network. UMTS security builds on the 
success of GSM by retaining the security features that have proved to be needed and 
that are robust. However, UMTS AKA has been criticized due to its introduction 
of sequence numbers and its vulnerabilities of redirection attacks and active attacks 
in corrupted networks. Another drawback of UMTS AKA exists in the distribution 
of authentication vectors. A size n array of authentication vectors can be used for 
n times authentication. Since only the HE is responsible for generating and sending 
authentication vectors for all subscribers, it actually becomes the traffic bottleneck. 
In UMTS networks, the danger of DoS attacks is threatening different targets [1]: 
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the communication infrastructure, specific services and the mobile devices. Given 
the high risk of DoS attacks for UMTS networks, it is vital to provide a systematic 
countermeasure to thwart these attacks. In addition, the system needs a mechanism 
to control the access of legitimate users according to current resource consummation. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main research objective of this thesis is to design a set of lightweight and efficient 
security mechanisms dedicated to next generation mobile networks. More specifically, 
it aims at reaching the following objectives: 
1. Propose an authentication mechanism for mobile value-added service access 
which takes into account the constraints in mobile networks and shifts high 
computational efforts from limited power mobile devices to powerful servers; 
2. Propose enhancements of UMTS authentication and key agreement mechanism; 
3. Design a client puzzle mechanism against DoS attacks in UMTS; 
4. Validate and evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanisms in order to 
check their efficiency and robustness. 
1.4 Thesis Outline and Contributions 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces fundamental concepts and 
techniques to design mobile service access mechanisms, to improve UMTS AKA, 
and to defend against DoS attacks. Then, major contributions and originalities are 
presented in Chapter 3 to Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3 propose a novel mechanism to access mobile VASs through reusable tickets. 
Considering the limited computation capability of mobile devices, the mechanism is 
lightweight on the mobile user side. We transfer high computational complexity to 
the ticket server and the VASP which are usually more powerful. Two hash chains 
are introduced to achieve mutual authentication, non-repudiation and ticket reuse. 
Chapter 4 proposes a novel enhancement of UMTS AKA based on authentication vec-
tor combination to eliminate the weaknesses and enhance the security. We abandon 
completely the adoption sequence numbers. The main advantage of VC-AKA is that 
it liberates the HE/HLR from the bottleneck of authentication vectors generation. 
The security analysis shows that VC-AKA can defend against redirection attacks and 
active attacks in corrupted networks. 
Chapter 5 proposes another enhancement of UMTS AKA based on one observation: 
a single mobile user usually has a fairly regular routine and could have a home VLR 
in which occur his most activities. Such mobile users have a high proportion of all 
mobile users. As a result, the home VLR can establish a trust relationship with the 
user's home network and authenticate the mobile user directly. Thus, we also liberate 
the HE/HLR from the traffic bottleneck. 
Chapter 6 proposes a fine-grained client puzzle based on quasi partial collisions to 
DoS attacks in UMTS. By introducing quasi partial collisions, we add more difficulty 
levels between the gap in partial collisions. 
After presenting these contributions, a general discussion is given in Chapter 7. At 





In previous chapter, we proposed our research objectives in wireless mobile networks. 
The development of new and lightweight security mechanisms is a challenging re-
search issue. As adversaries or attackers become familiar with the technology and 
develop sophisticated ways to compromise security, the risks of wireless technology 
with resource limited devices are well identified. Many researchers contribute their 
efforts to propose appropriate mechanisms to decrease the risks. 
Generally speaking, Security is a proactive method as we reinforce the network with 
security even if there is no attack. Consequently, this fact deteriorates the overall 
system performance. Thus, it is not recommended to use strong cryptographic al-
gorithms such as public key cryptography for authentication on mobile devices with 
limited capabilities. Given these constraints, it is recommended to develop lightweight 
authentication protocols that are able to detect an attack, and take countermeasures 
based on a security policy. 
In this chapter, we are going to review current contributions related to our proposed 
research objectives. First, we will analyze the mechanisms for mobile value-added 
service access. Mobile service access involves several subjects: authentication, pay-
ment and billing. All these processes require security. Second, we are going analyze 
UMTS security mechanisms. Currently, UMTS security has been widely scrutinized 
by researchers. Some weaknesses and improvements have been carefully discussed. 
Finally, we will analyze the DoS attack, one issue that we cannot ignore when apply 
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security in our networks. We will focus on the client puzzles mechanisms to defend 
against DoS attacks. 
2.2 Mobile Value-Added Service Access 
2.2.1 Background 
With the increasing use of mobile communication systems in a variety of mobile value-
added services (VAS), the provision of security guarantees to service providers and 
users is becoming an important issue. This is much more important in next-generation 
mobile networks where coexist numerous service providers and telecommunication 
operators. Also, the traditional trust model between users and operators is no longer 
appropriate because certain service providers could be malicious and deliberately leak 
a legitimate user's authentication information to others in order to help them pass 
authentication. Even worse, a service provider can concoct a billing and cheat a user's 
home network in order to gain profit. 
Using tickets to access various services is a widely accepted manner in every day 
life. We use tickets, for instance, to travel on a train or bus, to enter a cinema or 
museum, etc. Intuitively, a ticket is a piece of information that represents the rights 
of a certain user to access a certain service provided by a certain service provider. A 
flight ticket, for instance, can be used by its legitimate holder (user) to fly from one 
place to another (service) with the air-plane of an air company (service provider). A 
ticket may also have associated with it a number of conditions (e.g., validity period). 
There is nothing to prevent us to use ticket concept in the context of communication 
systems. The physical realization of a ticket, however, is different, it is realized in a 
pure electronic form. In mobile communications, ticket is a piece of data that shows 
that the user is entitled to certain services such as value-added services. The ticket can 
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contain all the necessary information for the service provider to decide if it should 
provide the service or not. Thus, there is no need to run long distance protocols 
with the on-line agent of the accessing user in order to check the validity of the 
certificate. When authentication is required with tickets, users do not have to disclose 
personal information. In addition, tickets can be used in different value-added service 
providers, which is of great importance in heterogeneous mobile networks. This makes 
ticket based service access an appealing approach in mobile communications where 
users roam and contact service providers in foreign domains. 
Compared to the ticket in our every day life, the mobile ticket has the following 
differences. First, it is flexible to provide any combinations of services needed in a 
single mobile ticket. While in the ticket of every day life, it is usually fixed and not 
easy do so. Second, the ticket of every day life usually comprises money. As a result, 
if the ticket is lost, the user loses his money. While in mobile ticket, a ticket is just a 
way to authenticate the user and may not be required to contain the money. Third, a 
mobile ticket usually has stronger security than our every day life ticket. It is difficult 
to make a fake mobile ticket. Last, the acquisition of a mobile ticket is through the 
mobile network and the user does not have to go somewhere to buy it. It is much 
more convenient that our every day life ticket. 
There are several advantages of using tickets for mobile service access: 
• Flexibility. Users can easily build and update personalized service profiles by 
buying the appropriate set of tickets. They do not have to engage into long 
term contractual relationships with service providers. Instead, they can choose 
services as they need them as best matches their personal requirements. 
• Scalability. For the service provider to decide if it should provide the service or 
not, the ticket can contain all the necessary information. Thus, there is no need 
to run long-distance protocols with some trusted agent of the accessing user in 
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order to perform authentication. 
• Privacy. A ticket based mechanism, together with a trusted agent that issues or 
acquires tickets and handles payments on behalf of users, can efficiently protect 
the privacy of users. The user only has to demonstrate that he is a legitimate 
holder of the ticket, and he does not necessarily have to reveal his true identity. 
Thus, no private information is available to service providers. 
2.2.2 Related Works 
Usually, the ticket based authentication scheme consists of the user, the value-added 
service provider, and the ticket server. The ticketing mechanism is split into two 
phases: ticket acquisition and ticket use. The user obtains tickets by running the 
ticket acquisition protocol with the ticket server. The ticket acquisition phase covers 
activities such as service discovery and selection, as well as possible authentication of 
both entities and the transfer of payment. The ticket use phase considers the steps 
required when the user wishes to use the particular service. These tickets can be 
used to access services anonymously. In the ticket use protocol, the user presents an 
appropriate ticket to the service provider, which can verify the validity of the ticket 
and the legitimacy of the user to use it. 
Based on this scheme, a secure billing for mobile information services conducted by 
Advanced Security for Personal Communications Technologies (ASPeCT) in UMTS 
is described in [2]. This work relies on a third trusted party (TTP) to support mobile 
telecommunications security services which use public key cryptography. To support 
the secure billing services, mobile users and VASPs will each register with TTPs 
acting as Certification Authorities (CAs), which will certify and manage public keys 
for them. A non-standard, compact public key certificate format has been chosen 
in ASPeCT because both storage space on a smart card and bandwidth on the air 
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interface are strictly limited. 
When requiring services from the VASP, the user pays for the service by sending 
micropayment tokens ("ticks") as shown in [3]. The "tick" is based on a hash chain 
fT{a). In order to get payment for the i-th tick, the following takes place: 
1. The payer sends ajj = fT~l(a) to the recipient. 
2. The recipient verifies that f(ai) = ai-\ («i-i was received in the previous 
round). 
The VASP is able to check the validity of these ticks with a user's credential certificate 
issued by the UMTS service provider, or an appropriate TTP acting on behalf of the 
UMTS service provider. This certificate contains the public key for the user. The 
UMTS service provider will collect the billing information from VASPs and in turn 
forward to the user. A two phase charging protocol is illustrated. In the first phase, 
the user and the VASP authenticate each other and agree on a Diffie-Hellman session 
key. The second phase is responsible for data transfer through user's ticks. 
In [4], a ticket-based authentication and payment protocol for mobile communications 
was presented. Instead of contacting an on-line TTP, the service provider has to verify 
only the user's ticket and its legitimacy of the user to use it. This protocol includes 
ticket acquisition and ticket access. The ticket structure contains a serial number 
sn, a freshly generated public Diffie-Hellamn agreement key gu, a freshly generated 
public signature public key P\j. 
Ticket = {idx, sn, gu, data, TST, SigT(h(idT, sn, gw, data, TST))} 
Before staring the ticket-acquisition protocol, the user U computes a random number 
u and the public key agreement key gu. He also generates the private signing key and 
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the corresponding public signature verification key PJJ. 
T -+U : r\\h(L\\r\\idT\\Ticket)\\Ticket 
U-+T: {Sigu(h(g
w\\gt\\r\\idT\\Ticket)))}L 
In the protocol, U generates a random number w and computes a temporary public 
key agreement key gw. U also generates an encryption session key L = gtw using the 
T"s public key agreement key gl. Then, U sends T the value gw, gu and P\j together 
with his own identity idu encrypted under the session key L. When receiving the 
message, T generates a random number r, computes gtw and then a session key 
L. Then, it sends back the message to U. U checks the message's correctness by 
computing the hash value h(L\\r\\idv). 
Once the U has the ticket in hand, he can show it to V, a service provider. Here, V 




Here, V generates a r and computes K — h(guv\\r). He demonstrates knowledge of the 
session key K. Once U receives the message, he checks the hash value's correctness. 
Then, he signs the hash value of the concatenation data. Thus, V first verifies the 
signature and acquires charging data chdata. 
In [5,6], another ticket based mobile service access mechanism was proposed. Instead 
of using Diffie-Hellamn, it uses RSA public key cryptography. The service archi-
tecture involves a Trusted Credential Center (TCC), a Trusted Authentication and 
u —> v 
U ^V 
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Registration Center (TARC) (via UDDI) and a secure ticket based mechanism for 





FIGURE 2.1 MOBILE SERVICE MODEL 
Users and service providers register with the TARC and are authenticated. Services 
are described in the TCC and service provider by WSDL. Based on authentication, 
tickets are issued by the TCC to the users. Tickets carry authorization information 
needed for the requested services. The billing information is stored in the TCC for 
the users to view and access after service provision. 
The mechanism consists single signature and multi-signature schemes. A single sig-
nature can be used in tickets with only one bound entity (users or service providers). 
There are four roles in the single signature scheme, signer, verifier, credential_role 
and trusted_role. The credential_role in the TCC will issue tickets as well as pro-
vides information for the verifier to check the signature. Whether the signature is 
valid or not depends on the information. The trusted_role is a judge to solve the 
conflict between users and service providers. 
The outline of the scheme is shown in Figure 2.2. In the system initialization, with 
SOAP methods, the trusted_role sends the private messages (r, S) to the signer when 
the signer / is set up, where r, S are computed by the trusted_role, will be used in 
the first verification by the credential_role and will be used as the first signature key 
by the signer. In the second step, the credential_role verifies if the data (/, r, D) sent 
by the signer are valid or not, where D is used in the ticket verification. The data 
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(/, D) will be put on a public directory in the TCC if the data are valid. At this 
time, the signer can complete a message signing job. 
j Credential_role 
[(public center) 
stepvntt, T, m) 
FIGURE 2.2 SINGLE SIGNATURE SCHEME 
While the signer signs a message m, the signer will send the signed message (£, T, m) 
as a ticket to the verifier, and the latter checks if it is true or not, where t and T are 
computed by the signer and may include some service information and conditions, 
etc. The verifier cannot verify the message when the data (I, D) in the TCC are not 
correct. Then the credential_role can control the usage of the ticket, and even find 
who the signer is if it contacts the trusted_role. In the final step, the verifier sends 
a message which includes the ticket to the TCC while the ticket is true. The latter 
will update the data (/, D) that is used to issue a charging bill. The data (/, D) is 
changed while the ticket is used and the ticket is invalid if the verifier cannot get the 
correct data (I,D). Thus, the ticket cannot be used twice and the user can see a 
clear statement. 
During the system initialization phase, the trusted_role computes a public composite 
modulus n = pq where factors are big primes. The Trusted_role chooses also prime 
exponents and such that e * d = 1( mod (p — l)(q — 1)). The pair n, e made public, 
and d is kept secret by the TARC as the system key. The trusted_role computes 
15 
when the signer with identity / signs up: r = kemodn,S = k* I( mod n). Then, 
D = Se — r * Ie( mod n). The trusted_role secretly sends (r, S) to the signer whose 
public identity is / . S will be used as the first signature key to issue a ticket. The 
signer with the public key / sends (I, r, D) to the credential_role, and the latter 
verifies the following equation: D — r * Ie( mod n). The credential_role publishes 
in a public directory the pair (/, D) for the signer with the public key / . The whole 
initialization process is outlined in Figure 2.3. 
Public data 
FIGURE 2.3 INITIALIZATION PHASE OF SINGLE SIGNATURE SCHEME 
The verifier can access the public values n, e and the public pair (I, D) registered in 
the TCC. The data D in the TCC must be correct; otherwise the signed message (the 
ticket) cannot be verified by the verifier. 
This paper also discussed the multi-signature scheme where the number of signers is 
not limited to two. The scheme is much more complicated than the single signature 
scheme. For both schemes, RSA public key cryptography is used to generate keys, 
signatures and verify signatures. Due to the focus of this thesis, we do not introduce 
details here. 
In [7], an accountable anonymous access to services in mobile communication systems 
is proposed. The protocol demonstrates one-time use, post-paid tickets for one type 
of ticket. It consists a ticket acquisition protocol and ticket usage protocol. It is 
also based on Dime-Hellman for agreement key exchange and public/private key 
generation. 
16 
In ticket acquisition protocol, the user U requests a ticket from the agency A: 
U^A: (Uid,r0) 
where Uid is the identity of the user and r0 is a freshly generated random number. 
The agency A constructs the ticket: 
T = (sn, cn, dh+, K+, Aid, SigK~ (sn, cn, dh+, K+, Aid)) 
where sn is the serial number, dh+ is the freshly generated public Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange parameter, K+ is the freshly generated public signature verification key 
K+, and cn is the initial parameter for the "tick" protocol (cn = g
n(co), g is a one-way 
hash function). Aid is the agency's identity. The agency sends the ticket to the user 
together with the private parameters CQ,dh~,andK~: 
A-+U : {T,c0, dhZ, K-, r0}Kua 
The message is encrypted with the key Kua using a symmetric encryption algorithm. 
Kua is shared by the user U and the agency A. 
In the ticket usage phase, the use computes a session key k using his private Diffie-
Hellman key exchange parameter dh^ and the service provider's public parameter 
dhf: k = fu(dh~, dh+). This key is used to authenticate the service provider and to 
encrypt and decrypt messages to and from the service provider. 
The user sends a service request to the service provider: 
U->S: (T,n) 
where T is the ticket and n is the freshly generated random number r\. 
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The service provider computes the session key k, using its own private Diffie-
Hellman key exchange parameter dh~ and the public parameter dh+ of the user: 
k = fa(dh~, dh+). k is the same key as the one computed by the user, thus, it can be 
used to encrypt messages to the user. 
The service provider authenticate itself and communicate the tariff t for the service 
by sending the following message to the user: 
S-+U: (t,h(k,t,n),r2) 
where r2 is a freshly generated random number. The user can check the correctness 
of the hash value. Then, he confirms the service request by signing the serial number 
sn of the ticket T together with the tariff t and the random number r2. 
U —>• S : SigK- (sn, t, r2) 
Then, the service provider verifies the signature and keeps it for later usage. The 
charging and payment is also based on the scheme in [3]. We assume that the last 
"tick" sent by the user is Q. the last "tick" is always stored by the service provider. 
1. The service provider sends a request for d ticks. 
2. The user computes ci-d = gl~d(co), and sends it to the service provider. 
3. The service provider checks the "tick" by computing gd(ci-d)- If the result is Q, 
then it provides the next part of the service according to the tariff. 
In short, the ticket based authentication mechanism proposed in [4-7] needs to run 
ticket acquisition protocol to get tickets. However, the ticket and the running of 
protocol require Diffie-Hellamn or RSA public key cryptography for key agreement 
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and digital signature. The computation complexity is very high. It is not practical 
for lower power computational mobile devices. In addition, in these works, a ticket 
cannot be reused. This results in the need for a quantity of tickets which is equal to 
the number of service requests. 
2.3 UMTS Access Security 
The access security features in UMTS are a superset of those provided in GSM. 
UMTS provides mutual authentication between the UMTS subscriber, represented 
by a smart card application known as the USIM, and the network. 
UMTS specification has the following user identity confidentiality security features: 
• User identity confidentiality: the property that the permanent user identity 
(IMSI) of a user to whom a services is delivered cannot be eavesdropped on the 
radio access link; 
• User location confidentiality: the property that the presence or the arrival of 
a user in a certain area cannot be determined by eavesdropping on the radio 
access link; 
• User untraceability: the property that an intruder cannot deduce whether dif-
ferent services are delivered to the same user by eavesdropping on the radio 
access link. 
The design of the authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for UMTS 
reflects the results of an analysis of the threats and risks in GSM [8]. It was guided by 
the principle that the compatibility with GSM should be maximized. In particular, 
the changes to the GSM core network should be minimized. 
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The AKA procedure is the essence of authenticating a user to the network and vice 
versa. This is possible due to the pre-shared secret key K stored in the Authentication 
Center (AuC) and in the UMTS Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The other 
parameters are derived from this key. 
During an AKA procedure, messages with parameters to be confirmed by the User 
Equipment (UE), are delivered from AuC. Such parameters are joined together in 
an Authentication Vector (AV). The AV is delivered to the Core Network, which 
distributes parts of this AV through the access network to the UE. The UE must 
then perform some calculations to match this challenge. The result of the UE is sent 
back and checked against the AV where it originated. If the result matches, then the 
authentication is successful. If the result fails some other procedures are activated to 
correct the problem. 
UMTS AKA achieves mutual authentication by the user and the network showing 
knowledge of a secret key K which is shared between and available only to the USIM 
and the AuC in the user's HE. In addition the USIM and the HE keep track of 
counters SQNMS and SQNHE respectively to support network authentication. The 
sequence number SQNHE is an individual counter for each user and the sequence 
number SQNMS denotes the highest sequence number the USIM has accepted. 
2.3.1 Review of UMTS AKA 
The method was chosen in such a way as to achieve maximum compatibility with the 
current GSM security architecture and facilitate migration from GSM to UMTS. The 
method is composed of a challenge/response protocol identical to the GSM subscriber 
authentication and key establishment protocol combined with a sequence number-
based one-pass protocol for network authentication (see Figure 2.4). 
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FIGURE 2.4 UMTS AUTHENTICATION AND K E Y AGREEMENT 
Authentication and key agreement consists of two procedures. First, the home en-
vironment (HE) distributes authentication information to the serving network (SN). 
Second, an authentication exchange is run between the user and the SN. The authen-
tication information consists of the parameters necessary to carry out the authenti-
cation exchange and provide the agreed keys. 
Upon receipt of a request from the VLR/SGSN, the HE/AuC sends an ordered array 
of n authentication vectors to the VLR/SGSN. The authentication vectors are ordered 
based on sequence number. Each vector consists of five components: a random 
number RAND; an expected response XRES; a cipher key CK; an integrity key 
IK; and an authentication token AUTH. Each vector is generated according to the 
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following steps. 
1. HN generates a sequence number SQN from the counter SQNH^ and also 
generates an unpredictable random number RAND. 
2. HN computes the following: XRES = f2K(RAND), CK = f3K(RAND), 
IK = f4K(RAND), AK = fbK(RAND),MAC = flK(SQN\\RAND\\AMF). 
3. HN assembles the authentication token AUTH = SQN 0 AK\\AMF\\MAC 
and RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTH. 
4. HN increases SQNHN by 1. 
In each authentication vector, an authentication and key management field AMF 
is included, which serves to define operator-specific options in the authentication 
process. 
The serving network SN invokes the second procedure by selecting the next unused 
authentication vector from the ordered array of authentication vectors. Each authen-
tication vector is good for one authentication and key agreement between the mobile 
station and the serving network. The serving network SN sends to MS the random 
number RAND and the authentication token AUTH from the selected authentication 
vector. 
Upon receipt of RAND and AUTN, MS computes the anonymity key AK = 
fbK(RAND) and retrieves the sequence number SQN = (SQN@AK)®AK. Then 
MS computes flK(SQN\\RAND\\AMF) and compares this with the MAC included 
in AUTH. If they are different, MS sends a user authentication reject message 
back to SN with an indication of the cause and abandons the procedure. Other-
wise, MS verifies if the received sequence number SQN is in the correct range, i.e., 
SQN > SQNMS- If MS considers the sequence number to be not in the correct 
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range, it sends a synchronization failure message back to SN. In this case, HN may 
need to resynchronize the counter SQNHN maintained for the mobile station. 
If the sequence number SQN is considered to be in the correct range, the authenti-
cation of the network is successful. In this case, MS computes RES = f2K(RAND) 
and sends it back to SN. Next, MS sets SQNMS equal to SQN if SQNMS < SQN. 
Lastly, MS computes the cipher key CK = f&K{RAND) and the integrity key 
IK = f4K(RAND). 
Upon receipt of the user authentication response, SN compares RES with the ex-
pected response XRES from the selected authentication vector. If RES is equal 
to XRES , the authentication of the user is successful and SN selects the cipher 
key CK and the integrity key IK from the selected authentication vector. If RES 
and XRES are different, SN sends an authentication failure report to the HN and 
abandons the procedure. 
If a resynchronization is required, a synchronization failure message sent by MS in-
cludes a resynchronization token AUTS in the form AUTS = Conc(SQNMs)\\SMAC, 
Conc(SQNMS) = SQNMS®f5*K(RAND), SMAC = fl*K(SQNMS\\RAND\\AMF). 
Upon receipt of the synchronization failure message, SN sends RAND and AUTS 
to the home network with an indication of the synchronization failure. 
After receiving the synchronization failure indication, HN retrieves SQNMs and 
verifies whether the value of SQNMs mandates that SQNHN needs to be changed, 
i.e.,SQNHN < SQNMS- If necessary, HN also verifies the correctness of the SMAC 
included in the resynchronization token AUTS and sets SQNHN equal to SQNMS-
Subsequently, HN sends a new batch of authentication vectors to SN. When SN 
receives a new batch of authentication vectors, it deletes the old authentication vectors 
stored for the user. 
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2.3.1.1 Weaknesses and Attacks 
The weaknesses and corresponding solutions of UMTS AKA are widely discussed 
in literature [9], [10], [11]. One of the big problems is the employment of sequence 
number introduced in the AKA. The generation, allocation, verification, and manage-
ment of the sequence number is a complicated matter [10]. It is really a tough task to 
maintain the synchronization. Several scenarios which could result in synchronization 
failures are discussed in [9],[10]. Once a synchronization fails, the re-synchronization 
procedure involves quite a few principals and network domains [8]. Moreover, a pos-
sible crush in the database which storing the sequence number will cost a lot to 
re-establish the synchronization [9]. 
In short, the sequence number adopted in UMTS AKA brings extra tremendous work 
over normal operations and potential attacks. To prevent synchronization and re-
synchronization of the sequence number, one good solution is to abandon completely 
the sequence number as shown in [9], [10], [11]. 
UMTS AKA was well designed by by the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI). As other security protocols, UMTS AKA provides confidentiality, 
integrity, mutual authentication (CIA). It also defends against man-in-the-middle and 
replay attacks. Nevertheless, two attacks are shown in [9]: redirection attack, active 
attack in corrupted networks. The redirection attack occurs when an adversary entices 
a legitimate mobile station to camp on the radio channels of the false base station. 
Since the authentication vector can be used for any serving network, an adversary can 
intercept the vector and impersonate both the mobile user and the serving network. 
As a result, the adversary can redirect user traffic to an unintended network. 
The active attack occurs while a network is corrupted and an adversary could forge 
an authentication data request from the corrupted network to obtain authentication 
vectors. In addition, the adversary could force the sequence number to be set in a 
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high value by flooding the authentication data to the home network. As a result, the 
adversary can start an active attack against legitimate users. 
2.3.2 Related Works 
In [9], an adaptive AKA (AP-AKA) is proposed (see Figure 2.5). As the synchroniza-
tion and re-synchronization of sequence numbers are really complicated, the sequence 
number is totally discarded in the protocol. Instead, the MS keeps a list of unused 
vectors' indexes to verify that an authentication vector is really sent from the serving 
network and was not used before. This helps to prevent replay attack. 
MS VLR/SN HLR/HN 
User data request 
FRESH 
User data response 
RN, VAC 
*-
Authentication data request 
IMSI, FRESH, RN, VAC 
Authentication data response 
AV[l...m] 
-̂  
User authentication request 
RAND.AUTH 
-* 
User authentication response 
RES 
• 
FIGURE 2.5 AP-AKA 
In AP-AKA, each mobile station and its home network share an authentication key 
K and three cryptographic algorithms F, G, and H, where F and H are message au-
thentication codes and G is a key generation function. In practice, the authentication 
key is usually generated by the home network and programmed into the mobile sta-
tion during service provisioning. Unlike in 3GPP AKA, however, the home network 
in AP-AKA does not maintain a dynamic state, e.g., the counter, for each individual 
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subscriber. 
The mobile station can verify whether an authentication vector was indeed requested 
by a serving network and was not used before by the serving network. The protocol 
AP-AKA specifies a sequence of six flows. Each flow defines a message type and 
format sent or received by an entity. Depending on the execution environment, entities 
have the flexibility of adaptively selecting flows for execution. 
The AP-AKA differentiate two ways of execution depending on whether SN has 
unused authentication vectors. If SN does not have unused authentication vec-
tors for the user, all the six flows will be carried out. SN starts the proto-
col by sending a user data request to the user. A random number, denoted by 
FRESH, is included in the request. After receiving the request, the MS gener-
ates a random number RN and computes a message authentication code, denoted 
by VAC = FK(FRESH\\RN\\IDSN), where IDSN denotes the identity of SN. The 
mobile station then sends a user data response back to including RN and VAC. 
Subsequently, SN sends an authentication data request to the home network, in-
cluding I MSI, FRESH, RN, and VAC. Upon receipt of the authentication data 
request from SN, HN retrieves the secret key K of the user and verifies the correct-
ness of the received VAC. If the verification succeeds, HN generates a batch m of 
authentication vectors and sends them back to SN. Each authentication vector con-
sists of four components (RAND,XRES,SK,AUTH) and is indexed by an integer 
idx, 1 < idx < m. The index number describes the order of the authentication vector 
in the batch. To generate an authentication vector, HN proceeds as follows: 
1. HN allocates an index number idx for authentication vector and generates a 
random number RAND; 
2. HN computes the following: the expected response XRES = FK(RAND); a 
session key SK = GK(RAND); and two message authentication codes RNi(ix = 
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HK{idx\\RN), and MAC = FK(RAND\\idx\\RNidx); 
3. HN assembles the authentication token AUTH — idx\\RNidx\\MAC and the 
authentication vector (RAND, XRES,SK, AUTH). 
After receiving the authentication vectors from HN, SN takes out one of them from 
the batch and stores the rest in its database. Then it sends a user authentication 
request to the mobile station, including RAND and AUTH from the selected au-
thentication vector. After receiving the user authentication response from the mobile 
station, SN compares if RES = XRES. If not, the authentication of the user fails 
and SN abandons the connection. Otherwise, the user authentication is successful 
and the agreed session key is the SK from the selected authentication vector, where 
SK may be a concatenation of a cipher key and an integrity key. 
If SN has unused authentication vectors for the user, it selects an unused authenti-
cation vector from its database and starts the protocol by executing the fifth flow, 
i.e., sending a user authentication request to the mobile station, including RAND 
and AUTH from the selected authentication vector. After receiving the user au-
thentication response, SN compares if RES = XRES and proceeds as described 
earlier. 
The main contribution of AP-AKA is that it discards the sequence numbers and 
replace with a predetermined indexes shared between the mobile station and the 
home network. If ever the mobile station loses the indexes, it needs only to ask the 
SN to request another array of vectors and no resynchronization procedure to be 
executed between the MS and the HN. 
The protocol also differentiates the scenarios that the MS stays in his home network 
or roams to a serving network. In each scenario, the execution of protocol is different. 
One disadvantage of this approach is the bandwidth consumption and storage space 
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of authentication vectors [11]. 
In [10], the authors employ two techniques: a one-time password/hash chaining tech-
nique [12] and keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [13] instead of the 
sequence number to establish mutual authentication (see Figure 2.6). 
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FIGURE 2.6 ENHANCED REGISTRATION AND AKA 
When a MS roams to a VLR, he generates a hash chain and sends MSGi, HMAC\ 
to his HE/HLR. After the HLR verifies the authenticity of MSGi, it then prepares 
MSG2 to send to the VLR. In order for the MS to verify the authenticity of the VLR 
later on in the AKA phase, MSG3 and HMAC3 is prepared and sent by the VLR. 
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Thus, each MS and VLR pair has two distinct sets of hash chains for mutual authen-
tication for future. Since each authentication uses one chain position, the MS can 
prove its identity to the VLR at most I x M times, whereas the VLR to the MS 
J x N times. Within each set of hash chains, it can be agreed that the chain with 
lower id is used. 
One of the big advantages of the hash chain is that there is no synchronization of 
sequence numbers needed between entities. The two hash chains can be used only 
and always for one MS and VLR pair even the MS roams out and roams back. This 
means the MS has to keep all the pairs of hash chains for every visited VLR. This 
would impose extra storage space for the mobile station. 
Another minor disadvantage is the employment of timestamps for message freshness 
while the MS sends his hash chain to the HE/HLR. However, to guarantee freshness 
by timestamps, both MS and HE/HLR must keep local clocks periodically synchro-
nized by a reliable source of time in a secure manner. Between synchronization with 
the reliable time source, local clocks may drift [14]. Both entities must allow a time 
window for timestamps to compensate for local clock drift and the fact that messages 
take time to cross a network. Moreover, the mobile user might have his own "per-
sonalized clock", for example, 3 minutes in advance. Thus, it is not reasonable to 
urge the mobile user to keep an exact clock. To avoid the use of timestamps, the MS 
can run extra protocol steps, for example, by exchanging random numbers, before 
sending his hash chain. 
The timestamps problem exists also in X-AKA proposed by [11]. In this extended 
AKA, the mobile user sends his message authentication code based on the timestamp, 
and the temporary key generated is also a function of the timestamp. Nevertheless, 
one advantage of this approach is the introducing of the temporary key between 
the MS and the VLR. Through this key, both entities can authenticate each other 
subsequently without the involving of sequence numbers. 
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2.4 DoS Attacks in Mobile Networks 
Denial-of-service (DoS) is becoming a growing concern in communication networks. 
The function of a DoS attack is fundamentally to flood its target servers with numer-
ous connect requests to prevent them from being accessible to any other legitimate 
users' requests or providing services. Consequently, the target server becomes too 
overburdened to respond to requests from its legitimate users and attackers. As a 
result, it has insufficient system resources to respond to legitimate requests on the 
network. Usually, the DoS attack packets are indistinguishable from the legitimate 
packets, which makes detection and traffic filtering difficult. 
Broadly speaking the attacks can be of three forms. 
• Attacks exploiting some vulnerability or implementation bug in the software 
implementation of a service to bring that down. 
• Attacks that use up all the available resources at the target machine. 
• Attacks that consume all the bandwidth available to the victim machine. 
DoS attacks may be either destructive or degradative. A destructive DoS attack 
prevents the availability of a service completely. In a degradative (non-destructive) 
DoS attack the performance of a service is reduced, such as in a flooding attack 
overloading a network link or a host CPU. This will typically cause only temporary 
problems, and a system will recover automatically as soon as an attack terminates. 
In modern mobile communication networks the danger of DoS attacks is threatening 
different targets: specific services, the communication infrastructure and the mobile 
devices. The current UMTS system architecture and protocols are designed to ac-
commodate Internet-like services, while it also exposes the UMTS network to various 
Internet attacks. Communication interruption caused by Internet DoS attacks is one 
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of the big concern. For example, the UMTS public land mobile network (PLMN) 
can be easily congested and therefore paralyzed by bogus traffic from the Internet. 
Additionally, the increasing complexity of mobile devices can coordinate to launch 
typical DoS attacks, taking advantage of limited resources in the network, such as 
the radio spectrum, etc. 
2.4.1 Client Puzzle Technique 
One mechanism to prevent DoS is client puzzles. Client puzzles [15-20] are a promis-
ing technique that aims to provide service guarantees to legitimate clients. A client 
puzzle is a small cryptographic problem created by the server in response to a client 
request. The client should first commit its resources to solving the puzzle before 
completing the remaining part of the communication protocol. An example of client 
puzzle is to solve the square root of 2 = \/2 x y/2. The client has to find the answer 
in a brute force manner, while validating the answer is much easier to the server. 
Clients get access to a service only after they prove their legitimacy. For each ser-
vice request, the client is forced to solve a cryptographic "puzzle" before the server 
commits its resources. This imposes a large computational task on adversaries gen-
erating traffic in large quantities. The main idea behind client puzzles is that any 
client requesting service must allocate some of its own resources (processing time or 
memory) before the server commits its resources for the connection. This defends 
against attacks staged by a large number of zombie computers using authentic IP 
addresses. 
The client puzzle does not make resource consumption attacks impossible, but it 
makes them more expensive for the attacker in the sense that successful attacks 
require considerably more resources from the attacker. Moreover, by varying the 
complexity of the puzzle, the cost of an attack can be varied too; this allows one 
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to adjust the system according to the assumptions he has about the strength of the 
attacker. 
A good puzzle should have the following properties [15]: 
1. Creating a puzzle and verifying the solution is inexpensive for the server. 
2. The cost of solving the puzzle is easy to adjust from zero to impossible. 
3. The puzzle can be solved on most types of client hardware (although it may 
take longer with slow hardware). 
4. It is not possible to precompute solutions to the puzzles. 
5. While the client is solving the puzzle, the server does not need to store the 
solution or other client-specific data. 
6. The same puzzle may be given to several clients. Knowing the solution of one 
or more clients does not help a new client in solving the puzzle. 
7. A client can reuse a puzzle by creating several instances of it. 
There are several variants of puzzle-based anti-DoS protocols. The puzzle auctions 
protocol of Wang and Reiter [18] requires the client to solve a puzzle of a certain 
difficulty level before it can initiate a session with the server. The request message 
must be accompanied by the solution to the puzzle. In the approach proposed by Feng 
et al. [16], instead clients increasing the puzzle difficulty level for each server rejection, 
the server is required to respond with a puzzle of the current highest difficulty level. 
The server allocates resources only if it receives the correct solution from the client. 
By adapting the puzzle difficulty level in proportion to the current load, the server 
can force clients to solve puzzles of varying difficulty. 
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2.4.2 Related Works 
Time-lock puzzles are based on the notion that a client must spend a particular 
amount of computation time performing repeated squaring [19]. Another puzzle 
mechanism is to force clients to reverse one-way hashes calculated at the server given 
the original random input with n bits erased [17]. In order to vary the difficulty 
level, n is either increased or decreased. The client performs a brute-force search on 
the erased bits by hashing each pattern in the space until it finds the answer. A 
different manner based on hash function is to make use of partial collision of two 
hash values to form puzzles instead [15]. The client is forced to solve the A;-bit partial 
collision. The hashed value of the solved puzzle must be £>bit (the most significant 
bits) partial collided with all O's string. The difficulty level is determined by the 
number of collision bits. A partial collision is that two hashed values have partially 
identical strings. In this puzzle protocol (Figure 2.7), the server generates nonce N$ 





FIGURE 2.7 PUZZLES BASED ON PARTIAL COLLISIONS 
The client generates his own nonce Nc- The necessity of Nc is to prevent an attacker 
to solve the solution based on Ns and send to the server before the client does. 
The client spends its time to find a required partial collision and from the following 
equation and sends the solution (C, NS,NC, X) to the server. 
k bits O's 
h(C, Na, Nc, X) = u00^~0CJ xxx2 • • • 
other bits 
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h = a hash function (MD5 or SHA1) 
C — the client identity 
Ns = the server's nonce 
Nc = the client's nonce 
X = the solution of the puzzle 
k = the difficulty level of the puzzle 
000 • • • 00 = the k first bits, must all be 0 
X\X2 • • • = other bits, garbage data 
Another approach, called Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Comput-
ers and Humans Apart, or CAPTCHA, is a program that can distinguish between 
humans and computers. First widely used by Alta Vista to prevent automated search 
submissions, CAPTCHAs are particularly effective in stopping any kind of automated 
abuse, including DoS attacks. They work by presenting some test that is easy for hu-
mans to pass but difficult for computers to pass; therefore, they can conclude with 
some certainty whether there is a human on the other end. One example of distorted 
words is shown in Figure 2.8. 
FIGURE 2.8 PUZZLES BASED ON PARTIAL COLLISIONS 
2.5 Discussion 
We have given a review of current literature related to our proposed research objec-
tives. All of the contributions are very interesting and we would like to consider the 
improvements based on them. As our main research objective is to design a set of 
34 
lightweight security mechanisms in order to meet with the constraints of mobile net-
works, we would like to design our own mechanisms which use lightweight techniques. 
There are two major common disadvantages for the current contributions for mobile 
service access: expensive cost due to public key cryptography and non-reusable tick-
ets. In order to reach our goal, we need to replace the public key cryptography 
techniques with lightweight techniques. Without a doubt, to ensure the security, the 
whole mechanism should be carefully redesigned. Considering the unbalanced char-
acteristic in mobile network, we may forward heavy calculation to the server side. We 
may also consider the possibility to make a ticket reusable. A hash-chain might help. 
UMTS AKA has been widely studied and the current contributions eliminate the 
synchronization of sequence numbers between the mobile station and the home net-
work. Thus, the security has been enhanced as well as the overall performance. In 
all these mechanisms, however, the authentication vector can be used once and only 
once. And it is always the home network to generate the authentication vectors for 
all its subscribers. We might consider to improve the performance further through a 
way to more efficiently use the vectors. Of course, one of the serious attack, replay 
attack, must be avoided. 
As defending against DoS attacks, the current client puzzle reviewed in this chapter 
uses a hash function problem which must be resolved by the client. An obvious issue 
is that there is a difficulty level gap between two neighbor levels. If we could find a 
way to decrease the gap, the performance would be much better. 
In the following chapters of this thesis, we are going to present our designed mech-




A LIGHTWEIGHT MOBILE SERVICE ACCESS BASED ON 
REUSABLE TICKETS 
3.1 Introduction 
The rapidly developing mobile technologies widely enhance the abilities of mobile net-
works to offer new services. Third-generation (3G) mobile systems such as Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS) bring mobile users a broad range of new 
value-added services (VASs). To access a service, users must authenticate themselves 
with the value-added service provider (VASP), while the latter must also be authenti-
cated to ensure it is not malicious. For mobile access across multiple service domains, 
the traditional access mechanisms [8-11,21-23] require the exchange of authentica-
tion information between the home domain and the foreign domain using roaming 
agreements. This may involve complicated and expensive activities over large scale 
networks and limit future mobile applications. 
Given the low-power computing capability of mobile devices, designing of secure ser-
vice access mechanisms which are suited for wireless mobile networks is a nontrivial 
challenge. Due to the complexity of the underlying problems, public key cryptogra-
phy (PKC) or asymmetric cryptography usually involves operations such as modular 
multiplication and exponentiation, which are much more computationally expensive 
than operations in symmetric cryptography. Hence, it is best to move demanding 
computational requirements from the mobile device to a powerful server in protocol 
design. 
In mobile communications, a ticket is a piece of data which is analogous to tickets 
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we use in various social events. The ticket proves that the user has been authorized 
to access to VASs like tourism guide. Thus, there is no need to run long distance 
protocols with an on-line third credential party of the accessing user in order to 
validate the user's certificate. Ticket-based service access is an appealing approach 
in mobile communication systems where users roam and contact VASPs in foreign 
domains [2,4-7,24]. 
Users do not have to disclose personal information, when ticket authentication is 
required. In addition, tickets can be used in different VASPs, which is of great 
importance in heterogeneous mobile networks. For example, a ticket-based mech-
anism [2,4-7,24], together with a trusted agent which issues tickets and handles 
payments on users' behalf, can protect the user privacy. 
Due to its flexibility, the ticket idea is also widely used for access control in dynamic 
and distributed networks. In [25], a ticket-based access control in mobile ad-hoc net-
works is introduced to meet the dynamics of network topology and node membership. 
Mobile nodes without a valid ticket are classified as misbehaving and denied from any 
network access. Here, a ticket acts as a passport for a networking node. It provides 
a simple yet effective mechanism for controlling the access of mobile nodes. 
In [26], a ticket-based secure delegation service is proposed to meet the requirements 
of distributed computing. It supports multiple domain models by extending the 
Kerberos [21] framework. By using tickets based on PKC, this mechanism realizes 
flexible key management and reliable session key generation between the client and 
the provider. 
Other ticket-based applications can also be found in literature. A ticket-based ad-
dress resolution protocol (TARP) [27] implements security by distributing centrally 
generated MAC/IP address mapping attestations, called tickets, to clients as they 
join the network. In [28], the authors proposed a secure wireless LAN access based 
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on an authentication ticket which preserves clients' privacy. 
This chapter proposes a novel ticket-based service access mechanism which incor-
porates two major contributions compared to various works. First, the proposal is 
lightweight on the mobile user's side. High computational complexity is transfered 
from the mobile user side to the ticket server and the VAS provider (VASP). Second, 
the ticket is reusable. Two hash chains are introduced: an authentication chain and 
a payment chain. The authentication chain allows a ticket to be reusable as well as 
achieving mutual authentication and non-repudiation. The payment chain is a stair-
case incremental value hash chain which is lightweight, practical and may avoid chain 
reinitialization. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section II covers the background work and 
concepts. The proposed service access model and protocols are shown in Section 3.2 
where ticket acquisition, service provision, payment and billing, ticket revocation 
and reuse issues are considered. Section 3.4 illustrates BAN logic [29] proofs and 
security analysis. In Section 3.5, the proposed mechanism is compared with related 
work including classical mechanism Kerberos and existed mobile service mechanisms. 
Finally, conclusions are given in Section 3.6. 
3.2 Background Work and Motivation 
3.2.1 Ticket Types vs. Service Types 
We encounter different types of tickets in our social life. In [5,6], the authors list 
four types of tickets (see Table 3.1). Some tickets bind a given user to a specific 
service provider. Certain tickets, however, do not restrict users and service providers. 
Certain tickets can only be used once (e.g., fight ticket), while other tickets can be 
reused many times. 
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As for their methods of payment, tickets can be categorized as prepaid and postpaid. 
The to type ticket is the simplest: it looks like cash. Since it does not bind to any 
principal, it must be prepaid. A t\ type of ticket means that the same ticket can be 
used by different users that it can be lent to someone else. If not free, most t\ tickets 
are prepaid like prepaid cellphone cards or concert tickets issued by a VASP, and are 
accepted by the same provider. Otherwise, the VASP could not find the right user 
for refunds. The ticket usage is quite simple: the user buys a ticket from a kiosk, 
scratches it and inputs the PIN number to the VASP. Then, the VASP grants the 
service access to the user as long as there is money left in the ticket. 
Generally speaking, using t2 and t3 tickets, is not as simple. The VASP must be paid 
from the legitimate ticket holder. Hence, a postpaid ticket is usually found to be a 
£2, £3 ticket although the latter can also be prepaid. A postpaid ticket works much the 
same as a credit card granting the service access right and requiring payment after 
the service has been delivered. Only when a mobile user starts his service, a potential 
payment occurs and both the VASP and the user sign the payment. An aggregated 
invoice is generated and sent to the user much like the balance statement from the 
credit card companies. The ticket validation requires authentication from both the 
ticket holder and the VASP. If it is prepaid, the payment is made immediately from 
the money left in the ticket. 
Traditionally, most mobile systems entirely rely on an implicit trust relationship 
between a user and a VASP. In the future, mobile systems will become larger and 
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there may co-exist many VASPs. Such a trust model is not suitable anymore because 
a VASP could not be completely trusted. It could even be malicious to mobile users in 
order to increase its profit. Hence, in order to access a service, mutual authentication 
is required and the potential payment after the service provision should be non-
repudiable. Non-repudiation means that the user cannot deny the service usage; the 
VASP cannot forge a payment. Thus, ticket binding to the user is required. In this 
situation, t2,t3 type tickets are of greater interest. The remainder of this paper will 
only consider t2,^3 type tickets. 
While service access is controlled by a ticket, billing and charging is determined by 
the service characteristics. There are different types of services. Considering the 
variety of mobile VASs, we can classify them into two categories: entertainment and 
information. The entertainment includes mobile movies, mobile games, TV-related 
services, etc. The information category includes other services such as location-based 
services (LBS), mobile marketing, mobile email and weather forecast. Service fees 
can be charged according to usage time, traffic or the number of access times. Some 
services (such as personal mobile banking) can be accessed free for those with the 
appropriate access right (such as the owner of an account). We list these types of 
services in Table 3.2. 







free, access right is required 
the number of access times 
service provision time 
quantity of traffic 
Knowing the type of service is helpful to design the charging and billing scheme 
during the service provision. Charging is very simple for s0 and Si service. For s2 and 
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S3 services, the scheme should provide continuous charging instead of pre-charging 
or post-charging. Pre-charging is not suitable as it is difficult to predict the usage 
time or quantity of traffic. Post-charging is risky as users can terminate the service 
deliberately just before the charging occurs. 
3.2.2 Ticket Usage 
The main advantages of ticket-based access are the following [7]: 
• Flexibility. A mobile user can choose personalized services by acquiring cor-
responding tickets and does not require long term contract with VASPs; 
• Scalability. A ticket can contain all of the necessary information for service 
provision. Long distance protocol running between the VASP and the user's 
home domain is not necessary; 
• Privacy. A ticket does not contain the user's personal information. It only 
proves the user as a legitimate ticket holder. 
Although these advantages make ticket-based access an appealing approach for service 
provision, several issues regarding the security of ticket design and usage must be kept 
in mind. One problem shown in [24] is duplication. There are two cases: a legitimate 
user deliberately makes copies of an acquired ticket; an eavesdropper steals a ticket. 
For both cases, a secure authentication associating with the ticket is required in order 
to prevent illegal use of a ticket. 
Another issue is forgery [24]. Only the ticket server can construct a valid ticket. 
Forgery can be prevented through encryption and digital signature from the ticket 
server. 
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In this paper, we will also address the ticket reuse issue. The current ticket-based 
service access mechanisms do not allow ticket reuse. This implies that a mobile user 
must acquire as many tickets as the number of service requests. Thus, the gain of no 
long distance cross domain authentication is not well worth only one service request, 
although ticket have privacy and flexibility advantages. If a ticket is reusable, it will 
be much more interesting. 
3.2.3 Lightweight Non-Repudiation Techniques 
We have claimed that non-repudiation is required for the service access. Because 
of the limited computation capability of mobile devices, the non-repudiation tech-
nique should be lightweight at the mobile user side. Digital signature is widely used 
for non-repudiation. However, it is usually computationally expensive. A one-way 
hash function chain was first proposed by [30]. Hash functions are generally faster 
than digital signature algorithms. Hash chains, a useful cryptographic technique, are 
used to provide services like authentication [30,31], micropayments [3,32-36], signa-
tures [37-40], multicasting [41] and certificate revocation [42]. Let f(x) be a one-way 
hash function and a hash chain of a length of N is constructed by applying iV times 
of hashing: 
f{N\x) = /(/(• ••/(*)•••)) 
Hash values are called nodes and f^N\x) is called the tip. We define f(°\x) = x. 
With knowledge of f^N\x), f^N~1\x) cannot be generated without the knowledge of 
x. However, given f^N~l\x), its correctness can easily be verified through f(N\x), 
simply checking if it satisfies the equation: f(N\x) = f(f(N~~^(x))- This property 
comes directly from the property of one-way hash functions. Once the tip is used for 
verification, the hash chain is reduced and the new tip becomes f^N-1\x). 
A cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) is a short piece of information 
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used to authenticate a message. The input of a MAC function consists of a secret 
key and a message to be authenticated: 
MAC = h(Key, Message) 
where h is a one-way hash function. The MAC technique is widely used in UMTS 
authentication and key agreement (AKA) [8]. The MAC value protects both a mes-
sage's integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing verifiers (who also possess the 
secret key) to detect any changes to the message content. 
The combination of MAC and hash chain can provide the non-repudiation purpose. 
A claimant randomly selects a nonce, generates a hash chain and its MAC, and sends 
both to the verifier. The hash chain can be used to prove the claimant for N times. 
At the first authentication, the claimant sends f^N_1\x) to the verifier. The verifier 
checks if it satisfies the equation f(N\x) = /(/<-iV~1*)(a;))- If it does, the verifier 
updates the stored value to f^N~^(x) for the following authentication. The property 
of the hash chain prevents non-legitimate users from impersonating the legitimate 
user. Obviously, it also guarantees that the legitimate sender of a message cannot 
subsequently deny having sent the message. 
3.3 Service Access through Tickets 
3.3.1 Service Access Model 
Cases where a ticket is issued and validated by the same service provider will not be 
covered as they do not belong to the typical models in cross domain authentication. 
We define the user's home domain as the ticket issuer (ticket server) and his foreign 
domain as the VASP. The proposed model contains four principals: a certification 
authority (CA), a ticket server (S), a mobile user (U) and a VASP (P) as illustrated 
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in Figure 3.1. 
Certification ^ .i^/ 
Authority * J&' * 
v &/ -'«& 
FIGURE 3.1 SERVICE ACCESS MODEL 
The last three principals all subscribe to the CA which is responsible for issuing 
certificates to mobile users and generating key pairs (a public key and a secret key) 
to the ticket server and the VASP. The mobile user obtains a ticket through presenting 
his certificate to the ticket server. This is realized by a ticket acquisition protocol. 
After successfully validating the certificate, the ticket server issues a ticket to the 
mobile user. Here, the mobile user obtains the right to access a service and does not 
need to pay the ticket. Once the mobile user gets the ticket, he can use it to request 
the service from the VASP anytime, anywhere. 
The VASP needs to access the ticket server occasionally, for example, for billing. 
In fact, in traditional cross domain authentication in GSM and UMTS [8,22], the 
home domain is always accessible for the foreign domain. For every time of service 
provision, the VASP generates a billing record and sends it to the ticket server. The 
ticket server collects all the billing records and generates an aggregated bill to the 
user periodically. The user pays the bill to the ticket server. Finally, the VASP gets 
paid through the financial clearance with the ticket server. 
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3.3.2 Ticket Acquisition 
As we analyzed previously, in mobile networks, the users usually have limited power 
mobile devices to communicate with more powerful servers like VASPs. Although 
mobile devices become increasingly powerful today, public key cryptographic oper-
ations (encryption/decryption) remain still two or three orders of magnitude slower 
than symmetric key cryptography operations. It is preferable to move high com-
putational complexity from mobile devices side to the ticket server side as much as 
possible. 
We denote U the mobile user, S the ticket server and P the VASP. We abuse the 
uppercase letters for principals and their identities. Before running the protocol, U 
first obtains a certificate Certv and his long term symmetric key Ku from the CA. 
The certificate is given as: 
Certfj = (Es(U, Ku, expire, Udata, SigcA(U, Ku, expire, Udata))) 
where Ku is C/'s long term symmetric secret key. This key, however, has a special 
property compared with ordinary secret keys. Instead of being known only by U, 
the key can also be known by the ticket server during the ticket acquisition phase. 
Aside from issuing certificates, the CA is responsible for generating symmetric keys 
for mobile users. In this certificate, SigcA is the secret signing algorithm of the CA. 
The result after running the signing algorithm is the CA's digital signature. The 
digital signature of a message is a string which depends on this message and on the 
CA's secret key, in such a way that anyone can check the validity of the signature 
through the CA's signature verification algorithm. The verification algorithm takes 
a message and its corresponding public key to compute the signature. 
Inside the certificate, U is the mobile user's identity and the field Udata includes 
all other relevant information: version number, serial number, user ID, issuer ID 
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and issuer name, etc. All the three fields with the signature are encrypted with the 
ticket server's public key (Es(X) denotes the public key encryption under S"s public 
key). This means that U possesses a certificate specific to the ticket server S before 
communicating with S. A similar server specific certificate can also be found in [43]. 
Once the mobile user has his certificate in hand, he can start his authentication to 
the ticket server and obtain a ticket. The protocol is illustrated as follows: 
U^S: Cert^iRw- ,RT}Ku 
S ^U : {fa © • • • © RT, id, ticket, Cx, • • • ,CT, KUP}Ku 
The protocol starts when U sends a set of random nonces R\, • • • , RT encrypted by 
his long term symmetric key Ky ({X}K denotes symmetric encryption of X under 
key K) and the certificate of U under S. These nonces are used to generate a set of 
hash chains. The length of the hash chain N is predetermined in advance for both 
principals. 
The ticket server decrypts the certificate with its private key, then verifies the sig-
nature using the CA's public signature verification algorithm. When S checks suc-
cessfully the certificate from U, it discovers the secret key Kv and stores its relevant 
information such as the expire date. It obtains the nonces and computes the corre-
sponding hash chains. 
Depending on the different types of service, if it can be known in advance, the 
ticket server generates payment chains of different lengths. Otherwise, it generates a 
payment chain based on experiences. It chooses a set of random nonces C\, • • • , CV to 
generate payment hash chains g^M\Ct) (g is a one-way hash function, 1 < t < T) with 
length of M. Then, it generates an authentication key Kup for future authentication 
between U and P, together with the ticket and its unique id. The ticket server 




{N){Ri),--- , / ( i V ) (^r) ,5 ( M ) (Ci) , - - - ,g{M)(CT),data, 
Sigs{P,KUPMJ
{N\Ri),--- , / W ( ^ T ) ^ ( M ) ( C I ) , - - - ,g^M\CT),data))) 
The ticket is specific to the VASP P. It is encrypted with F's public key, which means 
that only P can decrypt it and the ticket belongs to a t3 type ticket. This requires 
that the ticket server knows the VASP's public key through the CA. The signature 
of S in the ticket is used to prevent a fake ticket. The id is the unique identity of 
the ticket and the data field includes all detailed ticket information: issuer ID, issuer 
name, issued time, service type, service name, times of access, etc. 
When the ticket is sent, the ticket server stores the information pertaining to the 
ticket for future billing verifications. Here is an example: 
id P Kv expire Ri, • • • ,RT C\, • • • , CT valid 
where expire is the Ky expire date. The nonces are reserved for future authentications 
and payment chain validation. The field valid is reserved by the ticket server. When 
a ticket needs to be revoked, this field is set to FALSE. Otherwise, it is set to TRUE. 
When U receives the message, he checks the correctness of R\ © • • • © RT- If it is 
correct, he keeps the ticket for future service request. Otherwise, he discards the 
ticket. 
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3.3.3 Service Provision 
Once U obtains a valid ticket, he can provide it to P for service provision. The 
protocol is illustrated as follows: 
U-+P: ticket, {f^-^Rtl^Nu}^ 
P->U: {/^-i+1)(JRi),7Vc/ + l , i V p ; T p } ^ p 
U^P: {Np®TP}K 
The protocol starts when U wants to validate his ticket to get access to the service from 
P. He sends the ticket, together with the hash chain (the (i,t)-th time, 1 < i < N, 
1 < t < T), the identity of P and a nonce Nu encrypted with the authentication key 
KUP previously generated by the ticket server S during the ticket acquisition phase. 
Here, the inclusion of P is to tell P that U knows P as his peer communication 
principal. 
When P receives the service request, it decrypts the ticket with its private key and 
checks its validity with S"s signature verification algorithm. Then, it compares this 
signature to the one received. If they are identical, the ticket is considered as valid. 
Then, it gets the id of the ticket and searches its database to see if the ticket is used 
for the first time. If so, it stores the hash chains and the tip f(N\Ri):, otherwise, it 
ignores the chains. It gets the key Kup and decrypts the second part of the message. 
It checks if the hash chain f(N~z\Rt) satisfies the equation: 
f(f{N-HRt)) = fiN-i+1\Rt) 
If so, it updates the hash chain by removing the current tip f^N~%+1\Rt). The hash 
chain becomes shorter and the new tip is f(N~l\Rt). Note that the mobile user 
uses the hash nodes between f(N~lS)(Rt) and f^(Rt) (inclusive) for authentication 
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while the VASP uses the hash nodes between f(N\Rt) and f^(Rt) (inclusive) for 
verification. After that, the t-th chain is abandoned and the (t + l)-th chain is used 
until all the hash chains run out. 
Then, it chooses a nonce NP and generates a fresh session key K = f3KUP(Nu@Np), 
where / 3 can be defined as in UMTS authentication and key agreement [8]. It sends 
back /^_ l + 1^(i?f) as confirmation, together with (NJJ + 1), NP and the timestamp Tp 
encrypted by the shared key Kjjp-
When U receives the message, he decrypts the message and checks the correctness of 
f(N~l+1\Rt), (Nu + 1)- If they are correct, he knows that mutual authentication has 
been realized. He computes the fresh session key K — JZKUP{NU © Np) and sends 
back {NP © Tp]K for agreement of TP as the service start time. 
3.3.4 Ticket Acquisition via VASP 
In the proposed model, a mobile user acquires a ticket before a service request. It 
implies that the mobile user knows the VASP which he will request service from, 
before roaming into the service domain. This means, the ticket is type t3. However, 
it is not always the case. Sometimes, the mobile user cannot predict or simply has 
no knowledge of the VASP, or he might need only a t2 ticket. In this situation, the 
user can request a ticket from the VASP ignoring the VASP's identity. The VASP 
acts as a proxy to pass the request to the ticket server. This action is also helpful 
when the ticket server is not accessible directly by a mobile user even the user wants 
a i3 ticket. The following protocol describes this action. In this case, it becomes the 





Ep(NP + 1, ticket, {Ri © • • • © RT, id, ticket, Cx,--- ,CT, KUP}Ku, 
Sigs(NP + 1, ticket, {Ri © • • • © RT, id, ticket, C\, • • • , CT, KUP}Ku)) 
{/?!©••• ,id,ticket,Ci,--- ,CT, KUP}Ku, {{Ru • • • ,}Ku,NP,TP}Kup 
{NP © Tp\K 
The mobile user sends the certificate and a set of nonces encrypted with the secret 
key K\j to the VASP P. The latter appends a nonce NP, signs the whole message 
and sends it to the ticket server S. When S successfully checks the validity of the 
signature and the certificate, it generates the hash chains based on the nonces received 
and billing chains g^M\Ci), • • • , g^M\Cr). Then, it creates a ticket and computes the 
confirmation NP + 1 and {Ri ffi • • • © RT}KV- It signs the whole message and sends 
it to P. 
When P receives the message, it validates the signature. If it is valid, it keeps the 
ticket and gets the shared key Kup. It forwards to U the corresponding part. It 
encrypts the {R\,--- ,RT}KV with the shared key Kup for confirmation, together 
with a nonce Np and the timestamp Tp. The nonce and the timestamp have the 
same meaning as in the service provision protocol. They are used to generate fresh 
session key and service start time agreement. 
3.3.5 Payment and Billing 
The payment chain g^M\C\),- • • ,g(M\Cr) included in the ticket are used by the 







from the usage of the authentication chain. For each time service provision, the user 
takes off a new node from the authentication chain while restarting the same (only 
one) payment chain from the beginning. This means the payment is only related to 
the current service provision and independent to the previous service provision. 
During the service provision, payments happen several times depending on different 
types of service. The idea of "tick" payments based on hash chains was first introduced 
by Pedersen [3] and has been widely adopted in [7,32-35]. The payment in this paper 
is also based on ticks. The charging request is repeated several times according to 
the service provision requirements. The following steps are based on those in [7]. We 
assume that the last "tick" sent by the user is Cj. 
1. The VASP sends a request for d ticks according to the expense; 
2. The user sends back the response: the tick Cj-d = 9^~d\Ct) with the computed 
message authentication codes MAC'j_d — h(KUP,(P,Tj,Cj^d, f^
N~l\Rt))) and 
MACj-d = h(Ku, (P,Tj,Cj-d, /^-^(Rt))), where T- is the timestamp; 
3. The VASP checks if Cj = g(d\cj^d)- If so> it continues the service provision; 
otherwise, it stops. 
Even if the service is free (s0 type), the VASP still asks the user to sign the payment 
in order to prevent the user denying the service. In this case, the value of first tick 
can be defined as zero. 
Although the user can refuse to release a tick after a period of service, he cannot 
gain too much (only the value after the last tick Cj). When the service terminates, 
the VASP generates a billing record and subsequently sends the proof of the service 
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provision to the ticket server. 
P - S : Es(id,P,TP,Tj,Cj,f^W,MAq,MACj, 
SigP(id, P, TP, Tj,Cj, f^-HRt), MAC'j, MACj)) 
This billing message contains the ticket id, the identity of the VASP, the service start 
time and end time, the last tick from the user Cj, the current authentication chain 
and MAC'j,MACj. The message is authenticated by the user and signed by the 
VASP. Both of them cannot deny the service provision. The ticket service checks the 
validity of the payment chain and MAC',, MACj. If there is already a billing record 
corresponding to the current chain of this ticket, it is rejected by the ticket server it 
might be a replayed billing by the VASP. Otherwise, a billing record is stored and an 
aggregated bill will be sent to the user. 
A problem concerning the length of the payment chain, however, should be considered. 
Due to its finite length, the system has to restart when it runs out the hash chain. 
Simply generating a longer hash chain will not help out fundamentally because the 
length of the hash chain cannot be set too large in practice. A simple solution is to run 
again the service provision protocol to use the next node of the authentication chain. 
Another way is to re-initialize the old hash chain. In [44], the authors proposed a 
method which applies public key cryptography recursively to generate infinite length 
hash chains. In [45,46], the authors introduced a notion of "tying" multiple finite 
length hash chains through one time signature. All of these methods increase resource 
consumption. 
In this paper, we introduce a new payment method which may avoid hash chain 
reinitialization and keep the hash chain in a reasonable length. The idea is illustrated 
as follows. We do not try to prolong the hash chain while trying to use every tick 
efficiently. Traditionally, every tick has the same value. We define a staircase incre-
mental value function value(j) associating with each tick according to its position in 
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the hash chain (the position of the tick g^\Ct) is j). 
a if (n - j) < l0, 
a-pi if Z0 < (n-j) < h, 
value(j) = \ a • p2 K h < (n - j) < l2, 
a-pk if 4_i <(n- j) < n. 
where a > 1 and 1 < pi < p2 < • • • < Pk- The hash chain is cut into different segments 
and the ticks in different segments are associated with different values. Thus, the hash 
chain becomes a staircase. The ticks in the first stair ((n — j) < l0) is the cheapest, 
while those in the last stair (h-i < (n — j) < n) are the most expensive. For example, 
the value of one single tick in the second stair can be equivalent to the value of two 
ticks of the first stair. For example, pi,P2,P3, • • • can be 2,3,4, • • • or 21,22, 23, • • •. 
Intuitively, the ticks in the back are less frequently used than those in the front during 
the charging procedure. 
A more detailed example is as follows. Suppose a user needs to spend 10 dollar for his 
service. Each tick represents 10 cent in a regular hash chain. Suppose that a regular 
hash chain is only 50 in length, thus the total value of the hash chain is 5 dollar. 
Obviously, the hash chain needs to be reinitialized. In our scheme, we may define the 
first 10 ticks in the hash chain as the same value as in regular hash chain. However, 
we define the other ticks in more expensive values. For example, each tick between 
l is t and 20th represents 20 cent; each tick between 21st and 30th represents 30 cent; 
each tick between 30st and 40th represents 40 cent; each tick between 41st and 45th 
represents 60 cent; each tick between 46th and 50th represents 80 cent. Thus, the 
total value will become 17 dollar and hash chain does not need to be reinitialized. 
Moreover, as ticks become more and more expensive, they will be used less and less. 
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As a result, the VASP requests less and less the ticks from the user. Thus, our scheme 
improves the system performance. 
The value function is agreed among the principals in advance. If it is possible to know 
the type of service in the ticket acquisition phase, the payment chain can be tailored 
to the service. For s0 and S\ service, one tick is sufficient. For s2 and s3 service, the 
length of the chain and the value function needs to be carefully designed. Through 
this way, we may avoid reinitializing the payment hash chain. This approach is not 
perfect for payment, but practical and lightweight. 
The mico-payment chain was proposed in [3], and the security has been proved. Our 
proposed staircase incremental value function is essentially the same scheme from the 
security aspect. We change only the value function assigned to the payment chain. 
Actually, we can say that the payment chain in [3] is a special case where the staircase 
incremental value function defines the same cost for all its ticks. 
3.3.6 Ticket Revocation and Reuse 
The ticket revocation issue is simple. If a ticket is considered to be revoked (e.g., 
the mobile user's secret key Ku expires or the mobile user notices the ticket server 
to revoke a ticket), the ticket server sends REVOKE message to the corresponding 
VASP: 
S -> P : EP(id, REVOKE, Sigs(id, REVOKE)) 
The VASP checks if the ticket is already stored (used by the ticket holder before). If 
not, it means that the ticket has been issued and has not been used yet; the VASP 
stores the revoked ticket information. Otherwise, it updates the status of the ticket 
REVOKED. 
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When a user requests a service with a ticket, the VASP checks if the ticket has been 
revoked. If so, the service request is rejected. 
In the solution described in this paper, a ticket can be reused, which is different from 
other ticket-based mechanisms. This is realized and secured through the hash chains 
f(N)(Rx), fN\R2),--- J{N)(RT) shared between the mobile user and the VASP. 
This hash chain can be used N xT times. After that, this ticket becomes invalid and 
should be abandoned. Thus, we can say the ticket is reusable within a certain limit. 
3.4 System Security Analysis 
3.4.1 Logical Proof by BAN Logic 
The goal of a secure access mechanism is to ensure that authentication is realized 
for all principals involved in a communication. The authentication protocol relies on 
network relationships. Any failed relationship will allow an adversary to masquerade 
as legitimate principals in runs of the protocol. Belief logics can be used to exam-
ine trust relationships in security protocols. We use BAN logic [29] to analyze the 
protocols in this thesis. 
This chapter only presents proofs from the ticket acquisition protocol and the service 
provision protocol. The ticket acquisition via VASP is similar and we do not show 
its proof. For convenience, we put two protocols together. The idealized protocol is 
as follows: 









{NP e TP}K 
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The M l . , M2.,...,M5. represent the message rounds. In order to make it easy to be 
understood, we list the basic notations and inference rules used in this thesis below. 
For further information, please consult the original paper [29]. 
• i—̂> U: U has Ku as a public key. 
• Es(X): X is encrypted by S"s private key. 
• U <-^» P: U and P may use the shared secret key Kup to communicate. The 
key KUP is good, in that it will never be discovered by any principal except U 
and P, or a principal trusted by either U or P. 
v 
• P =F± Q: The formula X is a secret known only to P and Q, and possibly to 
principals trusted by them. Only P and Q may use X to prove their identities 
to one another. An example of a secret is a password. 
• P believes X: P believes X, or P would be entitled to believe X. In particular, 
the principal P may act as though X is true. This construct is central to the 
logic. 
• fresh(X): The formula X is fresh; that is, X has not been sent in a message at 
any time before the current run of the protocol. This is usually true for nonces, 
that is, expressions invented for the purpose of being fresh. 
• P controls X: P has jurisdiction over X. The principal P is an authority on 
X and should be trusted on this matter. For example, a server is often trusted 
to generate encryption keys properly. This may be expressed by the assumption 
that the principals believe that the server has jurisdiction over statements about 
the quality of keys. 
• P sees X: P sees X. Someone has sent a message containing X to P, who 
read and repeat X (possibly after doing some decryption). 
can 
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• P said X: P once said X. The principal P at some time sent a message 
including the statement X. It is not known whether the message was sent long 
ago or during the current run of the protocol, but it is known that P believed 
X then. 
• The message-meaning rule concerns the interpretation of messages. That is, if 
P believes that the key K is shared with Q and sees X encrypted under K, 
then P believes that Q once said X. 
• The nonce-verification rule expresses the check that a message is recent and, 
hence, that the sender still believes in it. That is, if P believes that X could 
have been uttered only recently (in the present) and that Q once said X (either 
in the past or in the present), then P believes that Q believes X. 
For sake of simplicity, we replace Certfj and the ticket by {v—^ U}KS and {U <-̂ + 
P}KP respectively and ignore signature verification fields inside. The hash chain and 
the i-th hash node are also simplified as R. The verification of hash chain is treated 
independently outside of the protocol, and the returned R implies the correctness of 
the verification. 
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Both U and P trust the shared key KUP generated by S and believe its freshness. All 
principals believe the freshness of R, nonce Nu and timestamp Tp. Each principal 
trusts its own secret key. 
As receiving M l , the principal S has S sees Es({^^ U}), {R}KV • I
n other 
words, the principal S can decrypt the message and read the secret key Kv and the 
random number R. With the hypothesis S believes i—A S , the message-meaning 
rule yields S believes U said ( 3 ^ JJ) • In other words, S believes that it is U, 
not anyone else, who sent the message. With the belief JJ believes i—̂> U , we can 
deduce S believes JJ said (R) • This means that S believes that it is JJ, not any-
one else, who sent the random number R. The initial belief S believes fresh(i?) 
and the nonce-verification rule yield S believes U believes fresh(i?) • In other 
words, both S and U believe that the random number R is fresh. 
Similarly, as receiving M2, we have JJ believes U ^ S , U believes U ^ S • 
In other words, both U and S know the secrets R and K\j. Since we have hypothesis 
S believes U M P , we obtain JJ believes U fe P • This means that U 
believes that Kup is the shared secret key between U and P. 
The deduction of M3 is similar to M l . We do not show the details here. The final 
result from M3 is P believes U believes fresh(A^) • This means that A^ is 
fresh and P believes this. 
While U receives the M4, with the result JJ believes U <^> P , the message-
meaning rule for shared keys applies. As a result, we can have the following result: 
U believes P said (R, NV,NP, TP) • Moreover, there are the following hypothe-
ses: U believes fresh(NP) , JJ believes fresh(TP) • The nonce-verification 
rule applies and yields JJ believes P believes (R,NU:NP,TP) • In other words, 
both P and U believe the freshness of R, Nu, NP, TP. 
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At this point, U and P are mutually authenticated. The last message, M5, is specif-
ically used for both the timestamp TP and the new session key agreement. It does 
not influence the beliefs just established above. 
We summarize the above formal analysis in natural language as follows. As the 
certificate is encrypted by the ticket server S and signed by CA, only S can verify it 
through its private key and CA's signature verification algorithm. Then, S can read 
t/'s secret key and further decrypt the random numbers. When U receives the ticket 
from S, he can know that it is sent from S because the Kv is only known by U and 
S. 
As the ticket is encrypted by service provider's public key, only P can decrypt it. 
When P receives this ticket, it can get the shared secret key Kup stored in the ticket 
and thus decrypt the hash node and the random number Nu in the message. At this 
point, both U and P believe that KUP is a shared secret key between them. They 
trust each other and use this key for secret communication. The next step is to verify 
the hash chain stored in the ticket. Of course, its security is guaranteed by KVp. 
Finally, both U and P contribute a random number and generate alone the session 
key K. 
3.4.2 Security Analysis 
It has been suggested that the BAN logic is unable to deal with security flaws result-
ing from interleaving of protocol steps [47]. We analyze the security aspects of the 
proposed protocols by considering possible attacks. 
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3.4.2.1 Forge Tickets 
Outside attackers cannot fabricate or forge tickets, because they cannot generate a 
valid signature in the name of the CA. In the ticket acquisition phase, since the Ku 
is encrypted in the certificate, only S can verify C/'s certificate Certfj and thus know 
C/'s long term secret symmetric key Kv and retrieves the nonces. Moreover, the ticket 
should contain a signature from S. Only S can generate the signature. The signature 
is also generated based on the nonces from U. 
3.4.2.2 Mutual Authentication 
The freshness of the ticket implies the freshness of the authentication chain and the 
payment chain inside. During the service provision phase, U sends a two-part message: 
ticket, the encrypted current hash node and a nonce Nu- The ticket is encrypted by 
P's public key and contain P's identity indicating that P has the right to validate 
the ticket. The ticket is signed by the ticket server and P can check if the ticket is 
valid through the signature contained in the ticket. 
When P receives the ticket, it cannot justify if the ticket owner is a legitimate user. 
It decrypts the hash chain and the nonce with the KUP retrieved from the ticket. 
Then, it sends back the updated hash chain, the nonce and its challenge (a nonce 
NP) encrypted by KUP. When U receives this message and validates it successfully, 
U knows that P is the right service provider. In other words, P is authenticated by 
U. The message that U sends back to P contains the response. When P validates 
successfully the response, P knows that U is the right ticket owner. In other words, 
U is authenticated by P. Thus, mutual authentication is reached. 
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3.4.2.3 Replay and Man-in-the-middle Attacks 
Although an attacker can eavesdrop a valid ticket, he cannot use it later, because he 
cannot get the KUP and the hash chain encrypted in the ticket. Only P can decrypt 
the ticket and get the hash chain then. An attacker cannot modify the ticket and 
the encrypted hash chain. Even if the attacker replays the encrypted hash chain, he 
cannot be authenticated by P as P will fail to validate the hash chain. Thus, replay 
and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are prevented. 
3.4.2.4 Key Freshness 
The authentication key KUP is used only during the authentication and known only 
by U and P. The new session key is generated for each time service provision and 
valid only at the current session. Both U and P contribute their nonces to establish 
this key. Thus, key freshness is guaranteed. 
3.4.2.5 Malicious Service Provider 
In mobile networks, a service provider could be malicious and deliberately leak a user's 
ticket to someone else. In the payment and billing protocol, U signs the ticks used 
with his private key K\j which can only be verified by the ticket server. This signature 
comprises the current tips of the authentication chain and the payment chain; nobody 
can tamper and generate it. Note that the payment is also agreed and signed by the 
VASP. Even if the VASP is malicious and helps an eavesdropper get a valid ticket, 
the eavesdropper cannot use it because he cannot generate a valid payment without 
the long term secret key Kv. Consequently, S will refuse the payment and P gets 
nothing. Note that the payment is also required for s0 type service (free) although the 
value is zero. This is helpful for the ticket server to solve possible conflicts between 
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the user and the VASP. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
We designed a complementary protocol to help a mobile user acquire a ticket via 
a VASP. When U needs to acquire a ticket via a VASP, it is mandatory that the 
ticket server be accessible. This is similar to Kerberos [21] in which the server should 
always remain on-line. However, the situation of our proposal is less serious because 
this protocol would not happen frequently. It can be mitigated by using multiple 
ticket servers. It seems that the system executes cross domain authentication and 
loses the benefit of a ticket. However, since the ticket described in this thesis is 
reusable, one time cross domain authentication is worth future reused local domain 
authentication. 
The authentication chain allows a ticket to be reused N x T times. Nevertheless, 
ticket reuse does not mean a duplicate ticket is acceptable because it would fail in 
authentication without a correct hash node. In order to use this chain correctly, 
both the user and the VASP have to synchronize its current position in the chain. If 
the synchronization fails (e.g., the user loses the position information), it is difficult 
for them to resynchronize. Consequently, the ticket should be abandoned. As for 
the payment chain, if it is not well designed, it can be run out before the service 
terminates. Experiments are helpful to determine the length of the chain and the 
value function. 
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3.5 Comparisons with Related Work 
3.5.1 Comparison with Kerberos 
Kerberos [21,48], a computer network authentication protocol developed by MIT to 
protect network services provided by Project Athena, allows individuals communicat-
ing over an insecure network where individuals prove their identities to one another 
in a secure manner. 
Kerberos (Version 5) protocol is based on the Needham-Schroeder protocol [49], but 
makes use of timestamps as nonces. It makes use of a trusted third party, called a 
Key Distribution Center (KDC), which consists of two logically separate parts: an 
Authentication Server (AS) and a Ticket Granting Server (TGS). Kerberos works on 
the basis of tickets which serve to prove the identity of users. 
We can specify Kerberos protocol as follows, where Alice (A) authenticates herself to 
Bob (B) using a server (S). 
A^S: A,B 
S —> A: {Ts, L, KAB, B, {TS, L, KAB, A}KBS}KAS 
A ^ B : {TS,L,KAB,A}KBS,{A,TA}KAB 
B^A: {TA + 1}KAB 
Server S stands for both AS and TGS, and KAB stands for the session key between A 
and B. In this protocol, {Ts, L, KAB, A}KBS acts as a ticket that the client authenti-
cates himself to B. In order to confirm JS's identity and its recognition of A, A sends 
{A,TA}KAB as an authenticator and B replies with {TA + 1}KAB-
The protocol security relies heavily on timestamps TS,TA and lifespans L as reliable 
indicators of the freshness of a communication. Thus, one drawback is that all 
63 
principals must keep local clock synchronization. Between two synchronizations with 
the reliable time source, local clocks may drift [14]. Participants must allow a time 
window for timestamps to compensate for local clock drift and the fact that messages 
take time to cross a network. In Kerberos, all tickets are time-stamped and have 
limited lifetimes. Ideally, no authentication ticket remains valid longer than the time 
an expert hacker would need to crack the encryption. The value of L should be 
carefully set in order to prevent replay attack by an eavesdropper. Authentication 
tickets are session-specific to improve the security of the system by ensuring that no 
authentication ticket remains valid after a given session is complete. In other words, 
a ticket can be used only once. Whenever the user wants to access the service again, 
he should apply a new ticket. In other words, the ticket cannot be reused. 
The security of the proposed proposal in this thesis, however, relies on a shared hash 
chain instead of timestamps. Thus, the validity of a ticket can last long time and can 
be reused. This will mitigate the burden of the ticket server to issue tickets. 
While the original Kerberos does not provide clients anonymity, one of the basic 
features of tickets is user privacy during service provision. Recently, an Internet 
draft [50] proposed a mechanism to allow a client to request an anonymous ticket. 
Moreover, Kerberos does not consider the payment and billing issue. If detailed 
billing records are needed by users, one solution is to add a record into S's database 
for each time of service by A. However, since both A and B only realize mutual 
authentication, A has no way to authorize B to generate a real record. The ticket 
here can be generated by B easily and B claims that A did access these services. 
It is also possible that B deliberately leaks the secret key and the ticket to help 
eavesdroppers to impersonate A. Similarly, A can also deny the service that he really 
did. 
Payment and billing activities are carefully designed through an improved payment 
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hash chain described in this thesis. Only U can sign the payment and nobody can forge 
this signature. Replaying a ticket to steal money by a malicious VASP is defended; 
denying the service from both principals are also impossible. 
As for scalability, Kerberos is limited to university-sized communities as the encryp-
tion specifications are designed primarily for conventional secret key cryptography. 
This results in a potential limitation in Kerberos scalability. Shared symmetric keys 
must be established and maintained between every user and the KDC, and between 
every application server and the KDC. 
This issue is quite different in the mechanism of this thesis. Although there is a 
secret authentication key shared between the ticket server and the client, this key is 
actually not established directly between the client and the ticket server. Instead, 
it is generated by the CA and transferred to the ticket server, by the client on 
his certificate. The ticket server does not directly have to maintain the secret key 
as it can obtain this key from the client's certificate while the client presents his 
certificate for ticket request. In addition, the key is stored with each ticket only for 
payment verification. Similarly, the client and the VASP do not have to maintain the 
authentication key either since the authentication key can be easily obtained from 
the ticket for each time of service request. 
3.5.2 Comparison with Extended Kerberos 
As indicated by Neuman et al. [51], the traditional Kerberos presents an attractive 
security target in the form of the KDC which maintains a shared symmetric key with 
every principal. In the event of a KDC compromise, all the symmetric keys will be 
divulged to the attacker and will have to be revoked [52]. 
Various studies have been done to extend Kerberos with PKC [51-54]. These ex-
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tensions integrate PKC into the initial authentication exchange and distribute most 
of the authentication workload away from the trusted intermediary to the commu-
nicating parties. Generally speaking, PKC can simplify the distribution of keys in 
the Kerberos environment because secret-key cryptology (SKC) requires a separate 
secret key to be shared between every pair of users. Thus, both the client and the 
KDC have a public-private key pair in order to prove their identities to each other 
over the open network. 
The extended Kerberos improves the scalability and security. Nevertheless, as with 
the traditional Kerberos, the extended Kerberos still relies on timestamps for freshness 
indicators. Consequently, the timestamped ticket can only be valid in a single session. 
The introduction of PKC also increases the computation requirement for clients. The 
billing issue remains the same. 
3.5.3 Comparisons with Mobile Service Mechanisms 
Many ticket-based mobile service access mechanisms [2,4-7,24] have been proposed 
to address the VAS access issue in mobile networks. We compare them with the work 
in this thesis. 
A secure billing for mobile information services conducted by Advanced Security for 
Personal Communications Technologies (ASPeCT) in UMTS is described in [2]. There 
are three principals in this pre-paid charging scheme: mobile user, service provider 
and UMTS service provider. This work relies on a third trusted party (TTP) to 
support mobile telecommunications security services which use PKC. When requiring 
services from the VASP, the user pays for the service by sending micropayment tokens 
("ticks") as shown in [3]. The VASP is able to check the validity of these ticks with a 
user's credential certificate issued by the UMTS service provider, or an appropriate 
TTP acting on behalf of the UMTS service provider. The UMTS service provider 
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will collect the billing information from VASPs and in turn forward to the user. A 
two phase charging protocol is illustrated. In the first phase, the user and the VASP 
authenticate each other and agree on a Diffie-Hellman session key. The second phase 
is responsible for data transfer through user's ticks. 
This work has several differences comparing to the work of this thesis. First, the 
protocol in [2] is based on PKC and the computational complexity is more expensive 
than symmetric cryptography operations. This requires powerful mobile devices. In 
this thesis, the mobile user needs only operations of hash and symmetric encryp-
tion/decryption. Second, the protocol focuses on authentication between the users 
and the VASP, and disregards different kinds of services in service provision. Third, 
the mobile user has to send his identity to the VASP. Thus, the VASP is constantly 
aware of the identity of users accessing services. 
In [7], an accountable anonymous access to services in mobile communication systems 
is proposed. It is also based on Diffie-Hellman PKC and composed of three roles: user, 
service provider and customer care agency. The protocol demonstrates one-time use, 
post-paid tickets for one type of ticket. Its charging is also based on ticks [3]. There 
are two major differences between this mechanism and the solution proposed in this 
thesis. First, the user has to generate a session key using Diffie-Hellman method. It 
involves a high level computational complexity. Second, the ticket cannot be reused. 
Although the user can obtain a few tickets once for later use, it is possible that a user 
would run out of his tickets while roaming. In this case, the user could not access a 
service since the customer care agency could not be reached. 
In [4], the authors present a ticket model which includes three principals: the mobile 
user, the service provider, and the ticket server. In this model, the mobile user is 
assumed to register with the ticket server. This service access mechanism can be 
split into two phases: ticket acquisition and ticket validation. The disadvantages of 
this work are similar to that in [2, 7]: a high-level computational complexity and 
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non-reusable tickets. The authors did not discuss the payment and billing issue. 
Another similar service access mechanism [24] is based on prepaid tickets that can 
only be used with the service provider issued them. Payment and billing issue is not 
discussed. The service provider can replay a ticket and users has no way to prove 
they have not used it. 
In [5,6], the authors propose another ticket-based model which involves a Trusted 
Credential Center (TCC) and a Trusted Authentication and Registration Center 
(TARC). In both mechanisms, different ticket types are considered with a single or 
multiple signatures required for ticket validation and the prevention of ticket reuse. 
All tickets cannot be modified by the users. Ticket duplication, including reusing a 
ticket and transferring a ticket, are discussed. One of the disadvantages is the high 
level of computational complexity required for the signer and the verifier who could 
be a mobile user. The signature schemes are based on RSA which is based on large 
prime numbers factorization. In the single signature scheme, the signer picks a large 
random number and runs large exponent operations twice while the verifier has to 
run it three times. All of these operations require users have powerful devices. The 
situation is even more serious when multiple signatures are involved. As with other 
ticket-based mechanisms, tickets cannot be reused. 
We simulated our mechanism and the mechanisms proposed in [4-7]. There are four 
ticket protocols in this simulation: 1 for our protocol, 2 for the protocol in [5,6], 3 for 
the protocol in [4] and 4 for the protocol in [7]. We chose 128 bits for symmetric key 
size and 1024 bits for public key size. The ticket and the certificate have the size of 
64 bytes. We chose Blowfish algorithm for symmetric encryption/decryption. For all 
the same message fields, we used the same size for all protocols. For protocol 1, we 
set the hash chain size 12. The message size comparison is shown in the Figure 3.2. 
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ticket acquisition phase while the provision message means all the messages involved 
during the service provision phase. The total message is just the sum of the acquisition 
message and the provision message. The total message size used protocol 1 is only 
nearly 400 bytes, much less than other protocols. This is because other protocols need 
to send public key or agreement key (1024 bits=128 bytes) in the message. While in 
protocol 1, the public key is only used for signature generation and verification. 
The networks for simulation are two popular packet data service networks: CDMA 
lxRTT and GPRS. We implemented the encryption/decryption algorithms with C++ 
language in a 1.8GHz CPU desktop computer. Thus, the desktop computer acted as 
the mobile station. Although it is too powerful compared to any mobile station, it is 
still a good reference as our goal is to compare the performance of protocols. 
For in each network, we split the simulation into two phases: ticket acquisition and 
service provision. For each phase, we simulated the user response time (the time that 
the user has to spend before replying the message, i.e., verifying and generating data) 
and the authentication time (the time that the whole protocol must consume from 
1200 1 
















the first message to the last message) as shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4: 
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FIGURE 3.3 SIMULATION IN CDMA lxRTT 
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FIGURE 3.4 SIMULATION IN GPRS 
The top curve in each figure represents the total authentication time for two phases 
of the ticket protocols. From simulations in both networks, the user response time 
for both phases are much less than the service provision time for all ticket protocols. 
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The user response time of protocol 1 is slightly less than that of other protocols. This 
difference would be much bigger for real mobile phone. As for the authentication time 
in both phases, protocol 1 takes much less time than other protocols. This can be 
explained from the difference of symmetric cryptography and public key cryptography 
used in the protocols. Considering the transmission time needed in the network, we 
have the top curves in each figure. These results prove that our proposed mechanism 
is lightweight. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Mobile communication systems are bringing more and more choices of VASs to mobile 
users. Due to various VASPs and numerous mobile users, the guarantee of secure and 
suitable access is a critical concern in service provision. This thesis proposed a novel 
mechanism to access mobile VASs through reusable tickets. Considering the limited 
computation capability of mobile devices, the mechanism is lightweight on the mobile 
user side: only symmetric encryption/decryption and hash operations are needed. We 
transfer high computational complexity to the ticket server and the VASP which are 
usually more powerful. Two hash chains are introduced to achieve mutual authenti-
cation, non-repudiation and ticket reuse. By allowing ticket reuse, a mobile user does 
not have to apply a new ticket for every service access. This is of high interest for 
two reasons: first, it is convenient for mobile users; second, it decreases the load of 
the ticket server. In order to avoid reinitializing the payment chain, we introduce a 
staircase incremental value function associating to the chain. We analyze the protocol 
through BAN belief logic. Comparisons with classic mechanisms (like Kerberos) and 
other mobile service access mechanisms, together with the experimental results, show 




ENHANCING UMTS AKA WITH VECTOR COMBINATION 
4.1 Introduction 
The unprecedented growth of world-wide mobile wireless markets, coupled with ad-
vances in communication technology and the accelerated development of services tak-
ing place in fixed networks, instigates the emergence of third Generation Mobile Com-
munication System (3G). The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
represents an evolution in terms of capacity, data speeds and new service capabilities 
from second generation mobile networks. It also provides more secure wireless access 
security mechanisms compared to the Global System for Mobile (GSM) Communica-
tions [22]. 
UMTS wireless security mechanisms has been widely applied while integrating UMTS 
with other networks [55-62]. Hence, providing secure wireless access mechanisms is 
critical to wireless network integration. One important mechanism in UMTS is the 
authentication and key agreement (AKA) [8,63-65]. UMTS AKA achieves mutual 
authentication by the user and the network through a long term shared secret key 
between the user's Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and the authentica-
tion center (AuC) in the user's home environment (HE). The design of UMTS AKA 
is closely based on the GSM challenge-response scheme. The mobile user's USIM 
maintains a sequence number with the user's home network. When the mobile user 
roams to a visited network, the home network sends a set of authentication vectors 
to the visited network. To authenticate the mobile station, the visited network picks 
up an unused vector and sends the challenge part to the mobile station. The mobile 
station checks the freshness of the sequence number and computes a response. Also, 
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the mobile station computes the cipher key and the integrity key for further commu-
nication encryption. The visited network compares the response with the expected 
response in the authentication vector. If they are same, the mobile station is authen-
ticated. Hence, mutual authentication is realized in UMTS. In GSM, only mobile 
station is authenticated. 
However, UMTS AKA has been criticized due to its introduction of sequence num-
bers [9-11] and its vulnerabilities of redirection attacks and active attacks in corrupted 
networks [9]. A failure of sequence number synchronization could result in compli-
cated protocol execution especially when the user roams to a foreign network [8,10]. 
The redirection attack can redirect a legitimate user's traffic to an unintended net-
work and also cause billing problem [9]. The active attack in corrupted networks 
may jeopardize the entire networks because an adversary can use the authentication 
vectors corrupted from one network to impersonate another network [9]. 
Another drawback of UMTS AKA exists in the distribution of authentication vectors. 
A size n array of authentication vectors can be used for n times authentication. Since 
only the HE is responsible for generating and sending authentication vectors for all 
subscribers, it actually becomes the traffic bottleneck. 
In this chapter, we abandon the adoption of sequence numbers and propose an en-
hanced AKA to eliminate the above drawbacks. The proposed AKA is based on 
vector combination: different vectors combining together can also be used for au-
thentication. Through vector combination, a size n array of authentication vectors 
can realize up to 2n~"1 times mutual authentication instead of only n times in UMTS 
AKA. Hence, the traffic for the HE to generate authentication vectors is exponentially 
decreased. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of UMTS AKA. 
Section 4.3 analyzes briefly its weaknesses. Section 4.4 presents the improved AKA 
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based on vector combination. Then, security analysis is given in Section 4.4. A 
comparison with related work is shown in Section 4.6. Finally, we conclude this 
chapter. 
4.2 Overview of UMTS AKA 
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of UMTS AKA mechanism. Detailed description can be 
found in [8,63-65]. The mobile station MS and its HE/HLR share a long term secret 
key K. This protocol describes the scenario that the MS roams to a visited location 
register (VLR) or a serving GPRS support node (SGSN). The communication channel 
between the VLR/SGSN and the HE/HLR is assumed secure [8]. 
MS VLR/SGSN HE/HLR 
Authentication data resquest 
IMSl 
Authentication data response 
AV[l..n] 
User authentication request 
RAND[i]\\AUTN[i] 
User authentication response 
RESfiJ 
FIGURE 4.1 UMTS AKA 
Upon receipt of a request from the VLR/SGSN, the HE/HLR sends an array of or-
dered authentication vectors AV[l..n] to the VLR/SGSN. The authentication vec-
tors are ordered based on a sequence number. Each authentication vector con-
sists of the following components: a random number RAND, an expected re-
sponse XRES = f2K(RAND), a cipher key CK = f3K(RAND), an integrity 
key IK = f4K(RAND), an anonymity key AK = fbK(RAND), a message au-
thentication code MAC = flK(SQN\\RAND\\AMF) and an authentication token 
AUTN = SQN(& AK||AMF|1MAC, where f2K,f3K,f4K are message authentica-
74 
tion functions with the secret key K, AMF is the authentication management field. 
The authentication token AUTN includes a sequence number SQN maintained be-
tween each pair of HE/HLR and the MS. Each authentication vector can be used for 
only one authentication and key agreement between the VLR/SGSN and the MS. 
Then, the VLR/SGSN selects the next available authentication vector and sends the 
parameters RAND and AUTN to the user. The MS first checks the correctness of 
MAC in AUTN. Then, it computes the AK and retrieves the SQN = SQN 0 
AK © AK. It verifies if SQN is in an acceptable range compared to the value 
he maintains. If it is not, he rejects the authentication and a sequence number 
resynchronization procedure may need to be executed by the HE/HLR. Otherwise, 
after successful verification of AUTN, the MS computes a response RES and sends 
back to the VLR/SGSN. The MS also computes CK and IK as the HE/HLR does. 
While receiving the response, the VLR/SGSN compares it with XRES stored in the 
authentication vector. If they match, the VLR/SGSN considers the authentication 
and key agreement exchange completed successfully. 
4.3 UMTS AKA Weaknesses 
Although UMTS provides more secure AKA than GSM as claimed by 3GPP [8], 
there still exists several weaknesses. These weaknesses has been widely discussed 
in literature. We first give an overview of these weaknesses here and propose an 
enhanced AKA in the next section. 
4.3.1 Sequence number: a bad choice 
In UMTS AKA, one of the main drawbacks is the adoption of sequence numbers. 
The HE/HLR should keep and update a sequence number for every mobile user. 
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The synchronization and re-synchronization involves complicated work (generation, 
allocation, verification, and management), especially with regard to the protection 
against an attack to force the sequence number wrap around and the compromise of 
user identity confidentiality [10]. A thorough analysis of operational difficulty with se-
quence numbers is given in [9]. Several scenarios which could result in synchronization 
failures are discussed in [9,10]. Once a synchronization fails, the re-synchronization 
procedure involves quite a few entities and network domains [8]. Moreover, a possible 
crash in the database which stores the sequence numbers will cost a lot to re-establish 
the synchronization [9]. 
4.3.2 HE/HLR: a bottleneck 
In UMTS AKA, the HE/HLR is responsible for generating authentication vectors 
upon receipt of requests from all VLRs/SGSNs. While the number of subscribers 
is usually large, the HE/HLR experiences heavy authentication traffic and actually 
becomes the bottleneck of the entire AKA scheme. This is even worse if the mobile 
user roams to a far away foreign network. This issue has been studied in [66,67]. 
Each work proposes an algorithm to investigate the traffic and determine the optimal 
number of authentication vectors. 
4.3.3 Attacks in UMTS AKA 
UMTA AKA is proved by BAN logic [29] in [8]. However, it has been suggested 
that the BAN logic is unable to deal with security flaws resulting from interleaving 
of protocol steps [47]. Recently, there are two attacks found in [9]: redirection at-
tacks, active attacks in corrupted networks. The redirection attack occurs when an 
adversary entices a legitimate mobile station to camp on the radio channels of the 
false base station. Since the authentication vectors can be used for any serving net-
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work, an adversary can intercept the vector and impersonate both the mobile user 
and the serving network. Consequently, the adversary can redirect user traffic to an 
unintended network. 
The active attack occurs while a network is corrupted and an adversary could forge 
an authentication data request from the corrupted network to obtain authentication 
vectors. In addition, the adversary could force the sequence number to be set in a 
very high value by flooding the authentication data to the home network. As a result, 
the adversary can start an active attack against legitimate users. 
4.4 Vector Combination Based AKA 
In this chapter, we propose an enhanced AKA based on vector combination (VC-
AKA). In UMTS AKA, each authentication vector is used only once. After that, it 
should be abandoned in order to defend replay attacks. In fact, we observe that a 
combination of two vectors can also be used for authentication in condition that this 
combination should also be used only once. For example, suppose (RANDi,XRESi) 
and (RAND2,XRES2) are two challenge-response pairs of two vectors in UMTS 
AKA, then (RANDx © RAND2,XRESi © XRES2) can also be used for authentica-
tion since only the user who passes the single vector authentication can compute the 
correct response. Of course, extra works need to be done in order to defend replay 
and impersonation attacks. 
In this way, a size n authentication vectors can have up to (2ra — 1) combinations 
(including combinations with only one vector as in UMTS AKA). The HE/HLR can 
control the combinations allowed to be used or simply allow both the VLR/SGSN 
and the MS to use all combinations. 
Based on this idea, we propose the protocol two procedures involved as follows. The 
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first procedure is responsible for the distribution and establishment of authentication 
vectors; the second procedure realizes vector combination based AKA between the 
mobile station and the VLR/SGSN (see Figure 4.2). 
MS VLR/SGSN HE/HLR 
User data request 
MSREQ 
User data response 
MSRES 
Authentication data resquest 
AUREQ 
Authentication data response 
AURES 
< 
Vector establishment request 
AUTN Distribution and 
Vector establishment response establishment of 
RES authentication vectors 
VC authentication request 
— Vector combination based 
VC authentication response authentication and key 
VCRES ^ agreement 
FIGURE 4.2 VECTOR COMBINATION BASED AKA 
When a mobile user roams to a visited network for the first time, the VLR/SGSN 
invokes the first procedure of this protocol by sending MSREQ as user data request 
to the MS: 
MSREQ = Nv 
where Nv is a newly generated nonce. Upon receipt of MSREQ, the mobile station 
MS generates MSRES as user data response and sends it back to the VLR/SGSN: 
MSRES = V, H, NM, MACM 
where NM is a nonce generated by the MS, and MACM = flK(NM\\Nv\\V\\H) 
is message authentication code generated by the function / l with the secret key 
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K. The MS indicates that V is the visited network and H is its home network for 
authentication. 
Subsequently, the VLR/SGSN sends AUREQ as authentication data request to the 
HE/HLR: 
AUREQ = MSRES, I MSI, Nv 
where IMSI is the MS's International Mobile Subscriber Identity. Upon receipt of 
AUREQ, the HE/HLR verifies if the mobile user is a legitimate user and checks 
the correctness of the authentication message code MACM through the shared se-
cret key K. If it fails, the HE/HLR rejects the authentication request. Oth-
erwise, the HE/HLR succeeds the mobile user authentication. Then, it gener-
ates authentication data as follows. First, it generates random numbers Rx,Ry 
and RAND. It computes a response XRES = f2K(NM\\Nv\\RAND), a ses-
sion key SK = fhK(NM\\Nv\\RAND) and an authentication token AUTN = 
RAND\\NM\\Nv\\{Ry}K\\MAC, where {RV}K means encrypted Ry with the secret 
key K and MAC = flK{RAND\\NM\\Nv\\{Ry}K). Then, it generates an array of 
n authentication vectors denoted by AV[l..n]. Each vector consists of a challenge-
response pair (RNi,XRESi), where RNt = f$K(NM\\NV\\RAND\\i) is the challenge 
and XRESi = f2K(NM\\Nv\\RAND\\i) © Rx is the response. Both of them rely 
strongly on the index i. The HE/HLR computes R — /2SK(RX © Ry) and constructs 
AURES message as authentication data response shown in Figure 4.2: 
AURES = AV[l..n], R, XRES, SK, AUTN. 
Upon receipt of AURES, the VLR/SGSN sends AUTN as vector establishment re-
quest to the MS and stores the rest locally. The MS isolates the RAND, {RV}K 
and checks the validity of the AUTN by computing the MAC. If it is not valid, 
the MS rejects. Otherwise, the MS gets the Ry by decrypting {RV}K with its 
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secret key K. It computes the session key SK — f5K{NM\\Ny\\RAND) and 
the response RES = f2K(NM\\Nv\\RAND). Then, the MS generates an ar-
ray of vectors AL4V[l..ra]. Each vector M^4V[i] consists of a challenge-response 
pair (XRNi,RESi), where XRNt = f5K(NM\\Nv\\RAND\\i) is the challenge and 
RESi = f2K(NM\\Nv\\RAND\\i)@Ry is the response. It keeps SK and sends RES 
as vector establishment response to the VLR/SGSN. 
Upon receipt of the RES, the VLR/SGSN compares if it is the same as XRES. 
If it is not, the VLR/SGSN rejects it and the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the first 
procedure finishes and authentication vectors are established in both the MS and the 
VLR/SGSN. 
The second procedure is invoked when the VLR/SGSN needs to authenticate the 
MS. It sends VC authentication request to the MS. This request message is based on 
vector combination. The number of combinations for n vectors is (2n — 1) (at least 
one vector in each combination). Each combination, denoted by c, is a 0 and 1 n-bit 
array and can be used only once. The combination's decimal value is between 1 and 
(2n - 1). For example, the decimal value of 01101 is 13 (between 1 and (25 - 1) = 31). 
Here, we add a constraint: the number of 1 bits of each combination must be odd. 
Thus, we actually have 2"_1 combinations available. 
For each request, the VLR/SGSN chooses randomly a different number c (1 < 
c < (2n — 1)) satisfying the above constraint. According to its bit 1 positions 
h,hr" !*m> the VLR/SGSN retrieves the challenges RNii:RNi2,- • • , RNim from 
the vectors Ay[l.,n]. Then, it computes RNVC = RNh © RNi2 © • • • © RNim and 
sends VCREQ as VC authentication request to the MS: 
VCREQ = {C}SK,RNVC. 
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Upon receipt of the message, the MS decrypts {C}SK and checks if combination c 
satisfies the constraint and if it is a new combination (all combinations sent from 
the VLR/SGSN are stored by the MS). If it does not, the MS rejects the authen-
tication request. Otherwise, it accepts the request and retrieves the challenges 
XRN^^XRN^,- • • ,XRNim according to c from the vectors MylV[l..n] and com-
putes the result XRNVC = XRNh 0 XRNi2 0 • • • 0 XRNim. 
It checks if RNvc and XRNVc are equal. If they are not, the MS rejects the 
authentication request. Otherwise, the network authentication succeeds. The MS 
increases the value of the selected challenges by 1 and stores XRN^ + l,XRNi2 + 
l,--- ,XRNim + 1 into the vector array MAV[l..n] for next time authentication. 
Then, the MS computes VCRES and sends it as VC authentication response to the 
VLR/SGSN: 
VCRES = RESh 0 RESi2 © • • • RESim 0 c. 
After sending VCRES, the MS also generates the cipher key CK = f3SK(XRNVc), 
the integrity key IK = fASK{XRNVc)- After that, the MS stores the combination 
c into its database and updates the number of combinations used. If the number 
of combinations reaches 2n _ 1 , there is no more combinations available for future 
authentication. In this case, the MS discards the authentication vectors and the 
first procedure needs to be executed to request new authentication vectors for future 
authentication. 
Upon receipt of the response, the VLR/SGSN computes 
VCXRES = XRESh © XRESi2 © • • • XRESim © c. 
Then, it checks if VCRES and VCX RES satisfy the follow equation: 
f2SK(VCRES © VCX RES) = R. 
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Here, we give an explanation. Since the number of 1 bits in c is odd, VCRES can 
be written as A © Ry © c and VCXRES can be written as A © Rx © c. Thus, 
VCRES © VCXRES = Rx © i^ . Note that i? = f2SK(Rx © #y) is computed in 
advance by the HE/HLR and stored only at the VLR/SGSN. 
If they fail to satisfy this equation, the VLR/SGSN aborts the authentication. Oth-
erwise, the MS authentication succeeds. The VLR/SGSN generates the cipher key 
and the integrity key similarly as the MS does: the cipher key CK = f3sK{RNyc) 
and the integrity key IK — JASK{RNVC)- Similarly, the VLR/SGSN also stores 
RN^ + 1, RNi2 + 1, • • • , RNim + 1 into the vector array AV[l..n] for next time au-
thentication. 
4.5 Security Analysis of VC-AKA 
4.5.1 Enhanced Security 
The proposed VC-AKA has enhanced security compared to UMTS AKA. In the 
first procedure, the distribution and establishment of authentication vectors, all the 
principals (the MS, the VLR/SGSN and the HE/HLR) contribute the generation of 
the session key SK and each RNt with their own nonces. While in UMTS AKA, 
they are generated only by the HE/HLR. In the second procedure, to achieve mutual 
authentication between the MS and the VLR/SGSN, a randomly chosen combination 
c is sent to the MS. The response from the MS is generated based on the contributions 
of all principals. Hence, mutual authentication is stronger. The cipher key CK and 
the integrity key IK are generated in the similar way. 
VC-AKA does not employ sequence numbers to realize network authentication as in 
UMTS AKA. Instead, all three principals contribute the random numbers' generation 
and the network authentication is guaranteed through unused vector combinations. 
82 
The only extra space needed for the VLR/SGSN and the MS is the storage for used 
combinations. In order to avoid large space for all 2 n _ 1 combinations, the HE/HLR 
can tune n to a reasonable value (e.g. n = 7) or choose randomly only a part of 
combinations permitted for both the VLR/SGSN and the MS. 
If ever k — 1 vectors are compromised (although it is very hard), the attacker is still 
not easy to impersonate a legitimate user. For each time authentication, the VLR 
chooses randomly m vectors. If there is at least one vector not belonging to the subset 
of k — 1 vectors, the attacker will not be able to concoct the response. Note that, all 
the m vectors will be updated after the authentication; thus, the k — 1 vectors will 
not be valid any more. 
4.5.2 Against Replay Attack 
The replay attack is one of main concerns while designing authentication protocols. 
In UMTS AKA, the sequence number is used to defend against the replay attack. 
In VC-AKA, we eliminate the sequence number and the VLR/SGSN and the MS 
maintain a set of combinations. Only if c has not been used before can it be accepted 
by the MS. Thus, we first defend against the used combinations attack. 
As for the authentication vectors, after each time authentication, both the MS and 
the VLR/SGSN update the selected RN^.RN^, • • • , RNim by increasing 1. In other 
words, the challenge RNi set in the vector AV[l..n] and the challenge XRNi set in 
vector MAV[l..n] are updated synchronizely for each time successful authentication. 
This is required to prevent an attacker concocting a valid RNvc through XOR oper-
ations on previously intercepted RNycS- Thus, we defend against the used challenges 
attack. 
To put the above results together, VC-AKA can defend against the replay attack. 
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4.5.3 Against Malicious Threats 
In UMTS security architecture [8], the VLR/SGSN could be in a foreign network 
and could be malicious. It is possible that the VLR/SGSN deliberately leaks Alice's 
information to Eve and tries to help Eve pass the authentication. Suppose that 
Eve has Alice's AV[l..ra]. However, since XRESi is not equal to RESi, Eve cannot 
compute the correct VCRES without the knowledge of Ry which is sent to Alice's 
mobile station secretly. 
For each time successful authentication, both the VLR/SGSN and the MS update 
the challenges by increasing their values by 1. Thus, the challenges in the two arrays 
are always fresh. Even if an adversary intercepts several used combinations and 
RNVc values, he can do nothing and cannot concoct a valid RNVc or XRNVc to 
impersonate a legitimate entity. 
The session key SK helps the VLR/SGSN and the MS to generate the cipher key 
CK and the integrity key IK in the similar way as in [10]. Even if Eve gets Alice's 
SK in the help of the malicious VLR/SGSN, however, Eve can do nothing. Note that 
R = J2SK{RX © Ry) is computed by the HE/HLR in advance; the VLR/SGSN can 
use R for verification only and cannot obtain the knowledge of Ry due to the one-way 
hash function; the MS has no knowledge of R and Rx, either. 
4.5.4 Against Redirection Attacks 
In [9], the authors showed a possible redirection attack in UMTS AKA because the 
authentication vector can be used by any serving network. In VC-AKA, when the 
MS roams from the HE/HLR to a VLR/SGSN, it receives the user data request 
message and replies a user data response message which includes the MACM = 
f\-K{NM\\Nv\\V\\H). When the HE/HLR receives the authentication data request 
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message, it can check if the MS is really in the coverage of the supposed VLR/SGSN. 
If it is not, the HE/HLR refuses the connection request. While the MS receives the 
authentication token AUTN, he can check if they are really sent by the supposed 
HE/HLR and VLR/SGSN through MAC since all three principals contribute to the 
generation of MAC. Similarly, for each mutual authentication between the MS and 
the VLR/SGSN, all principals also contribute to the generation of challenge/response 
message. Hence, VC-AKA can defend the redirection attack. 
4.5.5 Network Corruption Impact 
We also examine the impact of network corruption discussed in [9]. Suppose that a 
VLR/SGSN is corrupted and the adversary can eavesdrop any message received or 
sent by VLR/SGSN. There are two possible scenarios. First, the MS has no authen-
tication vectors left and needs to execute the first procedure to request vectors from 
its HE/HLR. However, in this scenario, the adversary cannot forge an authentication 
data request message because this message should comprise a message authentication 
code from the MS. 
Second, the MS has unused authentication vectors when the VLR/SGSN is corrupted. 
The adversary can concoct a challenge and force the MS to response. However, the 
adversary can only use the left combinations and can do nothing when all combina-
tions are used up. In this case, the first procedure should be executed to obtain new 
authentication vectors while it is impossible as described in the first scenario. Hence, 
network corruption can only influence the MS who has unused vector combinations. 
While in UMTS AKA, it could influence all the legitimate users. 
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4.6 Comparison with Related Work 
One of the obvious advantages of VC-AKA is the introduction of vector combination. 
Consequently, for an array of n vectors, authentication can reach up to 2 n _ 1 times 
instead of only n times in UMTS AKA. Take an example, n = 7, and authentication 
can happen up to 64 times instead of only 7 times. This decreases exponentially the 
traffic needed to generate authentication vectors for the HE/HLR which has numerous 
subscribers. 
We compare VC-AKA to other proposals. Recently, an analytic model [66] is pro-
posed to investigate the impact of the size of the authentication vector array in order 
to minimize the cost. Another work [67] proposes a dynamic length of authenti-
cation vector array based on prediction of the mobile user's residence time in the 
VLR/SGSN. Consequently, it is able to reduce the network traffic and avoid the bot-
tleneck at AuC. These works are different from VC-AKA because they do not change 
the original UMTS AKA protocol and tries to find a best size of the array through 
traffic analysis. 
In [9], an adaptive AKA (AP-AKA) is proposed without sequence numbers. Instead, 
the MS keeps a list of unused vectors' indexes to verify if an authentication vector is 
really sent from the serving network and was not used before. This helps the mobile 
user to defend replay attacks. The protocol also differentiates if the MS stays in 
his home network or roams to a serving network. In each scenario, the execution of 
protocol is different. To some extent, this improves the efficiency since the protocol 
in the home network needs less runs than that in the serving network. As in UMTS 
AKA, the authentication vectors can also be used only n times. 
In [10], the authors employ two techniques: a one-time password/hash chaining tech-
nique [12] and keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [13] instead of the 
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sequence number to establish mutual authentication. For convenience, we call this 
HH-AKA. In HH-AKA, when a mobile user roams to a VLR, he generates a hash 
chain and sends to his HE/HLR. After successful verification of the hash chain, the 
HE/HLR sends it to the VLR. The VLR then generates another hash chain and sends 
to the MS. Thus, each MS and VLR pair has two distinct hash chains for successive 
mutual authentication. This mechanism, however, introduces another synchroniza-
tion: the authentication times between the MS and the VLR. Once a mismatch of 
times occurs due to a network failure, it is difficult for the two parties to synchro-
nize. Compared to HH-AKA, the combination check in VC-AKA is more flexible: if 
a combination is found to be used, it does not influence future authentication. As in 
UMTS AKA and [9], authentication can happen only up to the length of the hash 
chain. 
As in UMTS AKA, the redirection attack in HH-AKA is also possible as discussed 
in [9]. An adversary can impersonate a base station and entice the mobile user 
to camp on the radio channels of the false base station. Since there is no serving 
network identity indication in the registration message, the home network cannot 
differentiate whether the message is from the mobile user directly or relayed by an 
adversary. Consequently, the authentication would be successful and the adversary 
could redirect the traffic to an unintended network. 
Another drawback in HH-AKA is the employment of timestamps for message fresh-
ness while the MS sends his hash chain to the HE/HLR. However, to guarantee 
freshness by timestamps, both MS and HE/HLR must keep local clocks periodically 
synchronized by a reliable source of time in a secure manner. Between synchroniza-
tion with the reliable time source, local clocks may drift [14]. Both entities must 
allow a time window for timestamps to compensate for local clock drift and the fact 
that messages take time to cross a network. Moreover, the mobile user might have 
his own "personalized clock" in his real life, for example, always 3 minutes in advance 
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for not missing the bus. Thus, it is not reasonable to require the mobile user to keep 
an exact clock as the network. 
We simulate the performance for UMTS AKA, AP-AKA, HH-AKA and VC-AKA as 
they are based on the same model of UMTS AKA. We are particularly interesting 
in the traffic generated by HLR as it is the bottleneck of the whole performance. 
Our analysis is based on the data from a week-long trace [68]. A total of 4,156 
users place 171,318 packet data calls from 139 cell sites. We assume that each call 
requires authentication between mobile users and networks. We also assume that the 
authentication vector length in UMTS AKA is 5 and the length of the authentication 
vector is 640 bits as defined in 3GPP [69]. The simulation results are shown in 
Figure 4.3. 
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FIGURE 4.3 TRAFFIC COMPARISON F O R AKA VARIANTS 
In this figure, the HLR traffic curves represents the authentication traffic that the 
HLR generates in order to help the VLR/SGSN authenticate the MS. This traffic may 
include only authentication vectors as in UMTS AKA; or, it may include also other 
authentication data as in AP-AKA, HH-AKA and VC-AKA. As the authentication 









171318/16 = 10708 times vector array (5 for each array). While in other AKA 
variants, the HLR has to generate 171318/5 = 34264 times vector array. From this 
figure, the HLR traffic for VC-AKA is much less than other variants. 
The wireless traffic curves represents the message transferred in wireless radio link: be-
tween the VLR/SGSN and the MS. Both the two procedures in each variant may con-
tribute the traffic. In UMTS AKA, there is no wireless traffic involved in the first pro-
cedure. While in the second procedure, the VLR/SGSN sends the RANDi\\AUTNi 
to the MS for each time authentication. In AP-AKA, the first procedure contributes 
some wireless traffic and the second procedure is similar to UMTS AKA. In HH-AKA, 
the first procedure contributes more traffic than that in AP-AKA and the second pro-
cedure sends 2 hash chains for each authentication. In VC-AKA, the first procedure 
contributes some traffic in order to help the VLR/SGSN and the MS to establish the 
authentication vectors. While the second procedure is much simpler than other AKA 
variants. To put them together, the wireless traffic comparison can be seen from this 
figure. VC-AKA involves least traffic than other variants. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter first gave an overview of UMTS AKA and showed its weaknesses, espe-
cially the adoption of sequence numbers and the traffic bottleneck in the HE/HLR. 
The synchronization of sequence numbers has been criticized a lot and many improve-
ments have been proposed. In this chapter, in order to eliminate these weaknesses 
and enhance the security, we abandon completely the adoption sequence numbers 
and propose an enhanced AKA based on authentication vector combination. The 
main advantage of VC-AKA is that it liberates the HE/HLR from the bottleneck of 
authentication vectors generation. 
The security analysis showed that VC-AKA can defend against redirection attacks and 
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active attacks in corrupted networks. Also, VC-AKA provides enhanced security on 
session key generation and mutual authentication. Through comparison with UMTS 




MOBILITY-ORIENTED AKA IN UMTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The amazingly high growth of world-wide mobile wireless markets, coupled with ad-
vances in communications technology and the accelerated development of services, 
instigates the emergence of third Generation Mobile Communications System (3G). 
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), a standard of 3G, rep-
resents an evolution in terms of capacity and more secure service capabilities from 
second generation mobile networks. 
In our real life, although people have the potential for relatively random patterns of 
behavior, there are easily identifiable routines in every person's life [70]: getting out of 
bed, eating lunch, driving from home to office, weekend shopping, etc. In mobile net-
works, not surprisingly, most users follow also regular routine during business hours, 
residing mostly at their place of work [71]. Many users show little or no mobility and 
they generally visit a small portion of the network [68,72]. An understanding of user 
mobility is required for the design, the implementation and the proper provisioning 
of services in 3G and future cellular networks [68], [72], [73]. 
In Chapter 4, we analyzed UMTS AKA and discussed its weaknesses. In this chapter, 
we consider authentication and user privacy issues in UMTS from the point of view 
of the user mobility patterns. The UMTS AKA does not consider the user mobility 
pattern. It treats the mobility for all mobile users in a general way: the same authen-
tication through a challenge-response mechanism. The challenge-response mechanism 
involves always three entities: the mobile user, the home environment/home location 
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register (HE/HLR) and the visitor location register (VLR). Consequently, they are 
not efficient if mobile users stay in their frequently visited foreign networks for most 
of their activities. 
To improve the AKA mechanisms to be mobility-oriented, we propose MO-AKA in 
which each mobile user keeps a cache of the most frequently visited VLRs and the last 
visited VLR. Each VLR in the cache can be a proxy of the HE/HLR for authentication 
purpose. Upon the next authentication, the mobile user first checks the cache to see 
if there is a proper proxy available. If he can find one, the mobile user and the 
newly visited VLR do not need to run long distance protocol with the HE/HLR for 
authentication. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 gives the background and the mo-
tivation. Our proposed mobility-oriented authentication is presented in Section 5.3. 
Then, we analyze our approach in Section 5.4. A comparison and performance is 
given in Section 5.5. Finally, we concludes this chapter. 
5.2 Background and Motivation 
In [72], the authors analyzed a seven-week trace of a metropolitan-area wireless net-
work in San Francisco Bay Area. The results shows that 42% of all mobile users are 
stationary, and that 64% visit only one location per day. More surpringly, as the 
number of locations visited on a daily basis increases, the average distance traveled 
decrease. This implies that the more mobile users roam, the closer the locations are. 
From the empirical findings, Halepovic et al. [68] introduced a notion of home cell 
in their mobility model. The notion of home cell refers to the cell from which a 
user makes a significant proportions of calls. They found that 55% of the users are 
stationary and 9.6% had only a single location change during the week. 
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In UMTS, a VLR usually comprises many cells and AKA is realized at the VLR 
level, not the cell level. Hence, different locations can be in the same VLR and most 
activities of a single mobile user could be in one VLR. We call this VLR as home 
VLR. Compared to the mobility behavior in terms of location, we can obtain the 
following observation. 
Observation: In UMTS, practically, a single mobile user usually has a fairly regular 
routine and could have a home VLR in which occur his most activities. Such mobile 
users have a high proportion of all mobile users. 
Quintero [71] indicates if mobile users are classified into categories, the system could 
treat each category differently to minimize system costs. This is helpful to traffic rout-
ing, admission control, resource allocation and handoff management [74], [75]. Such 
understanding is critical for planning future large-scale mobile network infrastructure 
such as UMTS [68], [72], [73]. 
Naturally, mobility patterns should be taken into account for the design of network 
security. Based on our observation, we classify users into two categories: stationary 
users and mobile users. Stationary users are those who stay in a VLR for most 
network service requests. Mobile users are those who roam frequently among VLRs. 
In UMTS AKA, we notice that the HE/HLR is a bottleneck of authentication traffic. 
If we could find a way to treat stationary users and mobile users differently and 
decrease the whole traffic, we would eliminate the bottleneck finally. 
5.3 Mobility-Oriented Authentication 
For convenience, we denote the identity of the mobile user by M, the identity of 
VLR/SGSN by V and the identity of HE/HLR by H. We assume that a mobile user 
shares a secret key KMH with the HE/HLR. In addition, we assume that the HE, the 
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VLR/SGSN have their own secret key KH, Kv respectively. For the first time that a 
mobile user registers to the HE/HLR, an encrypted identity {IMSI}KH is stored in 
the MS. The MS can present this encrypted identity for authentication request. 
5.3.1 The Trust Model 
In UMTS AKA, the trust relationship exists in two ways: one between the MS and the 
HE/HLR, the other between the HE/HLR and other VLRs. That's the reason why the 
VLR/SGSN should fetch an authentication vector generated by the HE/HLR. Also, 
it is the reason why the HE/HLR is the traffic bottleneck. Based on our observation, 
we may establish a "trust relationship" between the MS and his home VLR. Of course, 
this trust relationship should be under the control of the HE/HLR. In other words, 
only the HE/HLR can help both the MS and the home VLR trust each other. This 
would be reasonable in if the HE/HLR and the VLR belong to the same wireless 
operator. Formally, we have the following assumption: 
Assumption: In UMTS, the HE/HLR may delegate its authentication right to the 
MS's home VLR. 
Note that this delegation, and the trust relationship, should be short-term and the 
HE/HLR should update it periodically. The trust model is shown in Figure 5.1. 
In this model, the solid line represents the system predefined trust relationship. The 
empty line between the MS and the home VLR indicates an established (through 
the HE/HLR) trust relationship. The HE/HLR registers the home VLR of the user 
(usually the stationary user) based on his mobility behavior. This registration could 
be done through an agreement between the user and the network or through machine 
learning. 
In UMTS AKA, when a VLR/SGSN succeeds the authentication of a mobile user 
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FIGURE 5.1 T H E TRUST MODEL 
with the help of his HE/HLR, a mutual trust relationship is established between the 
VLR/SGSN and the MS. This means that this VLR/SGSN could be helpful if the 
MS roams to another VLR/SGSN. To maintain the relationship, we need a shared 
secret between the VLR/SGSN and the MS. When the MS starts to roam for the first 
time, the HE/HLR helps the VLR/SGSN and the MS to establish a shared secret key. 
When the MS roams to another VLR/SGSN, he can ask his last visited VLR/SGSN to 
be responsible to establish a trust relationship between him and the new VLR/SGSN. 
In this case, the visited VLR/SGSN is a kind of proxy of the HE/HLR and there is 
no necessity to run long distance authentication with the HE/HLR. 
5.3.2 Authentication Process 
Based on our observation, to be efficient and practical, we propose that the MS 
keeps a cache of VLRs/SGSNs which are the most frequently visited VLRs/SGSNs 
by the MS (for example, at home and at the office). Certainly, this cache includes his 
home VLR. Besides the home VLR in the cache, we allow a few other VLRs whose 
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activities with the MS have also relatively high proportion. According to the results 
from [68], [72], [76], the number of VLRs in the cache could range from 1 to 5. These 
VLRs/SGSNs can be learned step by step based on some user profile strategies [71], 
[75], [77], [78], [79], [80] or simply based on a user profile definition in practice. 
Since the newly visited VLR/SGSN is usually near to the last visited VLR/SGSN 
according to [72], we add a special property to the cache. Besides the most fre-
quently visited VLRs/SGSNs, the first entry of the cache is always the last visited 
VLR/SGSN. During the service provisioning of the entire network, once the mobile 
user wants a VLR to be in his cache, he notices the VLR to keep the shared secret 
key for fairly long time. Periodically, each VLR will check the visit frequency of all 
such mobile users in its database and delete those users who visit much less or do not 
visit any more. 
When the MS roams to a VLR/SGSN, he first checks if it is in the cache. If so, 
he authenticates with the VLR/SGSN directly without involvement of a third party. 
Otherwise, he asks the last visited VLR/SGSN as a proxy to authenticate himself. 
After that, he updates the cache by replacing the first entry as the newly visited 
VLR/SGSN. Through this way, we add intelligence into UMTS AKA and call this 
MO-AKA. In practice, the user mobility pattern definition or learning should be 
updated periodically in order to improve the hit rate of the cache. Nevertheless, 
we should notice that the VLRs/SGSNs are not completely equal to the HE/HLR. 
When the MS leaves his HE/HLR and roams for a long time, it is necessary to re-
authenticate the MS through the HE/HLR. 
In the following, we will consider different scenarios: MS roams from the HE/HLR 
to a VLR/SGSN, MS Roams between VLRs/SGSNs, MS Revisits a VLR/SGSN and 
MS Revisits the HE/HLR. 
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5.3.3 M S R o a m s from the H E / H L R t o a V L R / S G S N 
The first scenario is the most discussed one in literature: the MS leaves his HE/HLR 
and starts to roam to a VLR/SGSN. If it is the first time, the cache is empty. In this 
case, the only way through which the VLR/SGSN authenticates the mobile user is 
with the help of the HE/HLR. The figure 5.2 shows the protocol runs in this scenario. 
MS VLR/SGSN HE/HLR 
User data reguest 
MSREQ 
User data response 
MSRES 
Authentication data request 
AUREQ 
Authentication data response 
AURES 
User authentication request 
AUTN 





F I G U R E 5.2 MS R O A M S F R O M H E / H L R T O V L R / S G S N 
When the mobile user roams to the visited network, the VLR/SGSN invokes the 
protocol by sending MSREQ message for user data request. The MSREQ includes 
a newly generated nonce JVy. Upon receipt of MSREQ message, the mobile station 
generates MSRES message: MSRES = {IMSI}KH,H,NM,MACM where NM 
is a nonce generated by the mobile user, and MACM = flKMH{NM\\Nv\\V\\H) is 
message authentication code generated by the function / l with the secret key KMH-
The MS indicates that H is his home network for authentication. Subsequently, the 
VLR/SGSN sends AUREQ for authentication request to the HE/HLR. The AUREQ 
consists of MSRES and Nv: AUREQ = MSRES, Nv, V. 
Upon receipt of AUREQ, the HE/HLR first decrypts {IMSI}K[1 to get the identity 
of the mobile user and retrieves the shared secret key KMH- After the verification 
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that the mobile user is a valid registered user, the HE/HLR checks the correctness of 
the authentication message code MACM through the shared secret key KMH- If it 
fails, the HE/HLR rejects the authentication procedure. Otherwise, the HE/HLR 
succeeds the mobile user authentication. Then, it generates a random number 
RAND and computes a shared key KMV between the mobile user and VLR/SGSN: 
KMV = f^KMH(NM\\Nv\\RAND). This shared key is much secure since all the three 
parties contribute their own nonces. The HE/HLR includes this secret key in the 
AURES message: AURES = RAND, AMF, IMSI,MACH,KMV, where AMF is 
authentication management field and MACH = flKMH(RAND\\AMF\\IMSI\\V). 
It sends this message back to the VLR/SGSN. 
Upon receipt of AURES, the VLR/SGSN keeps the shared key KMV and builds 
an authentication token AUTN message: AUTN = RAND, AMF, MACH,MACV, 
where MACV = flKMV(RAND\\AMF\\MACH\\NV), and sends to the mobile user. 
Upon receipt of AUTN, the mobile user first verifies MACH through the shared 
key KMH- If it is not correct, he aborts the authentication procedure. Otherwise, 
the mobile user succeeds the authentication of the HE/HLR. Then, he computes 
the secret key KMv = f^KMH{NM\\Nv\\RAND) and continues to verify the correct-
ness of MACy with this key. If it is correct, he succeeds the authentication of the 
VLR/SGSN. Then, he computes the cipher key CK = fZKMV(NM\\Nv\\RAND) 
and integrity key IK = f4KMV(NM\\Nv\\RAND) for further secure communi-
cation. Also, he computes RES and sends back to the VLR/SGSN: RES = 
f2KMV(NM\\Nv\\RAND), {RN}KMV where RN is a new random number generated 
by the MS. 
The VLR/SGSN verifies the correctness of RES through the newly established shared 
key KMV- If it fails, the VLR/SGSN rejects the authentication. Otherwise, the 
VLR/SGSN succeeds the authentication of the mobile user. Then, the VLR/SGSN 
generates a TMSI and stores the triplet (IMSI, TMSI, KMV) in its local database 
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for future authentication. In the database, the IMSI is the primary key and TMSI 
should be uniquely indexed. This means that there should be only one entry in the 
database for each IMSI and the triplet can be retrieved by a TMSI. If there is 
already an entry for an IMSI, it should be updated. 
The VLR/SGSN also computes the cipher key: CK = fZKMV(NM\\Nv\\RAND) and 
the integrity key: IK = JAKMV{NM\\NV\\RAND) for subsequent secure communica-
tion. At last, the VLR/SGSN generates ALLOC message and sends to the mobile 
user: ALLOC = {{TMSI}Kv,RN + 1 , T M S I } K M V where TMSI is the newly gen-
erated temporary mobile subscriber identity. It should be noticed that TMSI is 
usually coupled with location area identity (LAI) [8] in order to locate the mobile 
user's position in the network. For simplicity, we only put TMSI in the protocol. 
Upon receipt the ALLOC, the mobile user verifies its correctness by decrypting it 
with KMV a n d checking the nonce RN + 1. If it is correct, he saves {TMSI}KV and 
TMSI for next time authentication use. 
Until now, the mobile user authenticates the VLR/SGSN and the HE/HLR; the 
VLR/SGSN and the HE/HLR succeed the authentication of the mobile user. Thus, 
mutual authentication is realized. The MS adds this VLR/SGSN and the KMV into 
his cache if it is considered to be a frequently visited VLR/SGSN. 
5.3.4 MS Roams between VLRs/SGSNs 
The second scenario occurs when the mobile user roams from a VLR/SGSN to an-
other VLR/SGSN and the latter is not in the cache of the mobile user. The new 
VLR/SGSN does not need to ask the HE/HLR for authentication. Instead, the last 
visited VLR/SGSN (denoted by VLR0/SGSN0) would be a proxy of the HE/HLR 
to authenticate the mobile user. The authentication procedure is similar to the one 
that the MS roams from his HE/HLR to a VLR/SGSN. We just need to replace the 
99 
HE/HLR identity H with V0. The only difference is that the user temporary identity 
{TMSI}KVO is sent instead of the permanent identity {IMSI}KH in the MSRES 
message. We just omit the detailed description here. 
5.3.5 MS Revisits a VLR/SGSN 
The next scenario of MO-AKA considers the authentication while the mobile user 
revisits or remains in a VLR/SGSN. According to our observation, this scenario is 
the most common in practice. Most of activities of a given mobile user are found 
in this scenario. Thus, the efficiency of AKA in this case is critical to the overall 
performance of wireless networks. The authentication procedure is very simple as 
shown in figure 5.3. 
MS VLR/SGSN 
User data request 
MSREQ 





FIGURE 5.3 MS REVISITS A VLR/SGSN 
The VLR/SGSN invokes the protocol by sending MSREQ message for user data 
request. The MSREQ includes a newly generated nonce Nv as in other scenarios. 
Upon receipt of MSREQ, the mobile station generates MSRES message MSRES = 
{TMSI}Kv, {NV, V, NM}KMV and sends back to VLR/SGSN, where NM is a nonce 
generated by the mobile user. When the VLR/SGSN receives the message, it decrypts 
the first field with its secret key Ky and gets the mobile user's TMSI. It retrieves 
the triplet from its database and gets the corresponding shared key KMv- Then, 
it decrypts the second field with this key and gets the nonce Ny,V and NM- It 
checks the correctness of the nonce Ny and the identity V. If they are correct, the 
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VLR/SGSN authenticates the mobile user and knows that the mobile user knows V 
as his authentication network. It computes the cipher key CK = f%KMV{NM\\Nv) 
and the integrity key IK = fAKMV(NM\\Nv) for subsequent secure communication. 
Then, it generates a new TMSI encrypted with its secret key for the mobile user and 
sends back NETAU message: NETAU = {NM ® IMSI,{TMSIn}Kv}KMV where 
I MSI is retrieved from the triplet. 
As soon as the mobile user receives the NETAU message and verifies the correctness, 
he succeeds the authentication of the VLR/SGSN. He stores {TMSIn}Kv for next 
time authentication. Then, he computes the cipher key CK — f^KMv(^M\\Nv) and 
the integrity key IK = f^KMV{NM\\Nv) for subsequent secure communication. Thus, 
mutual authentication between the mobile user and the VLR/SGSN is realized. 
5.3.6 MS Revisits the HE/HLR 
Now, we consider the last scenario of MO-AKA: the mobile user revisits his HE/HLR. 
This could be the case that the mobile user roams from a VLR/SGSN or the mobile 
user stays in the HE/HLR and just reauthenticates. In this scenario, the mobile user 
does not need to ask a VLR/SGSN for authentication as in the previous scenario. 
The authentication is also simple as shown in figure 5.4. 
MS HE/HLR 
User data request 
MSREQ 






FIGURE 5.4 MS REVISITS THE HE/HLR 
The HE/HLR invokes the protocol by sending MSREQ message for user data request. 
The MSREQ includes a newly generated nonce NH- Upon receipt of MSREQ, the 
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mobile user generates MSRES message and sends back to HE/HLR: MSRES = 
{IMSI}KH,{NH,H,NM}KMH where NM is a nonce generated by the mobile user. 
When the HE/HLR receives the message, it decrypts the first field with its secret 
key KH and gets the mobile user's I MSI. It retrieves the corresponding shared key 
K-MH- Then, it decrypts the second field with this key and gets the nonce NH, H and 
NM- It checks the correctness of the nonce NH and the identity H. If they are correct, 
the HE/HLR authenticates the mobile user and knows that the mobile user knows 
H as his home network. Then, it computes the cipher key CK = f&KMH{NM\\NH) 
and the integrity key IK = /4:KMH(NM\\NH) for subsequent secure communication. 
It sends back NETAU message: NETAU = {NM © IMSI}KMH. 
As soon as the mobile user receives the NETAU message and verifies the correctness, 
he succeeds the authentication of the VLR/SGSN. Then, he computes the cipher key 
CK = f3KMH(NM\\NH) and the integrity key IK = fAKMH{NM\\NH) for subsequent 
secure communication. Thus, mutual authentication between the mobile user and the 
HE/HLR is realized. 
5.4 Security Analysis of MO-AKA 
5.4.1 User Privacy and Untraceability 
In mobile networks, untraceability is the ability that it is difficult to verify the history, 
location, or application of an user by means of recorded identification. Untraceability 
belongs to user privacy category and is recommended by 3GPP. In all the protocols 
of MO-AKA, the user identity is always sent in an encrypted form. To prevent 
an adversary from tracing the encrypted identification, a TMSI is generated and 
encrypted by the VLR once the MS the VLR establish a trust relationship with the 
help of the HE/HLR. After that, the TMSI is changed immediately whenever the 
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MS re-visits the VLR. While in UMTS AKA, the I MSI is still sent in cleartext while 
the mobile user sends registration requests to the VLR. Hence, we realize user privacy 
and untraceability. 
5.4.2 Key Generation and Freshness 
In the first two scenarios, the shared secret key between a VLR and a MS is generated 
by the HE/HLR or the last visited VLR in this way: the key is the function of three 
nonces from the VLR, the MS and the HE/HLR (or the last visited VLR). The cipher 
key and the integrity key are also generated in the same way in the first two scenarios. 
For the last two scenarios, two parties are involved instead of three parties. The cipher 
key and the integrity key are generated by the function of two nonces from the MS 
and the VLR (or the HE/HLR). Hence, the generated secure keys are strong and 
fresh since all involved parties contribute their nonces. 
5.4.3 Threats and Attacks 
MO-AKA is a tailored UMTS AKA which takes into account the user's mobility 
pattern. It is based on an assumption and works only when the user's home VLR 
is determined and available. The assumption is the base stone of MO-AKA. The 
agreement is made by the MS, the home VLR and the HE/HLR. Any principal can 
terminate the agreement and MO-AKA will be replaced by regular UMTS AKA. 
Also, the agreement needs to deal with the issue that the shared secret between the 
MS and the home VLR should be updated periodically. 
This assumption would be easy within the same wireless operator where the HE/HLR 
and all VLRs can be trusted each other. Between different wireless operators, how-
ever, the management of the trust relationship is critical in MO-AKA and may bring 
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risks from both the inside and the outside of the system. The home VLR and the 
VLR in cache from a different operator might be malicious and deliberately leak the 
secret key KMV to other mobile users to help them impersonate the legitimate users. 
Consequently, the VLR may blame that the legitimate user leaks the secret key and 
it is hard to justify the responsibility. 
The management of the cache is also a risky task to the system. The updating of the 
cache may bring potential outside attacks, for example, DoS attacks. An adversary 
may launch numerous updating requests to a VLR. The VLR, as a result, becomes 
very busy in maintaining the database and may not be able to handle regular service 
requests. In order to defend the DoS attacks, we can avoid the cache updating 
procedure. In order to avoid updating, in practice, the cache size can be fixed and 
limited to 1 (home VLR only) or 2 (home VLR + a most frequently visited VLR). This 
would be also beneficial for the management of the trust relationship. In addition, it 
would be fairly easier to designate a trustful home VLR than require other VLRs be 
trustful as well. Thus, the probability of threats from inside would be much less. 
5.5 Comparison and Performance Evaluation 
MO-AKA treats stationary users and mobile users differently. As a result, it does not 
need sequence number synchronization any more and decreases the network traffic and 
improve the authentication efficiency. Considering the mobility behavior of mobile 
users in practice, MO-AKA is a tailored AKA which improves the efficiency and 
liberates the HE/HLR from the burden of authentication vectors requests without 
loss of security. We decrease the authentication traffic not only in the HE/HLR part, 
but also in the overall network because authentication between a VLR and a mobile 
user is lightweight while the VLR is in the cache of the mobile user. 
We evaluate the performance of MO-AKA. Our analysis is based on the data from 
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a week-long trace [68]. A total of 4,156 users place 171,318 packet data calls from 
139 cell sites. We assume that each call requires authentication between mobile users 
and networks. We suppose the number of authentication vectors in UMTS AKA is 
5 and the length of the authentication vector is 640 bits [69]. We define that there 
are 5 VLRs/SGSNs in the cache of MO-AKA. Among the 5 VLRs/SGSNs, the first 
one is always the last visited VLR/SGSN and others are the most frequently visited 
VLRs/SGSNs (for example, at home and at the office). 
For simplicity, we also suppose that there is no synchronization needed of sequence 
numbers in UMTS AKA. All networks work normally without corruption. We sim-
ulate different AKA mechanisms and calculate the network traffic generated in this 
one week-long trace. We define the stationary traffic as the authentication traffic in-
volved by stationary users and the mobile traffic as the authentication traffic involved 
by mobile users. The total traffic is simply the sum of all users (including stationary 
and mobile users). Figure 5.5 compares total traffic, stationary traffic and mobile 
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FIGURE 5.5 TOTAL TRAFFIC, STATIONARY TRAFFIC AND MOBILE TRAFFIC 
From this figure, we can see that the total traffic in both UMTS AKA is much higher 
that in MO-AKA. This is determined by the fact that all authentication vectors 
are generated by the HE/HLR and transfered to VLRs, while this is not the case 
• 1 1 1 Stationary 1 1 Mobile 
1 
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in MO-AKA. In UMTS AKA, the HE/HLR is responsible to generate a batch of 
authentication vectors. While in MO-AKA, the HE/HLR generates only a temporary 
key for the VLR and the MS. And the following authentication will not require the 
authentication vectors any more before an explicit temporary key update required. 
Thus, it transfers a part of authentication task to the VLR. 
As for the stationary traffic, UMTS AKA generates much more than MO-AKA. This is 
because there is no involvement of the HE/HLR while a mobile user remains in a VLR. 
All the authentication will be processed with this security key and no authentication 
vectors needed. Further, the authentication message in this case is shorter than that 
in UMTS AKA. 
As for the mobile traffic, the traffic difference is not so obvious as in stationary case. 
For mobile users roaming frequently among different VLR/SGSNs, the authentication 
is performed through standard UMTS AKA. In this case, the generated authentication 
traffic will be the same as in UMTS AKA. MO-AKA is based on the mobility pattern 
of users, and would not improve the performance for mobile users. 
Nevertheless, MO-AKA generates slightly less traffic. This is because MO-AKA keeps 
a cache of VLRs and does not need to ask HE/HLR for authentication if the VLR 
can be found in the cache. 
We can also compare the traffic involved at the wireless link and at the HE/HLR in 
figure 5.6. We define the wireless link as the traffic involved between the MS and the 
VLR and the HE/HLR traffic as the necessary traffic generated by the HE/HLR in 
order to generate the authentication vectors. MO-AKA requires much less HE/HLR 
traffic than UMTS AKA as the HE/HLR does not have to generate the authentica-
tion vectors for all authentications. This illustrates well that the established trust 
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FIGURE 5.6 WIRELESS TRAFFIC AND HE/HLR TRAFFIC 
The proxy VLR in the cache can also help the network shorten the response time 
for authentication requests because the newly visited VLR does not need to run long 
distance protocol with the HE/HLR. Thus, it improves the network performance effi-
ciency. Further detailed analysis will require the knowledge of the network topology. 
Different topologies should be considered and analyzed in order to evaluate our ap-
proach. We do not discuss here since our focus in this chapter is the security aspect. 
5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we first analyzed the security weaknesses in UMTS AKA. Specifically, 
we showed the traffic bottleneck at HE/HLR in AKA as well as the drawbacks of 
sequence numbers. Then, based on the empirical results on mobile user behaviors, 
we find that mobile users have fairly regular routines in the daily life. The mobility 
pattern is the motivation of our proposed mobility-oriented AKA. 
The basic idea of MO-AKA is to treat stationary users and mobile users differently. 
To reach the goal, we introduce a trust relationship established between a VLR and 
a mobile user. This relationship can not only simplify the authentication procedure 
between two entities, but also act a proxy of the HE/HLR to help another VLR 
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to establish the trust relationship with the mobile user. A security analysis shows 
that MO-AKA provides enhanced user privacy and authentication security. Also, 
a cache of the most frequently visited VLRs is introduced in order to eliminate 
unnecessary frequent long distance run protocol with the HE/HLR. The benefit from 
these mechanisms is remarkable traffic decrease, particularly the traffic involved at 
the HE/HLR which is usually the bottleneck in UMTS AKA. 
Through security analysis and the performance comparison on a week-long trace in 
practice, we show that our approach is more efficient and secure. For future work, we 
may analysis other performance indicators, such as the network response time, given 
the topology of a practical mobile network. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A FINE-GRAINED PUZZLE AGAINST DOS ATTACKS 
6.1 Introduction 
The convergence of mobile communication and Internet brings Internet-like mobile 
services and specific services like mobile commerce directly to mobile users. The 
UMTS system architecture and protocols are designed to accommodate these services, 
while they expose the UMTS network to various Internet attacks as well. The Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack is one of these attacks. The UMTS public land mobile network 
(PLMN) can be easily congested and therefore paralyzed by bogus traffic from the 
Internet. These attacks happen not only in "pull" type services invoked by user 
equipments, but also in "push" type services invoked by the network node. 
In addition, the increasingly powerful mobile devices can coordinate to launch typical 
DoS attacks, taking advantage of limited resources in the network, such as the radio 
link bandwidth. These devices include Palm OS [81], Symbian OS [82] and Smart-
phone OS [83]. With open APIs and powerful services, these devices can access 
Internet and wireless mobile networks like UMTS, and potentially launch DoS attacks. 
The function of a DoS attack is fundamentally to flood its target servers with numer-
ous connect requests to prevent them from being accessible to any other legitimate 
users' requests or providing services. Consequently, the target servers become too 
overburdened to respond to requests from its attackers. As a result, it has insufficient 
system resources to respond to legitimate requests on the network. The CSI/FBI 
2004 Computer Crime and Security Survey found that other than viruses, DoS at-
tacks caused more financial losses than any other cyber-security breach. 
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In UMTS networks, the danger of DoS attacks is threatening different targets [1]: 
the communication infrastructure, specific services and the mobile devices. Given 
the high risk of DoS attacks for UMTS networks, it is vital to provide a systematic 
countermeasure to thwart these attacks. In addition, the system needs a mechanism 
to control the access of legitimate users according to current resource consummation. 
There are a number of defenses against DoS attacks in literature. Meadows [84] 
proposed a formal framework based on an observation that any point during a protocol 
execution where a responder may accept a bogus message as genuine could be used 
to launch a DoS attack. The framework defines cost functions which assign costs of 
engaging in individual actions. Then, it compares the cost to defender against the 
cost to attacker. A protocol is called DoS resistant if the former is less than the latter. 
Another defense to prevent DoS attacks is client puzzle technique [16,18, 20, 85]. 
Client puzzles have been used to provide service guarantees to legitimate clients. For 
each service request, the client is forced to solve a cryptographic puzzle before the 
server commits its resources. The computational efforts for each request is very small. 
However, this imposes a large computational task on adversaries generating traffic in 
large quantities. The main idea behind client puzzles is that any client requesting 
service must allocate some of its own resources (processing time or memory) before the 
server commits its resources for the connection. The client must consume resources 
to solve the puzzle, while the puzzles are usually verified easily by the servers. 
These client puzzles, however, are usually designed for wired network environment. 
Most of them are not small enough to accommodate wireless access networks. In 
addition, the difficulties of these puzzles are not easily to be adjusted finely, which 
results in a gap between two neighbor difficulty levels. 
In this chapter, we propose a quasi partial collision concept and design a new client 
puzzle based on it. Our puzzle is very small; the difficulties can be fine-grained 
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controlled. In Section II, a discussion of related work is given. Then, we propose our 
quasi partial collision technique in Section III. We analyze it and design the client 
puzzle in Section IV. A comparison and performance results are shown in Section V. 
At last, we conclude this chapter. 
6.2 Related Work 
Aura [15] proposed that a good puzzle should have certain properties. For conve-
nience, we list these properties plus two more properties specially for mobile networks. 
1. Creating a puzzle and verifying the solution are not expensive for the server; 
2. The cost of solving the puzzle is easy to adjust from zero to impossible; 
3. The puzzle can be solved on most types of client hardware; 
4. It is not possible to precompute solutions to the puzzles; 
5. While the client is solving the puzzle, the server does not need to store the 
solution or other client-specific data; 
6. The same puzzle may be given to several clients; Knowing the solution of one 
or more clients does not help a new client in solving the puzzle; 
7. A client can reuse a puzzle by creating several instances of it; 
8. The difficulty of a puzzle can be fine-grained controlled by the server; 
9. The puzzle should be small and compact in order to avoid too much increase in 
traffic. 
Compared to the second property, the eighth property is added in order to emphasize 
that the server can adjust finely the difficulties of puzzles instead of bringing a gap 
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while increasing or decreasing a difficulty level. This is particularly useful for access 
control. The last property is required in mobile networks where radio bandwidth is 
limited compared in wired networks. 
There are several puzzles mechanisms. Time-lock puzzles require a client to spend 
a particular amount of computation time performing repeated squaring [19] before 
communication. These puzzles require the calculation of two large prime numbers in 
the server side. It consumes significantly the system resources. Thus, these puzzles 
cannot be generated efficiently on the order of microseconds. 
Another puzzle mechanism is to force clients to reverse one-way hashes calculated at 
the server given the original random input with n bits erased [17]. These puzzles are 
small and compact, and the puzzle generation time is significantly smaller than time-
lock puzzles. In order to vary the difficulty level, n is either increased or decreased. 
The client performs a brute-force search on the erased bits by hashing each pattern 
in the space until it finds the answer. The big disadvantage of these puzzles is that 
the effort of solving a (k + 1) bits puzzle is twice as hard as that of a A; bit puzzle. 
In [17], another approach based on multiple hash-reversals is proposed to mitigate 
the difficulty. However, this brings more traffic workload and is not efficient in UMTS 
environments. Feng et al. [16] proposed an improved version through a hint of the 
solution. The server sends the puzzle along with a hint of the answer that gives the 
client an idea of where the answer lies. The hint is a single value. By adjusting the 
hint, the difficulty of a client puzzle can be probabilistically controlled in a range. 
However, in this approach, the server should run the hash function to get a hint 
before sending it to the client. When the client sends back the solution, the server 
have to run the hash function again or compare the solution with the one stored in 
database. This needs more system resource consumption. 
Aura et al. [15] showed a technique based on partial collision in a hash function. A 
good hash function (like SHAl, MD5) requires that no two distinct strings whose 
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hash values are same. A partial collision is that two hashed values have partially 
identical strings. In this puzzle protocol (Figure 6.1), the server generates nonce N$ 





FIGURE 6.1 PUZZLES BASED ON PARTIAL COLLISIONS 
The client generates his own nonce Nc- The necessity of iVc is to prevent an attacker 
to solve the solution based 'on Ns and send to the server before the client does. 
The client spends its time to find a required partial collision and from the following 
equation and sends the solution (C, Ns, Nc, X) to the server. 
k bits O's 










a hash function (MD5 or SHAl) 
the client identity 
the server's nonce 
the client's nonce 
the solution of the puzzle 
the difficulty level of the puzzle 
the k first bits, must all be 0 
other bits, garbage data 
In this equation, the client should find a string whose hashed value has partial collision 
(k bits) with given hashed values. In Aura's approach, the hashed value of the solved 
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puzzle must be k-bit (the most significant bits) partially collided with all O's string. 
The difficulty level is determined by k, the number of collision bits. If k = 0, no work 
is required. If k = 128 (for MD5) or k = 160 (for SHAl), the client must reverse the 
entire one-way hash function, which is computationally impossible. 
However, Aura's approach has a drawback: the effort of solving a (k + l)-bit puzzle is 
twice as hard as that of solving a fc-bit puzzle. This does not meet the eighth puzzle 
property. Table 6.1 shows some examples tested by a Java application in Windows 
Desktop with Intel CPU 350MHz. 





































From Figure 6.2, the time needed to find partial collisions grows exponentially while 
the number of bits increases. 
Thus, there is a big gap between the two nearest difficulties. We need a method to 
finely control the difficulties quite smoothly in order to have a better performance. 
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FIGURE 6.2 AVERAGE TIME NEEDED TO FIND PARTIAL COLLISIONS 
6.3 Quasi Partial Collision 
We reconsider the idea of partial collision puzzles. Given a k-bit puzzle, the client is 
required to find a solution whose hash value cares only the first k-bit values and does 
not care the (k + l)-bit (xi) value and other bits values. 
In the (k + l)-bit puzzle, the x\ should be considered and its value must also be zero 
while it can be 0 or 1 as in the k-b\t puzzle. Thus, more work should be done to find 
a new solution whose hash value has the most significant (k + 1) zero bits. 
k bits O's 
- * • 
h(C, Ns, Nc, X) = 000 • • • 00 0 x2x3 
other bits 
Thus, the need of one extra bit zero is a strong condition. We ought to make a weak 
condition in order to compensate the whole requirement. Since this is only one bit, 
we cannot make use of it too much. We might ask its neighbor bits for help. 
Our proposed puzzle protocol is shown in Figure 6.3. While applying this protocol 
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to UMTS environment, the server can be service providers or operators who are the 





FIGURE 6.3 PUZZLES BASED ON QUASI PARTIAL COLLISIONS 
This is similar to Aura's approach except that the server also decides a quasi value 
Q. The quasi value is used to control the quasi partial collisions. We will explain 
value later. These three values together form the puzzle that is sent to the client. 
To solve the puzzle, the client also generates a random nonce Nc. Now, we modify a 
little the equation, for example, by considering the last 4 bits Q1Q2Q3Q4 in the first 
A>bits as the following. 
(fc ~ 4) ° ' s other bits 
h(C, Ns,Nc,X) = 600^0frQiQ2<93<34 £i^~~^ 
4 quasi bits 
This equation is similar to Aura's equation. In this example, however, we have an 
extra requirement. If we isolate the 4 bits Q1Q2Q3Q4, its decimal value must be less 
than Q. 
Q1Q2Q3Q4 < Q 
Here, we also use k to control the difficulty level. Since there is a big gap between 
(k — l)-bit partial collision puzzle and k-bit partial collision puzzle, we allow the last 
four bits, Q1Q2Q3Q4, °f the first k bits to take several acceptable values instead of 
only 0000 in a normal fc-bit partial collision puzzle. And we still treat the whole k bits 
as collision. Thus, we call this quasi partial collision (Figure 6.4). In other words, we 
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require a weak k-bit partial collision. 
,,. . quasi 
collision ' . . 
collision 
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FIGURE 6.4 k BITS QUASI COLLISION 
For a good hash function, we assume that the hash values of a set of random input 
messages distribute randomly. There are 16 combinations for these four bits from 0000 
to 1111. We define a set A with Q elements chosen from these 16 combinations. Based 
on this assumption, the probability of a hash value whose Q1Q2Q3Q4 is in the set A is 
dependant only on Q and independent on the elements in A. Hence, for efficiency and 
simplicity, we choose the smallest Q strings and require that Q1Q2Q3Q4 < Q- The 
value of Q is called quasi value. The quasi value Q from the server controls the number 
of choices. We can change the decimal value of the four quasi bits between 0 and 
15. If Q = 1, then this equation becomes a normal k-bit partial collision puzzles. If 
Q = 16, then it is a (k — 4)-bit partial collision puzzle. Any other values will generate 
a puzzle between fc-bit and (k — 4)-bit puzzles. In this way, we add several difficulty 
levels into the big gap. The selection of Q is practical, so we need experiences to 
determine proper values. 
In short, quasi partial collision puzzles ask the client to give solutions whose hash 
values are not strictly collided but in an allowable value range. Thus, we decrease the 
difficulty. 
6.4 Fine-grained Control over Difficulties 
Our goal is to design a client puzzle which meets the nine required properties. It 
is required that the difficulty of a puzzle could be fine-grained controlled. We just 
discussed an example of quasi partial collision. Now, let's step back and think this 
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problem again. 
The difficulty grows exponentially while the number of bits needed for partial collision 
increases. In fact, the last bit (as each other bit) in (k + l)-bit partial collision is 
forced to be 0. This constraint makes its difficulty twice as hard as A;-bit partial 
collision because in the latter case the (k + 1) bit can be 0 or 1. Hence, if we denote 
Dk the difficulty of k-bit partial collision, then we have 
Dk = 2 * D{k_1} = 2
2 * £>(fc_2) = 2
3 * .D(fc_3) = • • • (6.1) 
We look at this problem from a different view. If we allow the last bit of (k + l)-bit 
partial collision to have two choices (0 and 1), then this problem becomes A;-bit partial 
collision. In other words, if we allow two (k + l)-bit strings acceptable as solutions of 
(k + l)-bit partial collision puzzles, the difficulty of the puzzles decreases to be half. 
Thus, if we can find a way to give more acceptable strings, then we can have finer 
scale of difficulties. 
Let us look at again the example in the previous section. There are 16 choices for 4 
bits. If we fix only one choice for these bits whatever it is 0000 or 1010 or some other 
combinations, the difficulty level is Dk. If we allow two choices for these 4 bits, then 
it is equivalent to (k — l)-bit partial collision since it is essentially same as we ignore 
the last bit value. We denote the new difficulty as Dki2 (2 means two acceptable 
strings, or quasi value), and we have Dkj2 = Ac/2. Similarly, we have Dk,8 = Dk/3, 
Dk,i6 = Dk/4. Now, we ignore the number of quasi bits and only care the number of 
acceptable strings (in fact, we can work in a reversal way, from the latter to get the 
former). Suppose we allow Q acceptable strings in k-bit partial collision puzzles, the 
client must first decide how many last bits (in the k first bits) needed, for example, 
3 bits needed for Q = 6, 4 bits needed for Q = 10. These bits are quasi bits. Then, 
the client should find a solution that the decimal value of quasi bits in the hashed 
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value is not larger than Q. The following is the final version of the equation in our 
approach. 
(k ~ m) ° ' s other bits 
h{C, NS) k, Q, Nc, X) = ^ 0 0 ^ ~ 0 5 Q I Q 2 • • • Qm %7^~^ 
m quasi bits 
If we denote the difficulty for a k bit puzzle with Q quasi value as DkjQ, then we have 
the following equation, 
Dk,Q = Dk/Q (6.2) 
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Dk/3 < £>(fc_D 
Dk,8 < Dkj < • • 
Dk}l6 < -Dfc,15 <
 -
• < Ac,4 = D(k-2) 
• • < Ac,8 = -D(fc-3) 
In fact, the normal partial collision is a special case of quasi partial collision with 
the quasi value Q = 1. By introducing the quasi value, we add new difficulty levels 
between two neighbor levels like D(k-3)
 a n d D(k-2)
 m Aura's approach. The gap 
between these two levels becomes much smaller than before. Thus, we have a fine-
grained scale of puzzle difficulties. 
Based on the above analysis, we notice that the additional difficulty levels introduced 
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by quasi partial collisions become closer and denser while the quasi value increases. 
This give us a guide on how to choose k and Q in practice. For example, if we want to 
add about 6 difficulty levels between k = 20 and k = 21 in normal partial collisions, 
we choose k' — 23 (because (22) = 4 < 6 < 8 = (23)) and set Q from 4 to 8. Thus, 
we obtain 
£>20 — -^23,8 < -^23,7 < • • • < ^23,4 = D2\ 
For general cases, this is the rule to choose k' and Q. First, we strengthen the difficulty 
by requiring several more bits collisions; then, we weaken the difficulty by allowing 
appropriate quasi values. The more additional levels we need, the larger are the k' 
and the Q. 
6.5 Comparison and Performance Discussion 
We analyze our approach by comparing the properties defined in Section II. First, 
the puzzle can be verified quickly (a hash function) by the server. Second, we can 
adjust the difficulty level k according to current system performance. Moreover, 
our approach provides a fine-grained control over difficulties. This meets the eighth 
property. 
As indicated in [15], client puzzle works only in an authentication protocol to defend 
DoS attacks. The server sends a puzzle to the client before it allocats its resource. 
For flooding attacks, the clients or attackers will not try to resolve the puzzle. Thus, 
client puzzle will not be able to defend the flooding attacks in this case. 
In an authentication protocol, when the client is solving the puzzle, the server does 
not have to store the solution. The server needs only to check the nonces and justify 
if it is a new puzzle. Hence, the system resource consumption is limited. 
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Compared to the hint-based hash-reversal puzzles [16], the amount of time to solve a 
quasi partial collision puzzle is deterministic, not probabilistic as in the hint approach. 
In addition, in the hint approach, to generate a puzzle with 0(D) difficulty, the server 
should generate a hint which needs to be uniformly distributed in (0, 2D) difficulty 
range. In our approach, it is much easier since the server needs only to send a quasi 
value Q. 
Compared to the multiple hash-reversal puzzles, our puzzles are smaller in the size. 
It meets the last property. It is practical and efficient in UMTS systems. Moreover, 
it is easy to control the difficulties instead of combining different sizes of puzzles into 
a new puzzle. 
Since the quasi partial collision is similar to partial collision, our puzzles meet other 
properties as Aura's approach. 
We simulate the time needed to find quasi partial collisions for k = 21, 22,24, 25 and 
the quasi value ranging from 1 to 11 (Figure 6.5). In order to verify whether we 
reach the goal for fine-grained controlling over difficulties, we compare the number of 
difficulty levels in both partial collisions and quasi partial collisions. For simplicity 
and clarity, we consider only the difficulty levels from 0 and 100 seconds (Figure 6.6). 
In this figure, the first column represents the difficulty levels in partial collision while 
others represent the difficulty levels in quasi partial collisions with different k bits. 
Each quasi partial collision introduces new levels in different ranges. Compared to 
the difficulty level distribution in the partial collision, all the new levels provide much 
finer granularity. For example, in the partial collision, there is only one level in the 
range 20-30 seconds; in the quasi collisions, there are about 8 levels. Note that we 
can choose more k and q values to obtain more levels. 
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FIGURE 6.6 PUZZLE DIFFICULTY LEVELS COMPARISON 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we show that UMTS is vulnerable to DoS attacks while it brings 
Internet-like services to mobile users. We described a client puzzle approach based 
on quasi partial collisions to defend these attacks. Actually, this mechanism can also 
be applied in other networks which are vulnerable of DoS attacks. 
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Currently, most types of client puzzles have a common drawback: solving a higher 
difficulty level puzzle is about twice as hard as the effort to solve the current one. 
By introducing quasi partial collisions, we add more difficulty levels between the gap. 
This is realized by adjusting the quasi value. The quasi value allows that some last bits 
of the partial collision do not have to be 0 as required in the normal partial collision 
approach. Instead, they can have some choices and we still treat them as collisions. 
Thus, we have fine-grained control over difficulty puzzles. This is particularly useful 
for access control. We analyzed and examined our approach. In practice, the k and Q 
should be carefully chosen based on the client computational power and the current 




In the first chapter, we discussed that mobile devices are generally characterized by 
the limited memory capacity and limited computational power in mobile networks. 
Also, due to the mobility, the mobile user and the service provider should be mutually 
authenticated while the user roaming to a foreign domain. Moreover, the wireless 
communication medium is more difficult to be protected against active attacks and 
eavesdropping. An adversary can easily intercept the messages sent through the 
radio link. These constraints have prevented a simple migration of cryptographic 
protocols that have been widely adopted in wire-line networks to wireless networks 
for authentication and security. Based on these constraints, we proposed our research 
objectives. 
In this chapter, we discuss our designed mechanisms with these constraints. First, we 
analyze the lightweight techniques used for mobile devices. Second, we analyze our 
mechanisms and claim that they can prevent replay attacks and provide confiden-
tiality, integrity and user privacy. Then, we discuss the performance of our designed 
mechanisms and compare to related works. Finally, we investigate the conformity of 
our contribution to the proposed research objectives. 
7.1 Lightweight to Mobile Devices 
Due to limited computational complexity of mobile devices, lightweight techniques 
such as hash function and hash function chain are adopted in our designed mecha-
nisms. Hash function is much faster than public key cryptography operations. In the 
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proposed ticket-based service access mechanism, we apply a hash chain into the ticket 
instead of Diffie-Hellman key agreement as in other related work. In the proposed 
client puzzle against DoS attacks in UMTS, a hash function is also used to build a 
client puzzle. 
However, the application of hash function in these two mechanisms are quite different. 
In the first mechanism, the hash function is used for non-repudiation and authenti-
cation. This is guaranteed due to the one-way property of a hash function. In the 
second mechanism, the hash function is used for finding partial collisions. 
Other lightweight techniques can also be found in UMTS AKA enhancements. In both 
VC-AKA and MO-AKA, only symmetric key cryptographic operations, key genera-
tion functions (i.e., f2x(x), /5K(X)) and MAC functions are used as bricks in the 
protocol. These operations are generally much faster than public key cryptographic 
operations. 
7.2 Against Replay Attacks 
As an adversary can easily intercept a message sent during the protocol runs, replay 
attacks are one of the concerns in security protocol design. In ticket-based service 
access mechanism, we adopt a hash chain in order to prevent replay attacks. Both 
the mobile user and the service provider maintain a shared hash chain. For each time 
of service request, the mobile user takes off the next available hash node from the 
hash chain and presents to the service provider. The latter validates the request by 
verifying the correctness of the hash node with its current hash chain. After successful 
authentication, both them update the hash chain. Even if an adversary intercepts 
the message, it cannot replay it as a valid request since the service provider will not 
accept it. 
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In VC-AKA, both the VLR/SGSN and the MS keep updating the authentication 
arrays for every time authentication request. Once some challenges in the arrays 
have been used for current authentication request, they will be updated immediately 
if the authentication finishes successfully. An adversary cannot rebuild a valid request 
based on the challenges intercepted during previous authentication requests. In MO-
AKA, a newly generated TMSI and a nonce are sent by the MS in order to prevent 
replay attacks. 
7.3 Confidentiality, Integrity and User Privacy 
Another concern in mobile networks is the data confidentiality while the messages 
transferring through wireless link. In ticket-based service access mechanism, all the 
messages are encrypted either by the ticket server and the service provider's public 
key, or by the mobile user's long term secret key and the fresh session key. Thus, an 
eavesdropper can learn nothing from the protocol runs. In VC-AKA, the eavesdrop-
per can get the random numbers in cleartext. However, he cannot do anything due to 
the integrity guaranteed by the MAC. During the authentication in the second pro-
cedure, the eavesdropper can only get the encrypted combinations and corresponding 
challenges. Nothing more information can be obtained based on these values. Simi-
larly in MO-AKA, all messages are encrypted by the shared secret key between the 
VLR/SGSN and the mobile user. 
User privacy is also a critical issue in mobile communications. As we introduced 
previously, one of the advantages of tickets is the user privacy. A ticket does not 
include user personal information while the user requests a service. Wherever the 
user roams, he will not leak his personal information to the service provider. While in 
VC-AKA and MO-AKA, they are based on UMTS AKA which protects user privacy. 
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7.4 Performance Discussion 
7.4.1 Ticket-based Service Access 
When a mobile user needs to acquire a ticket through a VASP, it is mandatory that the 
ticket server be accessible. This is similar to Kerberos [21] in which the server should 
always remain on-line. However, the situation of our proposal is less serious because 
this protocol would not happen frequently. It can be mitigated by using multiple 
ticket servers. It seems that the system executes cross domain authentication and 
loses the benefit of a ticket. However, since the ticket described in this paper is 
reusable, one time cross domain authentication is worth future reused local domain 
authentication. 
The authentication chain allows a ticket to be reused N x T times. Nevertheless, 
ticket reuse does not mean a duplicate ticket is acceptable because it would fail in 
authentication without a correct hash node. In order to use this chain correctly, both 
the user and the VASP have to synchronize its current position in the chain. If the 
synchronization fails (e.g., the user loses the position information), it is difficult for 
them to resynchronize. Consequently, the ticket should be abandoned. As for the 
payment chain, if it is not well designed, it can run out before the service terminates. 
Experiments are helpful to determine the length of the chain and the value function. 
Since the ticket server is so critical for secure service access, it may experience denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks. Meadows [84] shows that any point during a protocol exe-
cution where a responder may accept a bogus message as genuine could be used to 
launch a DoS attack. The client puzzle technique [16,18, 20,85-87] is widely used 
against DoS attacks and to provide service guarantees to legitimate clients. For each 
service request, the client is forced to solve a cryptographic puzzle before the server 
commits its resources. The computational complexity for each request is very small. 
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However, this imposes a large computational task on attackers generating a large 
quantity of traffic and slows down the requests significantly. Since mobile devices are 
usually low in the power, an efficient and finely-controlled DoS mechanism should be 
employed. The proposed client puzzle in Chapter 6 can be used for this purpose. 
7.4.2 Enhancements of UMTS AKA 
The proposed VC-AKA has two main advantages. First, there is no need for syn-
chronization of sequence numbers between the MS and the HE/HLR. Second, the 
HE/HLR is no longer the bottleneck of authentication traffic generation. 
In VC-AKA, there are three runs of message exchange for the first procedure. It 
seems that VC-AKA is not so efficient as UMTS AKA (two runs only). This can 
be explained from two aspects. First, the purpose of the first run in VC-AKA is to 
establish the knowledge that both the MS and the VLR/SGSN know each other as its 
designated principal. Also, both of them contribute its nonce for future use. Thus, 
security is enhanced. Second, one of the purposes of the first procedure is to establish 
two different authentication vector arrays (size n) for the MS and the VLR/SGSN. 
These arrays can be used for future authentication up to 2n~1 times. Hence, one extra 
run is worth the efficiency of entire AKA. 
7.4.3 Client Puzzles Against DoS Attacks 
The proposed client puzzle against DoS attacks in UMTS can also be applied in 
other mobile networks, such as UMTS, even Internet. The hash function can also be 
replaced by others such as MD5 and SHA1. An encryption function is also possible 
to replace the hash function. 
In every environment, the quasi value and the difficulty level need to chosen based 
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on experiments. Also, the fine-grained difficulty control is based on an assumption: 
the hash values of a set of random input messages distribute randomly. In practice, 
however, this assumption may not be always true. Consequently, solving some puzzles 
can take longer or shorter time than expected. This requires also the necessity of 
experiments. 
7.5 The Relations of Mechanisms in Networks 
In mobile communications, the mobile user communicates with the server via wireless 
link. Wireless link brings a whole new meaning to design network security mecha-
nisms. There is an ongoing debate on this issue: Which layer should we protect? 
Link layer, network layer or even higher layer (transport or application layer)? Here, 
we discuss our mechanisms with network layers. 
Link layer security protects a wireless network by denying access to the network 
itself before a user is successfully authenticated. This prevents attacks against the 
network infrastructure and protects the network from attacks that rely on having IP 
connectivity in network layer. However, link layer security protocols do not provide 
end-to-end security. On the other hand, network layer or transport layer can provide 
more suitable security solution in wired portion of the networks. Thus, it is generally 
accepted that link layer security can be complemented through the use of security 
mechanisms at higher protocol layers. Link layer security protocols may be used to 
provide network access domain security, including user authentication to the serving 
network. High layer security protocols can provide end-to-end security. 
The designed mechanisms are particularly applicable to next-generation mobile net-
works where a number of mobile systems coexist in a large-scale manner. To put them 
into the network model, the enhancements of UMTS AKA authenticate mobile users 
at the link layer while the ticket-based service access is responsible to provide the 
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service in network layer, transport layer or even in application layer. As a result, the 
service provision will be as follows. The mobile user first needs to get authenticated to 
the mobile networks through the UMTS link layer authentication mechanisms; then, 
he can further send a service provision request to his local service provider through the 
ticket-based service access mechanism. This would involve large-scale authentication. 
The mechanism can provide flexibility and scalability in this scenario. 
Without a doubt, the service providers and UMTS home networks could be the 
potential targets of DoS attacks during the service provision. The designed client 
puzzles can be launched to defend against these attacks if the system finds it necessary. 
In short, our designed mechanisms provide suitable authentication solutions for next-
generation mobile network not only from the link layer but also from the network layer 
or even high layer. We also give a fine-grained solution for potential DoS attacks. 
7.6 Contribution Integration into UMTS networks 
In this thesis, we proposed four contributions, each of which focuses on different as-
pects of the network. Considering the next-generation mobile networks, for example, 
UMTS networks, these contributions can be integrated into UMTS and improve the 
overall performence of the network. 
Mobile service access through ticket is an upper layer mechanism. We need to desig-
nate a CA to be trusted by all service providers like Bell mobility, Verizon wireless, 
etc. We also need to establish a ticket server which is able to responde mobile user's 
requests to issue tickets. This ticket server should be trusted by the mobile users and 
all service providers. Thus, a user can obtain the ticket and use the ticket for service 
request. In this scenario, the user does not need to sign a contract with each service 
provider in order to get the service. 
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UMTS AKA improvements can be used for data link layer improvement. VC-AKA 
is specially useful for multiple service providers. However, the mobile user needs to 
maintain its authentication vectors with different service provider. This is the extra 
cost compared to the standard UMTS AKA. If there is only one carrier in a country, 
MO-AKA can be used to improve the overall performance. 
7.7 Conformity of the Contribution to the Research Objectives 
In this section, we compare our designed mechanisms to the research objectives pro-
posed in the beginning of this thesis. 
The first specific research objective is to propose an authentication mechanism for 
mobile value-added service access which takes into account the constraints in mobile 
networks and shifts high computational efforts from limited power mobile devices to 
powerful servers. In our work, the designed ticket-based mobile service access re-
alizes mutual authentication between the mobile devices and the service provider. 
It requires mobile devices only lightweight operations: hash function and symmet-
ric cryptographic operations. Expensive computational operations such as public 
cryptographic operations are only employed in the powerful ticket server and service 
providers. Considering the constraints in mobile networks, this mechanism can pre-
vent replay attacks and provide confidentiality, integrity and user privacy. As the 
proposed ticket is reusable and the payment is based on a staircase incremental value 
hash chain, it is more efficient than other related mobile service access mechanisms. 
Thus, the designed mechanism realized the proposed specific research objective. 
The second specific research objective is to propose enhancements of UMTS authenti-
cation and key agreement mechanism. We proposed two enhancements in this thesis. 
The original UMTS AKA was designed specifically for mobile networks with the con-
sideration of the constraints. Our enhancements are based on the original UMTS 
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AKA without introducing extra expensive operations. Both enhancements improve 
the efficiency by liberating the HE/HLR from the authentication traffic. To reach 
this goal, one enhancement (VC-AKA) is based on vector combination while the 
other (MO-AKA) is based on user mobility pattern. In VC-AKA, a set of authen-
tication vectors can be reused securely many times, thus it reduces authentication 
vector traffic needed from the HE/HLR. In MO-AKA, the home VLR can help the 
HE/HLR authenticate the mobile user. In addition, both provides enhanced secu-
rity compared to the original UMTS AKA. Thus, we realized the proposed specific 
research objective. 
The third specific research objective is to design a client puzzle mechanism against 
DoS attacks in UMTS. The designed client puzzle is based on a lightweight hash 
function. The client need to find a solution to meet the quasi partial collision require-
ments. The difficulty level can be tuned easily in order to provide fine-grained control 
compared to related works on client puzzles. It is compact and suitable to mobile de-
vices. Considering the characteristics of UMTS PLMN networks, the designed client 
puzzle is appropriate to difficulty control and effective to defend DoS attacks. Thus, 
this mechanism also realized the proposed research objective. 
The last specific research objective is to validate and evaluate the performance of 
the proposed mechanisms in order to check their efficiency and robustness. In this 
chapter, we have already given an analysis of all our designed mechanisms from the 
aspects of techniques, attacks, security and performance (see Section 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 
7.4). Through the analysis, we can see that our designed mechanisms are efficient, 
secure and robust. 
The main research objective is to design a set of lightweight and efficient security 
mechanisms dedicated to next generation mobile networks. As we discussed above, 
all our designed mechanisms use only lightweight techniques on mobile devices. The 
performance discussion also proved that they were efficient and could provide strong 
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security compared to related works. All these mechanisms are dedicated to next-
generation mobile networks. As we realized all the specific research objectives, we 
realized naturally the main research objective of this entire thesis: design a set of 





This thesis first gave an introduction on next-generation mobile networks and pointed 
out the necessity of design appropriate security mechanisms in Chapter 1. It also 
declared that designed mechanisms should accommodate the constraints particular 
in mobile networks. Open problems and research challenges were also discussed in 
this chapter. We are particularly interested in three issues: mobile service access, 
improving UMTS AKA and against DoS attacks in UMTS. For each issue, a novel 
mechanism is designed while accommodating constraints in mobile networks. 
8.1 Summary of Contributions 
This thesis has four main contributions to the state of art in research in next-
generation mobile networks: 
1. A novel ticket-based mobile service access mechanism; 
2. An Enhancement of UMTS AKA through vector combination; 
3. Mobility-Oriented AKA in UMTS; 
4. A client puzzle against DoS attacks in UMTS. 
The mobile service access through reusable tickets is lightweight for the mobile de-
vice and mutually authenticable for both the mobile device and the service provider. 
Hence, this mechanism satisfies the constraints and is appropriate to mobile networks. 
The two enhancements of UMTS AKA are based on the original version of UMTS 
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AKA which is designed specifically for mobile networks. The two enhancements im-
proved the efficiency from the traffic point of view based on vector combination and 
mobility pattern. There is no expensive computation introduced in both mechanisms, 
thus they satisfy also the constraints and are appropriate to UMTS. As for the de-
signed client puzzle, it is based on quasi partial collisions in a hash function. It is 
compact, concise and fine-grained, so it is also appropriate to mobile networks. 
Therefore, our contributions realized the objectives defined in Chapter 1. Here, we 
summarize each contribution as follows. 
8.1.1 Ticket-based Mobile Service Access 
In current literature, all the proposed mobile service access mechanisms have some 
common disadvantages. First, the mobile user has to run expensive public key cryp-
tographic operations such as Difne-Hellmann and RSA. Second, every ticket can only 
be used for only once for service access. Consequently, a user has to acquire the quan-
tity of tickets as many as the times of service requests. Some mechanisms considered 
the payment and billing issue. However, the micro-payment re-initialization issue was 
also expensive. 
In this thesis, our contribution is a lightweight secure and accountable access to mobile 
services through reusable tickets. There are several advantages in our mechanism 
compared to related work. First, the ticket is reusable. This is realized through a 
hash chain with the ticket and maintained between the mobile user and the service 
provider. Thus, a ticket can be used many times for authentication until the hash 
chain runs out. The hash chain can also prevent replay attacks. All other mechanisms 
do not allow a ticket to be reused in order to prevent replay attacks. 
Second, our mechanism is lightweight for mobile devices (only hash function and 
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symmetric encryption/decryption operations required). While in other mechanisms, 
public key cryptography is used at mobile devices in order to provide non-repudiation 
property; the mobile devices have to run expensive public key operations. 
Third, the charging and billing is carefully designed through a staircase increment 
value function. It is practical and might avoid payment chain reinitialization. In 
some mechanisms, this issue remains untouched; in other mechanisms, payment chain 
reinitialization involves public key cryptography and is not suitable to mobile devices. 
8.1.2 Enhancements of UMTS AKA 
The current UMTS AKA has been criticized for its adoption of a sequence number 
between the mobile station and the HE/HLR. Consequently, it is vulnerable to redi-
rection attacks and active attacks in corrupted networks. In addition, the HE/HLR 
becomes the bottleneck of the authentication vector generation. 
In this thesis, we have two contributions to improve the UMTS AKA. The first con-
tribution is called VC-AKA which is based on vector combination. It has two major 
advantages compared to UMTS AKA. First, it abandons completely the synchroniza-
tion of sequence numbers which has been widely criticized in literature. Second, it 
liberates the HE/HLR from the traffic bottleneck through vector combination. There 
exist also many works to improve UMTS AKA. However, all of them did not de-
crease the traffic from the HE/HLR fundamentally. Due to numerous subscribers 
registered at the HE/HLR, VC-AKA does really improve the efficiency of the en-
tire networks. Third, VC-AKA provides enhanced security and can defend efficiently 
malicious threats and attacks. 
The second contribution is to improve the UMTS AKA from the mobility point of 
view. It was based on one observation: a single mobile user usually has a fairly 
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regular routine and could have a home VLR in which occur his most activities. Such 
mobile users have a high proportion of all mobile users. As a result, the home VLR 
can establish a trust relationship with the user's home network and authenticate the 
mobile user directly. Thus, we also liberate the HE/HLR from the traffic bottleneck. 
8.1.3 Against DoS Attacks in UMTS 
Our last contribution in this thesis is the fine-grained difficulty puzzles to defend 
against DoS attacks. Currently, the client puzzles proposed in literature have a gap 
between two neighbor difficulty levels. We designed a fine-grained difficulty puzzle. 
The client puzzle is concise and suitable to mobile devices. Through tunning the 
quasi bits and the difficulty level, we can add more difficulty levels between the gap. 
As a result, the system resource can be utilized as much as possible to support all 
user-demanded services while reducing the chance of DoS attacks. 
8.2 Limitations 
We claimed that our proposed ticket-based mobile service access mechanism was 
more efficient and lightweight compared to related works. The techniques used are 
hash chains and symmetric cryptography. A CA is required to issue and manage 
public/private keys for the ticket server and each VASP. Also, it is responsible to 
generate the user's long term secret key. This may bring attacks to the CA. If ever an 
adversary obtains the secret information from the CA, the entire system may become 
vulnerable. From the management point of view, the CA needs to be completely 
trusted by other principals. This imposes an implicit constraint while deploying 
the system. In practice, sometimes it is difficult to maintain the trust relationship 
between principals. It brings more management tasks. Also, the issue and revoke of 
certificates involves a set of updates in the system's databases. A possible solution 
137 
could be merging the CA into the ticket server. Each user registers to the ticket server 
directly. In this case, the certificate issued to the user might become a certificate 
issued by the ticket server. Even, we can abandon the certificate since the ticket 
server and the user keep a long-term secret key. Thus, both the user and the ticket 
server are responsible to maintain the long-term secret keys. This might also make 
the ticket server a target of DoS attacks. In addition, the ticket acquisition and the 
service provision protocols need to redesigned. As for the payment and billing, the 
staircase incremental value function is actually related to the user's service behavior. 
It is not trivial to determine the staircase for each user. Experimental results would 
be helpful. 
In VC-AKA, although we eliminate the synchronization of sequence numbers between 
the MS and the HE/HLR, the MS and the VLR/SGSN need to maintain used com-
binations. The first procedure in VC-AKA needs to execute more tasks to establish 
the vectors in both the VLR/SGSN and the MS. Extra space is also required to 
store these vectors. If the MS roams from a VLR/SGSN to a new VLR/SGSN, the 
old VLR/SGSN should transfer authentication vectors and unused combinations to 
the new VLR/SGSN. Modification of VC-AKA is necessary to meet this scenario. 
As UMTS AKA, we assume that the channel between two VLR/SGSNs is secure. 
However, this assumption may not be appropriate for future heterogeneous networks. 
This also requires modification of the entire AKA. 
As for MO-AKA, the mobility pattern establishment is critical to the whole system 
performance. In practice, this requires long-term users data tracking and analysis. 
Also, it is not trivial to determine the home VLR of a user. It may exists a few 
possible home VLRSs. According to the MO-AKA, we currently assume only one 
home VLR for each user. In this case, the system can just pick one as the home VLR. 
Although most customers have possible home VLRs, others may have no one simply 
because they have no clear mobility pattern. In this case, just selecting a VLR as 
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the home VLR may not be a wise solution. The system can just ignore this case and 
treat it with traditional UMTS AKA. 
8.3 Future Work 
In the ticket-based mobile service access mechanism, we have just discussed the pos-
sibility to merge the CA into the ticket server. We will eliminate the certificate as 
well as the CA. The user obtains the long-term secret key from the ticket server. For 
every ticket request, the user presents a nonce encrypted with his long-term secret 
key as a challenge to the ticket server; the latter decrypts the nonce and return a 
response together with a newly generated ticket. We will still keep the hash chain as 
it is essential for non-repudiation purpose in our mechanisms. We will also do some 
experiments to obtain user's service behaviors in order to determine a reasonable 
staircase incremental value function. 
As for VC-AKA, we will consider the case that the channel between two VLRs are not 
secure. As VLRs are usually powerful enough to execute computationally expensive 
operations. We will adopt public key cryptography for each VLR in order to encrypt 
the channel. In this case, the VLR does not need to store the public keys of the users, 
it is enough to store only the certification and encryption key-pairs of the HLR and 
the VLR. Moreover, the IMSI and the public key of the user can be stored on the 
USIM in an encrypted form. This information is encrypted by the public encryption 
key of the HLR therefore only an authenticated VLR is able to learn the identity of 
the user. While in UMTS AKA, the IMSI is sent in the plain on the air interface thus 
an attacker can obtain the identity of the user by personalizing the VLR or simply by 
intercepting the message. Currently, there exists some approaches to enhance UMTS 
AKA with PKI. We will consult these approaches and propose a more complex version 
of enhanced AKA. 
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This issue also applies to MO-AKA. The implicit secure channel between the home 
VLR and the HLR, or different VLRs can be enhanced by public key cryptographic 
techniques. In addition, we care one more thing in MO-AKA, the user mobility 
pattern. To obtain the mobility pattern is not a trivial work. We will design a data 
model and a mobility profile for each user. In the data model, a location query is 
executed every intervals during a day or a week. The locations will be classified in 
order to build a rough location areas. These location areas, together with the VLR 
locations, will be the references to determine the possible home VLRs. We believe 
that mobility pattern will have high impact on the performance of MO-AKA. 
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